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Regulating International
Arbitrators: A Functional Approach
to Developing Standards of
Conduct
Catherine A. Rogers'
It has been suggested that "barbers and taxidermists are subject to far
greater regulation than [arbitrators]."' The irony of this apparent incongruence
is punctuated by some striking international cases.' Take for instance the Saudi
Arabian arbitrator who was unabashedly collaborating with his appointing
party, helping plan its case strategy and rehearse witness testimony.3 Or
consider the enforcement of an award notwithstanding the fact that an Indian
* Richard C. Cadwallader Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Long-Term Visiting Associate Professor of Law,
UniversitA Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan, Italy. For their helpful comments, suggestions,
support, and encouragement, I thank Ed Brunet, Guido Calabresi, Jules Coleman, Bill Dodge, John
Devlin, Monroe Freedman, Keith Hylton, Mary Kay Kane, Jason Kilbom, Michael Malinowski,
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ken Murchison, Michael Reisman, Ted Schneyer, John White, Michael Van
Alstine and Marco Ventoruzzo. This Article benefited from the generous research support of
Chancellor John Costonis and the LSU Law Center, and from the excellent research assistance of
students Bill Bordelon, Teri Ellision and Reyna Mejia, and research librarians Randall Thompson,
Kevin Gray and George Jacobsen. Special thanks are also due to Chris Drahozal for his uniquely
detailed and precise comments. This Article was presented at faculty workshops at Hofstra University
Law School and at UniversitA Bocconi, where it received helpful comments from Robin Charlow,
Mark Movsesian and Giorgio Sacerdoti. Finally, in presenting this Article at the 2004 Stanford-Yale
Junior Faculty Forum, I benefited greatly from the comments and questions of Jose Alvarez, Robert
Gordon, Harold Koh, and Alan Schwartz. Remaining errors are, of course, my own.
I Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1013 (2000).
2 What some might consider the "socially trivial" activity of cutting hair requires formal training
and government licensure. In California, for example, it is a criminal misdemeanor for unlicensed
persons to perform such services for money, and the California Board of Barbering and Cosmology
disciplines persons who violate the Act. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7301 et seq (1990).
Meanwhile, the venerable task of serving as an arbitrator can be performed by anyone, regardless of
qualifications or training, and there is no regulatory oversight body. Only in relatively unusual venues
such as Argentina is there even the minimal qualification that an arbitrator must be qualified as an
attorney. See Christina L. Whittinghill, The Role and Regulation of International Commercial
Arbitration in Argentina, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 795, 801 (2003) (noting that this unusual requirement
"remains a point of contention in the legislature"). I stress at the outset that the issue of arbitrator
misconduct is important because the consequences can be dire, both for individual parties and the
system, but by all accounts the overall incidence of arbitrator misconduct is quite low.
3 See Nicholas C. Ulmer, Doing Well by Doing Good, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE:
THE 1996 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 167, 171
n.8 (Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell ed., 1997).
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arbitrator withheld during the appointment process his numerous prior
representations of his nominating party. And ponder how an English court
could characterize as simply a "most unfortunate secretarial error" the failure
by a Canadian arbitrator to disclose his directorship in a company that bid on
the very contract in dispute.' None of these arbitrators were sanctioned,
removed, or even reprimanded. But what is ultimately problematic about these
cases is not that these arbitrators were subject to less exacting regulation than
their hair-cutting counterparts, but that no one agrees about how they should
have been regulated.6
Even as the need for clarity has increased, standards regarding
arbitrator conduct remain obscure.7 Courts routinely express confusion over
the vague and conflicting standards that purport to govern arbitrator
misconduct,8 and commentators cannot agree about how the mess should be
cleaned up.9 Meanwhile, some experts have been valiantly struggling to
4 Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 953-54 (S.D. Ohio 1981). One
of the more interesting, and apparently persuasive, arguments raised was that the Indian arbitrator's
prior representation of the party was not as an advocate for the party, but as an Indian Senior Advocate
(similar to a barrister in England). In that capacity, the arbitrator was insulated from his ultimate
client, having been retained by the party's advocate and not directly by the party. In this capacity, he
operated as an officer to the court who was expected to maintain independence from clients. For a
discussion of analogies between barristers and party-appointed arbitrators, see infra note 351 and
accompanying text.
5 AT&T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co., [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 22 (Q.B. 1999). Although the
arbitrator claimed that the omission had been an accident, that explanation is particularly troubling in
light of the fact that he had circulated another CV that included the relevant information at the same
time.
6 In the two of these three cases that made it to award enforcement, the standards for evaluating
the arbitrators' conduct was, and remains, subject to considerable controversy. In Fertilizer Corp. of
India, IDI submitted an expert affidavit swearing that it was permissible under Indian law to appoint a
former legal representative and not disclose the former representation, while Fertilizer Corp. submitted
an affidavit by another expert on Indian law which stated precisely the opposite. Fertilizer Corp. of
India, 517 F. Supp. at 954. The court itself conceded the confusion in acknowledging one party's
argument that "[e]ven today it is not clear whether an 'independent' arbitrator need be neutral." Id.
Likewise, the court's decision in AT&T is regarded as seminal for its attempt to bring some stability to
the otherwise murky precedents, but the decision has been vigorously critiqued as resting on faulty
ground. See Lawrence Shore, Disclosure and Impartiality: An Arbitrator's Responsibility vis-d-vis
Legal Standards, 57 DisP. RESOL. J. 32, 36 (2002) (describing as far beyond what was reasonable and
a troubling perspective the AT&T court's deference to the arbitrator's discretion simply because of his
experience and status as "a man of considerable distinction").
7 "The rights and obligations of arbitrators are called into question increasingly often, and while
national law remains highly elliptical on these issues, they have become a matter of some concern to
the courts and practitioners." FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 558 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage, eds., 1999); Shore, supra note 6, at 35 (noting
that U.S. and English standards "do not provide clear guidelines").
8 Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Tuco, Inc. 960 S.W.2d 629, 632-36 (Tex. 1997) (surveying the
various splits among both state and federal courts).
9 Compare James H. Carter, Rights & Obligations of the Arbitrator, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 56
(1997) (arguing that arbitrator obligations should be construed in light of "arbitrator's rights" and thus
not be too constrictive); M. Scott Donahey, The Independence and Neutrality ofArbitrators, 9 J. INT'L
ARB. 31 (1992) (proposing that party-appointed arbitrators adhere to a more "neutral" model that
better suits the needs of the parties); William O'Malley Forbes, Rules of Ethics for Arbitrators and
Their Application, 9 J. INT'L ARB. 5 (1992) (calling for heightened ethical standards); David Hacking,
Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility: A Response: What Happens if the Icelandic Arbitrator Falls Through the
Ice?, 15 J. INT'L ARB. 73, 78 (1998) (proposing a regular training process for international arbitrators
as necessary to ensure quality); Chiara Giovannucci Orlandi, Ethics for International Arbitrators, 67
UMKC L. REv. 93, 94 (1998) (noting the "large debate among scholars concerning the meaning of
[the] term" "impartiality"); Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 13, 17 (1997)
(warning against "over-emphasis on mechanical disclosure tests" that will "tend to exclude the honest
and do very little to combat truly pernicious machinations"); Shore, supra note 6, at 35; Huang
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promulgate new, clearer standards.' ° To date, however, courts are still baffled,
scholarly debate remains stalled, and the development of new standards is still
in experimental phases." The primary reason for this methodological mayhem,
I contend, is that there is no coherent conceptual theory to undergird new
standards or to make sense of the confusion generated by the old standards.'2
The purpose of this Article is to provide the necessary theoretical framework to
develop and justify standards of conduct.'3
I contend that the confusion over standards for arbitrator conduct is
rooted in the misleading judicial referent. 4  In the only, now-antiquated U.S.
Supreme Court decision addressing arbitrator impartiality,'5 the purported
majority opinion and the concurrence were deeply split over whether the
Yanming, The Ethics of Arbitrators in CIETAC Arbitration, 12 J. INT'L ARB. 5 (1995) (suggesting an
arbitrator's "self-discipline" and reputation are sufficient to safeguard the integrity of the process).
10 The two most prominent examples are the International Bar Association (IBA) and
the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Both organizations had existing ethical codes, but both
have spent considerable time revamping those codes. The AAA recognized that "the 1977 Code's
predominant focus on commercial arbitrators in domestic disputes within the United States was no
longer useful or realistic." John D. Feerick, The 1977 Code of Ethics for Arbitrators: An Outside
Perspective, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 907, 919 (2002) (quoting Introduction to CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Working Draft, 2001)).
Both the AAA and the IBA have recently completed their projects. See THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Mar. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1620 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005); IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ("IBA CONFLICT GUIDELINES") (May 22, 2004),
available at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/guidelines%20text.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2004).
11 For example, the new IBA CONFLICT GUIDELINES were formally approved in May 2004, but
in the introduction the drafters, led by Otto L.O. de Witt Wijnen, describe the guidelines "as a
beginning, rather than an end, of the process" of defining standards of conduct. Still their completion
represents a major accomplishment, particularly in light of admonitions from some detractors during
the process that their project should be abandoned. Email from Otto L.O. de Witt Wijnen to the
author (Feb. 13, 2003) (on file with author).
12 The category labeled "arbitrator misconduct" encompasses a range of behaviors, but the area
that causes the most consternation, and the one that I focus on in this Article, is arbitrator bias or
partiality. The U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root captured the concern well at the Second Hague
Conference when he stated, "[Tihe great obstacle to universal adoption of arbitration is not the
unwillingness of civilized nations to submit their disputes to the decision of an impartial tribunal, it is
rather the apprehension that the tribunal selected will not be impartial." Quoted in Edward Gordon et
al., The Independence and Impartiality of International Judges, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 508,
508 (1989).
13 In this Article, I do not undertake to draft the specific rules for a code of ethics for arbitrators,
in large part because much of the search for standards has found expression in newly minted AAA and
IBA Codes. Instead, I seek to provide a conceptual analysis of the problem of arbitrator impartiality, a
theoretical framework that will support and justify current and future efforts to develop ethical codes
and a basis for interpreting and applying the standards that have been newly articulated in the revised
codes. While I ultimately seek to tease apart conduct standards from enforcement standards because
they have been routinely conflated by courts and commentators, some of my analysis of conduct
standards in this Article necessarily implicates enforcement standards.
Many judicial decisions contemplating the question of arbitrator impartiality reason simply
that judges are required to be "impartial," arbitrators substitute for judges, and therefore that
arbitrators are required to be "impartial." Such decisions often go on to identify particular similarities
and differences between judges and arbitrators, but because they begin with the more particularized
referent, "judges," as opposed to the more general category of "adjudicators," their entire comparison
is skewed. See discussion infra Subpart I.B.
15 Although I engage in comparative analysis of various national standards, I focus on
international arbitration as applied by the U.S. legal system. This emphasis is a product both of the
growing influence of U.S. standards in the international arbitration system and the limitations of my
own professional expertise. Ultimately, the development of standards to govern international
arbitrators must engage worldwide debate and more in-depth comparative analysis than is possible in
the space of this Article.
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standard for arbitrator impartiality should be the same or "lower" than that of
judges.'6 While their divergent perspectives have been extensively debated,'7
no one has ever questioned their reliance on the judicial model.
"Impartiality" is said to be the defining feature of the judge,'8 but the
mirage of absolute judicial impartiality becomes more distorted when it is
superimposed onto the arbitrator. All the guarantees that ensure judicial
impartiality, or at least protect the myth of impartiality, are either missing or
openly flouted in the arbitral process. For example, attorneys can only be
eligible for appointment or election as judges if they possess certain
professional qualifications,'9 while arbitrators are not formally required to have
any minimum qualifications, and in most cases they are not even required to
possess any legal training." Judges are sequestered from the professional
community by rules that prohibit professional affiliations,2' whereas arbitrators
are often drawn from the ranks of active professionals." Judges are randomly
assigned to individual cases23 and litigants are discouraged from forum
shopping, but parties deliberately and individually select arbitrators who are
presumably predisposed toward their case.2" Judges are expressly precluded
16 Compare Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968)
(reasoning that "we should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of
arbitrators than judges"); with id. at 150 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that arbitrators cannot be held
to as high as standard as judges). For a full discussion of the Commonwealth Coatings case, see infra
notes 141-150, and accompanying text.
17 Courts cannot even agree about whether Justice Black's opinion in Commonwealth Coatings
was a plurality or a majority opinion. Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)
("Commonwealth Coatings is not a plurality opinion."); Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Serv.
Corp., 751 A.2d 426, 434 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("Federal courts have struggled over the meaning and
application of Commonwealth Coatings, principally because of the unusual nature of Justice White's
concurrence in which he purported to join the majority opinion while delimiting its application.");
with Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82 (2d.
Cir. 1984) ("Four justices... [who joined Justice Black's opinion] do not constitute a majority of the
Supreme Court."). As a result, one commentator has noted, "'[a]lthough Commonwealth Coatings
was the Supreme Court's first and only word on the matter,' it has provided little true guidance." Eric
M. Sommers, Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Services, Inc., 14 OHIO ST. J.
ON DiSP. RESOL. 687, 692 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
18 As Professor John Leubsdorf has put it, "To decide when a judge may not sit is to define what
a judge is." John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 237,
237 (1987).
19 This observation is true with regard to judicial selection in the United States. See, e.g.,
Susanne Di Pietro et al., Judicial Qualifications and Judicial Performance: Is There a Relationship?,
83 JUDICATURE 196, 196 (2000) (describing a study in Alaska to determine which "objectively
identifiable qualities" are associated with nomination, appointment, and professional performance of
judges).
20 Requirements that arbitrators have some legal training or qualifications are controversial in the
few countries where they exist. See Whittinghill, supra note 2, at 801.
21 "Usually, by virtue of a statutory provision or a rule of court, a judge of a court of record is
prohibited from practicing law." 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judges § 48 (2004).
22 See discussion infra Subparts I.A. 1-2.
23 Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choices, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 627, 630 (1994); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for
Improving American Justice, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 215, 216 (1999). See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr.
& Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1037
(2000) (providing a detailed description of assignment practices on a circuit-by-circuit basis).
24 "[T]he law struggles mightily, and generally successfully, to prevent judicial forum
shopping .... In arbitration, by contrast, something akin to forum shopping-the search for a panel
with the array of experience and skills sought by the parties-is not only permitted but encouraged,"
Francis 0. Spalding, Selecting the Arbitrator What Counsel Can Do, in WHAT THE BUSINESS
LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ADR 351, 353 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course,
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from receiving even nominal or indirect compensation from cases they preside
over,25 but arbitrators typically earn lavish fees. As an ultimate affront to
notions of judicial impartiality, the availability of arbitrators' fees can depend
in part on the substantive outcome of arbitrators' own decisions26 and the
amount of fees is often determined by, or at least influenced by, the arbitrators
themselves.27 In sum, when arbitrators step into judges' shoes, they seem to be
wearing them on the wrong feet.
Reconciling the underlying contradictions requires a new
understanding of the term "impartiality," defined specifically for the
international arbitration context and independent from national judicial
standards.28 This Article undertakes that effort in three Parts. I begin in Part I
by describing the current state of affairs, starting with the practical pressures
that compel a coherent theory of arbitrator impartiality. In the past, informal
social pressures and a personal sense of duty provided sufficient constraints on
arbitrator conduct.29 Today, the pool of arbitrators has vastly expanded and the
occupation is seen less as a noble duty than as an entrepreneurial opportunity."
Notwithstanding these dramatic changes, professional standards and
procedures for regulating arbitrators represent only partial and imperfect
modifications on the earlier regime based on self-regulation.' To make
Handbook Series No. 770, 1998).
25 In the United States, the principle has been held to preclude an old practice of calculating
judges' incomes based on the number of convictions they presided over. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523 (1927) (concluding that under this arrangement, the judge would have a "direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the case).
26 For example, decisions that find no arbitral jurisdiction will likely result in nominal or no
arbitrator fees. See William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration
and Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 50 (1999) ("Presumably arbitrators
will be more likely than courts to find jurisdiction, since arbitrators get paid if they hear a dispute.").
Relatedly, in some aberrant cases, arbitrators have made overtures about their future availability to the
parties in an apparent attempt to solicit future appointments while the current case was still pending.
See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. PMAC, Ltd., 863 S.W.2d 225, 233-34 (Tex. App. 1993).
Notably, the court in Babcock found that the arbitrator's impartiality was not necessarily
compromised.
27 See John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees in International Commercial
Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-3 (1999) (noting that an overwhelming number of countries
permit arbitrators to award costs and fees, which often run into the millions of dollars). Additionally,
one detractor of arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") argues
that since arbitrators' fees under the ICC rules are set based on "the complexity of the case, as
reflected in the award," arbitrators have "an incentive to write unnecessarily elaborate opinions." Julia
A. Martin, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather Than Litigating in Los Angeles: The Advantages of
International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REV. 917,
967 (1997).
28 Although I refer collectively to "national judicial standards," they are not entirely uniform.
"Virtually all jurisdictions apply the same standard of bias for judges and arbitrators[,]" but here are
some differentiations. Draft Joint Report of the Working Group on Guidelines Regarding the
Standard of Bias and Disclosure in International Commercial Arbitration § 2.3, at. 12 (October 7 &
15, 2003) (draft on file with author). Some systems (such as Sweden) define arbitrator standards as
stricter than that of judges, while other systems (such as Germany) permit more contact between
arbitrators and parties than would be allowed with judges. See id. at 12-13. A comprehensive
comparative analysis of the meaning of judicial impartiality in various nations is beyond the scope of
this Article, but a brief analysis of the meaning of impartiality as applied to a civil law judge is
provided infra Subpart II.B.
29 See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
30 See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341, 357 (2002).
31 As Otto L.O. de Witt Wijnen, one of the architects of the IBA's GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, explains:
58 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
matters worse, the primary contrivance used to effect the few cosmetic changes
has been analogy to judicial ethics. In focusing on the judicial analogy, courts
and commentators have failed to take account of how arbitrator impartiality fits
with the central tenants of the international arbitration system.
Another cause of the underlying confusion is the conflation of conduct
standards with enforcement standards. In this Article, I argue that conduct
standards, meaning those norms or rules that guide arbitrators' professional
conduct, must be more detailed and quantitative than the vague and qualitative
standards that currently prevail. I also argue that these conduct standards
should be enacted in the form of codes of ethics that should be enforced by
arbitral institutions. The relationship of these conduct standards to
enforcement standards, meaning those tenets that determine whether particular
misconduct is so problematic that the resulting award should not be enforced, I
take up in a forthcoming companion article. Teasing apart conduct and
enforcement standards is a critical corollary to my overall thesis because one
of the primary objections to efforts to increase specificity and transparency in
the standards for arbitrator conduct is a concern that such efforts will increase
the frequency of award non-enforcement. This objection fails, however, if the
former can be independently augmented without disrupting application of the
latter.
Before applying my theory, in Part II I undertake a conceptual analysis
of the general problem of decisionmaker impartiality. The model I employ for
understanding standards of decisionmaker conduct is what I have elsewhere
dubbed a functional approach to ethics." This theoretical approach is
grounded in the relationship between morality and role, and posits that
professional ethical norms are designed to correspond with the functional role
assigned to an actor within a particular legal system.3 To explicate the
The question of independence and impartiality of the
arbitrator is an old one. But ... it has become more and
more complex over the last years-and, more important, it
seems more and more difficult to find answers to this
question and to the many forms in which it appears and the
many situations that occur.
Otto L.O. de Witt Wijnen, The Increasing Complex Problem of Independence and Impartiality:
Arbitrator Disclosure Requirements, Remarks for the 6th IBA International Arbitration Day, Sydney,
Australia, (Feb. 13, 2003) (on file with author).
32 The functional approach is a method of conceptual analysis that I first developed in an earlier
article regarding attorney ethics in international arbitration. See Rogers, supra note 30, at 380.
33 See id. at 380-81. In many ways, my functional approach echoes Lon Fuller's theory on legal
ethics. As David Luban summarizes, Fuller envisioned the following procedure for deriving
professional ethics:
First, ascertain the nature of professionals' work ("the
purposes they serve in society"). Second, devise an
appropriate method for morally assessing its purposes and
their necessities. Third, following that method, "reason out
what restraints must be observed if those purposes are to be
achieved." Fuller has illuminating ideas on all of these
topics.
David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801, 807 (1998)
(citing Lon L. Fuller, The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, 1995 ELEC. ENG. 916, 917) (footnotes
omitted)). It also appears that John Leubsdorf's principles of judicial qualifications are similarly
traceable to a vision of the functional role of judges, which he refers to as the "constrained dialogue"
model. Leubsdorf, supra note 18, at 282-89 (arguing that disqualification should be based on
principles of "excluding personal considerations," "willingness to listen," and "clean slate," which are
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functional role of the arbitrator, I develop an archetypal model of
adjudication," from which I outline the functional features that define the role
of the universal adjudicator, and the fundamental ethical obligations that are
inherent in that role. 5 Based on this archetypal model, I explore variations on
the adjudicator's role that exist within adjudicatory forms present in the United
States and in other national legal systems. Tracing how shifts in the
adjudicator's role reshape and recalibrate ethical obligations provides a
demonstration of the functional approach's explanatory powers.
Finally, in Part III, I take the conceptual analysis of the first two Parts
and apply the functional approach prescriptively to the international arbitration
system.36 The problem in this context is that the primary harbingers of an
adjudicator's role-the appointment process, their decisional methodology and
the procedural arrangements used for gathering proof and argumentation-are
all subject to constant, ad hoc change through individually crafted arbitration
agreements. This feature requires that the ethical codes for arbitrators be
appended to the arbitral rules adopted by parties, as a few arbitral institutions
have already done.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to prescribe specific rules, I
apply the functional approach to the two aspects of arbitrator impartiality
obligations that have been the central focus of concern by commentators and
courts-the impartiality obligations of the party-appointed arbitrator and the
duty to disclose potential conflicts during the selection process. Through this
analysis, I help reconfigure the underlying debate by clarifying its terms and
identifying the source from which the specific ethical rules should be crafted. 7
What becomes clear from this analysis is that the impartiality required
of arbitrators is tied to specific features of their functional role, rather than
being simply a watered-down version of the mythological "impartial" judge.
This insight avoids the unflattering and inaccurate comparison that recasts
arbitrators as "caricatures of their judicial siblings" and, by extension, relegates
arbitration to its former status as a "bastard remedy."3  By elaborating
all tied to features of the judicial decisionmaking role in the constrained dialogue model).
34 See infra notes 181-192 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
36 The importance of clarifying the role of international adjudicators, independently from their
national judicial analogues, is all the more important as the "proliferation of international judicial
bodies" offers new and different models of dispute resolution. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, The New Dispute
Settlers: (Hal]) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405, 405 (2003); Cesare P.R. Romano,
The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 709, 709 (1999).
37 This analysis also provides a foundation for understanding the necessity of distinguishing
between conduct standards and enforcement standards, which I take up in Subpart I.B.3. and a
forthcoming companion article.
38 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law,
70 TUL. L. REv. 1945, 1947 (1996). Judicial and scholarly critics of arbitration remain, although the
focus of modem criticisms is more on the protection of parties' procedural rights and arbitrator
adherence to the rule of law. See, e.g., Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public
Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 255 (1987) ("[C]ourts have recognized,
and continue to recognize, that the specific alternative dispute resolution device called 'arbitration'
may be inferior to traditional judicial dispute resolution in the quality of justice it accords to individual
disputants as well as in its ability to protect public interests."); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus.,
783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he arbitration system is an inferior system of justice,
structured without due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law.").
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independent justifications for the standards that govern arbitrator impartiality,
the functional approach not only provides guidance at a prescriptive level for
the development and justification of ethical norms, but it reinforces the
normative legitimacy of the international arbitration system." This legitimacy
is what encourages nation-states to permit resolution of certain important
mandatory laws by arbitrators instead of judges and what persuades parties to
forsake substantive appeal. In addition, the legitimacy of international
arbitrators is also largely responsible for selection of arbitration as the system
of choice for new areas of international governance, such as dispute resolution
at the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade
Agreement. Improved standards and increased transparency are required to
maintain this legitimacy and, by extension, the continued prominence of
international arbitration.
I. THE CURRENT CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION
"[P]rivate dispute resolution amongst commercial men is as old as
commerce itself."4' Since the inception of this ancient institution, arbitrator
regulation has scarcely improved, while concern over its inadequacies and
confusion over its application have escalated dramatically.4 ' To understand this
discrepancy, I provide, in Subpart A, an historical prologue to the current
situation. In Subpart B I observe the incoherence of applying traditional static
notions of judicial impartiality to arbitration, which is aggravated, as I explain
in Subpart C, by certain features of the international arbitration system that
defy traditional notions of judicial impartiality.
A. Prelude to an Abyss
Although the absence of arbitrator regulation seems astonishing today,
until recently, formal regulation was presumed to be unnecessary. The
ultimate testament to this historic belief is that the document that establishes
the modern international arbitration system, the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 2 does not
mention any minimum qualifications for arbitrators or any consequences for
arbitrator bias.4 '3  This omission seems like a significant oversight," but the
39 Because international arbitration is "the preferred means of transnational dispute resolution, it
is the arbitrator rather than a national judge who will decide most international commercial disputes.
And, while arbitral institutions are there to assist and provide support, it is the arbitrator upon whom
the success of any arbitration ultimately depends." Michael F. Hoellering, The Role of International
Arbitrators, 51 DisP. RESOL. J. 100, 100 (1996). Failure to carefully define the role of adjudicators in
other contexts has undermined the legitimacy and efficacy of those systems. See, e.g., Susan H. Shin,
Comparison of the Dispute Settlement Procedures of the World Trade Organization for Trade
Disputes and the Inter-American System for Human Rights Violations, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 43, 95(2003) (arguing that the "loose" and dual functions of both the WTO Commission and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights undermines the legitimacy and efficacy of those systems and their
rule-based function).
40 W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International
CommercialArbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (1995).
41 Shore, supra note 6, at 34 ("Independence and impartiality underpin the entire arbitral process.
Without their assured vitality, arbitration as the favored dispute resolution method in international
commercial contracts will have a troubled future.").
42 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (hereinafter the "New York Convention" or the "Convention").
43 Id. The enumerated grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitral award under the New York
Convention are the exclusive grounds for which signatory nations can review awards rendered in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
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drafting of the New York Convention was itself a dramatic shift away from the
prevailing view that informal social controls were sufficient to regulate the
international arbitration system." During the period prior to the drafting of the
New York Convention it was widely believed that there was no real need for
judicial enforcement of arbitral awards because a businessperson's sense of
honor was sufficient to ensure voluntary compliance. 6 While the drafters of
the New York Convention recognized that losing parties may falter in their
commitment to behave honorably, it must have been unimaginable that one of
the "grand old men"" who formed the closed circle of potential arbitrators (and
who were themselves drafting the New York Convention) could stray from
their noble duties. 8 Several trends make this early altruism untenable in the
CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 1093
(1997). Parties often argue that arbitrator partiality or nondisclosure has meant that the tribunal was
not constituted in accordance with the parties' agreement or violates the public policy of the
enforcement jurisdiction. See New York Convention, supra note 42, art. V(1)(d) and V(2)(b). These
and related enforcement issues are taken up in my forthcoming companion article.
44 A review of the New York Convention's drafting history reveals that the central debates
occupying drafters involved the definition of what constitutes a "foreign award" and whether the
Convention should begin with a presumption of enforceability of awards. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller
Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1983). This presumption is in contrast with the Geneva
Convention's previous placement of the burden on the victor to prove enforceability. Charles H.
Brower, II, What I Tell You Three Times Is True: US. Courts and Pre-Award Interim Measures Under
the New York Convention, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 971, 1011 (1995).
45 In any nascent legal system, when there is a relatively small and intimate group, informal
social controls can operate as sufficient control mechanisms. Detlev F. Vagts, The International Legal
Profession: A Need for More Governance?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 250, 250 (1996) (noting that in the
early American legal profession "[t]here [were] only a few persons in the profession and they knew
what they [were] supposed to do. In the rare case that somebody [was] tempted to lapse from grace,
the prospect of disapproval by one's peers [was] deterrence enough."); see also Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1771 (1996).
46 For example, the 1923 version of the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules
provided only that the parties were "honor bound" to comply with the award. Craig, supra note 40, at
7. "It was expected that moral norms and 'the force that businessmen of a country can bring to bear
upon a recalcitrant neighbor' would be sufficient to ensure respect for arbitral awards." Id. The
assumption that it was unnecessary to mandate appropriate conduct also extended to arbitrator
conduct. See W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
§ 13.03, at 210 (3d ed. 2000) (describing how the former Secretary General of the Court of Arbitration
submitted an affidavit to a court explaining that later rules made explicit the longstanding ICC practice
of requiring independent arbitrators).
47 See YvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 34-36 (1996) (describing the "grand
old men" who "played a central role in the emergence and the recognition of arbitration"). The use of
masculine pronouns in the international arbitration context is an accurate reflection of unfortunate
realities. For most of international arbitration's history, there were no women arbitrators, and still
there are very few. See Louise Barrington, Arbitral Women: A Study of Women in International
Commercial Arbitration, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE: THE 1996 INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 229-41 (Geoffrey M. Beresford
Hartwell ed., 1996) (surveying the limited participation of, systematic discrimination against, and
recent progress for women in international arbitration); Dr. K.V.S.K. Nathan, Well, Why Did You Not
Get the Right Arbitrator?, 15-7 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 10 (2000) (noting that "the majority in a
multimember international arbitral tribunal is always white" and interpreting a British arbitrator's
commentary as improperly suggesting that, "arbitrators from the developing countries and women
simply do not or cannot satisfy the selection criteria" for arbitrators).
48 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 47, at 36-38 (describing how the early arbitrators
regarded their occupation more as a duty than a career). So complete was the sense of being above the
fray that prominent international lawyers close to or part of the inner circle of international arbitrators
maintained that party-appointed arbitrators were generally immune from the pulls of party loyalty.
For my prescriptions for drafting rules for party-appointed arbitrators, see discussion infra Subpart
III.C.
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modem international arbitration context.
1. Expansion in the Number and Diversity of Arbitrators
In recent years, the intimacy and limited size that are prerequisites for
informal social controls in the international arbitration community gave way to
a host of pressures brought by its growth and expansion. Increased activity
among traditional trading partners, as well as the entry of new nations onto the
stage of world trade, inevitably resulted in more disputes and more
arbitration. 9 As part of this trend, some developing countries that agreed to
submit disputes to arbitration in order to attract foreign investment0 became
disenchanted with arbitrators from predominantly Western European
backgrounds, whom they believed were biased against them." Unable to reject
international arbitration altogether, parties from these countries began to insist
on alternative arbitral candidates who were nationals of their own or other
developing countries, and who had been trained in local legal systems." The
resulting increase in the number of international arbitrations led to a dramatic
expansion in the pool of arbitral candidates, 3 and a commensurate
diversification of the cultural and legal traditions among arbitrators. These
new arbitrators brought new assumptions about what constitutes proper
49 Institutions such as China International Commercial Dispute Resolution ("CIETAC"), the
International Chamber of Commerce, and the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") have seen a
great increase in the annual number of international cases filed with them. TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 1 (Christopher R. Drahazol ed.,
2004).
50 Sir Michael J. Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, 6 J. INT'L ARB. 43, 53-54 (1989)
("[O]ne must take note of the efforts made by individual nations to make their arbitration
laws.., more attractive."). This trend extends to developing countries, such as Mauritius, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and many Latin American countries, which in recent years have made legal
commitments to support international arbitration as part of an effort to facilitate trade with foreign
investors and business interests. Donald Francis Donovan, International Commercial Arbitration and
Public Policy, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 645, 650-51 (1995); see also 10 WORLD ARB. & MED.
REPORT 209 (1999) ("The Turkish parliament's decision to approve a constitutional amendment
allowing for international arbitration in investment disputes should attract foreign investors to the
multibillion dollar energy projects currently awaiting funding.").
51 Leading arbitration practitioner and scholar Jan Paulsson concedes that "in the beginning of
this century, and until the 1950s, arbitrations conducted by various 'international' tribunals or
commissions evidenced bias against developing countries," but he claims that that the "dice are loaded
no longer." Jan Paulsson, Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration, 2 FOR.
INv. L.J. 19, 21 (1987). While there is significant consensus about the existence of bias conceded in
the first part of Mr. Paulsson's analysis, many in the developing world have some remaining doubts
about the more optimistic second part of his analysis. See, e.g., M. Somarajah, The Climate of
International Arbitration, 8 J. INT'L ARB. 47, 47-48 (June 1991) (arguing from historical evidence
that international arbitration manipulates vague notions of international law and systematically favors
capital exporting States); see also Amir A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for
Reassessing Bias under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARv. INT'L L.J. 419, 420-424, 427-431
(2000); Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri, Is There a Growing International Arbitration Culture in the Arab-
Islamic Juridical Culture?, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION CULTURE 47-48 (1998) (noting that, despite the long history and current popularity of
arbitration in Arab nations, the Arab legal community remains hostile toward transnational arbitration
because of perceptions of biased treatment by Western arbitrators); John Beechey, International
Commercial Arbitration: A Process Under Review and Change, AUG/OCT DiS. RES. J. 32, 33 (2000)
(explaining that there "remains a huge task" to convince developing nations that they can expect a fair
hearing before international arbitration tribunals).
52 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 47, at 47.
53 See H. Thomas Fehn, The Case for Arbitrator Certification, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION
2001, at 93, 93 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1264, 2001) (noting a
similar phenomenon in context of domestic securities arbitration).
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conduct" and created new pressures on historically informal social controls.5
Interestingly enough, even more disruptive than the influence of these
non-Western and culturally-distinct newcomers, such as Zimbabweans,
Yemenis, or Malaysians, was the advent of American lawyers and law firms.
American attorneys brought not only their uniquely adversarial litigation style,
the effects of which I discuss elsewhere, but also practices that profoundly
affect arbitrator conduct, such as a compulsively persnickety approach to
conflicts-of-interest. As characterized by one leading European scholar on
the matter, some individual U.S. states require disqualification of an arbitrator
simply because she "has the same hairdresser as the counsel of one of the
parties."" While this example may be more of an apocryphal parable than a
case study, the reality and perception of U.S. conflict-of-interest standards
contrast sharply with European standards and practices, which permit the same
and other close relationships to be legitimately withheld.'
In an unexpected counterpunch, American arbitrators and attorneys
also brought their uniquely partisan view of the role of the party-appointed
arbitrator to international arbitration. Domestic U.S. arbitration procedure
allows parties and their counsel to communicate throughout arbitral
proceedings with their party-appointed arbitrators, even about crucial issues
involving strategy.' Such communication is considered unacceptable in most
Vagts, supra note 45, at 250 ("As the activities of international law agencies, both public and
private, involve more countries and more cultures, disputes about standards of behavior can be
expected to multiply."); see also Susan D. Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators: A
Comparative Analysis and Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1,
31-49 (2000) (exploring varying standards of arbitrator immunity world-wide).
55 Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 ARB. 219, 220 (1987) (concluding
that the world of commercial arbitration to be no longer a club of gentlemen, but one that needs
explicit guidelines for conduct).
56 See generally Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The "Americanization " of International
Arbitration?, 4 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 11 (2001); see also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 47, at
53-54 (attributing the "Americanization" of arbitral proceedings to the symbolic capital brought to the
process by American attorneys).
57 Rogers, supra note 30, at 373-78.
58 John Toulmin, A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics?, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
673, 681 (1991/1992) ("[T]he rules of professional conduct in the United States relating to conflicts of
interest and imputed disqualification are among the strictest in the world.").
s9 Otto L.O. de Witt Wijnen, Challenges to the appointment of arbitrators on grounds of
bias/conflict of interest-current problems 2.4 (2003) (paper presented at the LCIA/AMINZ seminar,
Auckland, New Zealand, Feb. 20, 2003) (on file with author). This illustration by de Witt Wijnen
strikes an ironic contrast with the lament quoted in the first sentence of this Article that arbitrators are
regulated less rigorously than hairdressers. Compare id. with Reuben, supra note 1, at 1013; see also
Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 56, at 37 & n.44 (noting the disruptive effect of the American view that
relationships between an arbitrator and a party's counsel should be disclosed).
60 Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 56, at 39. These contrasting approaches to arbitrator conflicts
likely reflect the very different national approaches to attorney conflicts of interest, which I have
elsewhere identified. Rogers, supra note 30, at 368-70.
61 See, e.g., Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 759 (11 th Cir. 1993)
(finding no prejudicial misconduct despite finding that party-arbitrator met with representatives and
witnesses of appointing party before arbitration to plan strategy). Conflicting cultural perspectives on
ex parte communication were not an issue in cases like Sunkist because they involved solely domestic
U.S. arbitrations. Even in the United States, however, practices such as arbitrator ex parte
communications with the appointing party have met with significant criticism. See Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's Happening
and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 949-951 (2002); James H. Carter, Improving Life with the
Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clearer Conduct Guidelines for "Nonneutrals," 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
295, 298-99 (2000); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International
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other systems.62 This fundamental clash over the role of party-appointed
arbitrators became a pet topic, if not a litmus test, for those contemplating
regulation of arbitrator conduct.3
2. Commercialization of International Arbitrators
As it has expanded in numbers and cultural vicissitudes, the pool of
international arbitrators has also become more entrepreneurial. Arbitration
results not only in large awards for prevailing parties, but also large fees for
those rendering arbitral services.' Arbitrators can earn hundreds of thousands
to sometimes over a million dollars from a single arbitration," giving
candidates a strong incentive to compete for selection as arbitrators. Not
surprisingly, a consequence of these developments is that the new breed of
Controversies: Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 59, 65 (1995) (noting international norms that
seek to neutralize perceived partisanship in the party-appointed arbitrator). Recently, in response to
this problem, some institutions have clarified in their arbitral rules that all arbitrators are expected to
act as "neutrals." See, e.g., LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ARBITRAL RULES, art.
5.2 ("All arbitrators conducting an arbitration under these Rules shall be and remain at all times
impartial and independent of the parties; and none shall act in the arbitration as advocates for any
party.").
62 The starkness of this distinction has lost some force with recent efforts to revise the pertinent
rules, but a survey of the preceding rules and practices, even if now partially displaced, is still
illuminating. See, e.g., CRAIG ET AL., supra note 46, § 13.07; Donahey, supra note 9, at 41-42.
Compare ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 225-26 (1991) (noting that "it is not unusual for there to be discussions
with just one of the parties in respect of procedural matters such as availability for future hearings"),
and Former AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (1997), Canon
III(B)(5) (permitting ex parte communications with any member of the arbitral tribunal "concerning
such matters as setting the time and place of hearings or making other arrangements for the conduct of
the proceedings") and III(C) (permitting ex parte communications by party-appointed arbitrators as
long as general disclosure is made).
63 See Detlev Vagts, International Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 92 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 378, 379 (1998) (discussing a hypothetical case involving contrasting approaches to ex
parte communication with arbitrators as basis for panel discussion); Amb. Malcolm Wilkey, The
Practicalities of Cross-Cultural Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 86 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds.,
1999) (describing differing approaches to ex parte communication as a problem in international
arbitration that must be overcome); see also Hans Smit, Managing an International Arbitration: An
Arbitrator's View, 5 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 129, 131 (1994) (taking the view that communications
between party and party-appointed arbitrator concerning the appointment of the presiding arbitrator
are generally accepted where the party-appointed arbitrator takes part in the selection process, even if
the rules are silent); Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 59. But see Hans Smit, The Future of International
Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 17
n.40 (1986) (noting that an award rendered by an arbitrator who communicates ex parte with an
appointing party "may not be recognized in foreign countries").
64 The scramble among Western European nations to establish arbitration laws attractive to
parties demonstrates the high financial stakes involved in arbitration. See, e.g., William W. Park,
National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International
Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 680 (1989).
65 See Gotanda, supra note 27, at 1 (noting that fees can run into the millions of dollars). As the
Special Committee on Professionalism of National Academy of Arbitrators summarized:
There are those among us who view arbitration
primarily as a business. They are likely to concentrate more
on self-interest than the interest of the profession .... We
recognize that arbitrators are no less ambitious than other
professionals; we recognize that many of us are dependent
on arbitration fees for a livelihood.
Report of Special Committee on Professionalism of National Academy of Arbitrators, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 106, at E- 1, E-4 (June 4, 1987), cited in Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging,
38 S. TEX. L. REv. 485,485 (1997)).
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arbitrator regards participation in arbitration as an entrepreneurial venture."
These newcomers are less constrained by the established traditions, senses of
obligation, and informal social controls that served as constraints when the
community was still comprised of an elite in-group.67
While the number of arbitrators has expanded, it remains doubtful that
arbitration has developed into a fully functioning and open market. Even with
expansion, arbitral services are still dominated by those in the highest echelons
of legal talent.68 To surmount entry barriers new arrivals must acquire
professional credentials that make them attractive as arbitrators, and must be
acknowledged by participants, particularly those who are already part of the
controlling cartel. 9 The arbitration market may also create incentives for those
in the controlling cartel to affirm the strength of the international arbitration
system, as opposed to outing deviant arbitrators and decrying their decisional
products as invalid." The fact that most arbitration is confidential, most
awards are not published, and most institutional decisions regarding
arbitrators' challenges are rendered without reasoned explanations creates
significant information asymmetries that also belie the development of an
effective and efficient market.7" The result is an increasingly entrepreneurial
group that has not been formally organized into a profession, but nevertheless
is able to claim the mantle of professionalism.7
66 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 47, at 34-36.
67 See id.
68 See Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 13 (1997); David Hacking,
Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility: A Response: What Happens if the Icelandic Arbitrator Falls Through the
Ice?, 15 J. INT'L ARB. 73 (1998); and see David A. Hoffman, Certifying ADR Providers, 40 APR
BOST. B.J. 9 (1996) (arguing for certification, but acknowleging arguments that it can promote
monopolization). There is an obvious tension between the claim in the preceding paragraphs that the
pool of arbitrators is expanding enough to diminish the effect of informal social norms, and the claim
in this paragraph that significant entry barriers remain.
69 The existence and influence of the controlling cartel is a product of the sources and processes
used to select arbitrators. For example, one popular resource for arbitrator selection is the "Guide to
International Arbitration and Arbitrators," which has been described as a "Who's Who in International
Arbitration." For examples of arbitrators influencing selection as authors, see William W. Park, Book
Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 586 (1991) (famous international arbitrator reviewing new book compiled
by The Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law); Francis 0. Spalding, Selecting the
Arbitrator, What Counsel Can Do, 2 ADR CURRENTS Fall 1997, at 8 (1998) (well-known arbitrator
providing advice on how to use recommendations to select arbitrators). In addition, there are a few
internet-based electronic directories for identifying potential arbitrators which were founded by well-
known arbitrators. See, e.g., www.iaiparis.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) and www.hgexpersts.com
(last visited Jan. 31, 2005). For a discussion of the market to become an arbitrator, see DEZALAY &
GARTH, supra note 47, at 34-36. While parties and their counsel use these in-group sources to
identify would-be arbitrators, many arbitral institutions themselves appoint arbitral chairpersons. For
example, at the ICC, the Court of Arbitration appoints chairpersons. See Robert H. Smit, An Inside
View of the ICC Court, 10 INT'L ARB. 53 (1994). The Court of Arbitration is comprised of
accomplished arbitrators and practitioners, and this group decides on appointments of, and challenges
to, arbitrators. Id.
70 See Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 287, 365 n.218
(1999) (noting aspects of arbitration that undermine competitive forces in the market for arbitrators).
71 For a similar argument made in the context of attorney regulation, see Larry E. Ribstein,
Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1756-57 (1998)
(discussing information asymmetries as an obstacle to development of market-based substitutes for
attorney ethics).
72 As Richard Abel has explained in his seminal work on lawyers and the legal profession,
"[c]ontrol of the supply of services is one of the elements that defines a profession." Richard L. Abel,
Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, VOLUME THREE:
COMPARATIVE THEORIES 84 (Richard L. Abel and Philip S.C. Lewis eds. 1989). There are those who
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3. Development of an Arbitral Rule of Law'3
The final trend that has focused attention on regulation of arbitrator
conduct is the increasingly legalistic and rule-bound nature of international
arbitration. Until the last few decades, arbitration was regarded as an ad hoc
compromise-oriented process characterized by its informality and emphasis on
fairness over legality. "Arbitral decisions were not revered so much for their
legal accuracy or precision as much as for their sense of fairness and industry
knowledge.",7' Formerly, arbitrators were most often experts chosen from the
same industry as the dispute and were expected to render a just and equitable
result, even if that meant disregarding the express terms of the contract or the
provisions of the chosen law. 6 In this aim, the arbitrator was aided by the
doctrine of amiable compositeurs, the ability to rule ex aequo et bono," and the
principles of lex mercatoria7'8 all of which authorized arbitrators to disregard
the strictures of legal rules in search of more equitable resolutions to disputes.9
The increasing competitiveness of international business has
challenged this earlier version of arbitration as an informal and largely
equitable means of resolving disputes." International agreements are now
drafted with greater precision and parties are intentionally choosing what law
they want to govern interpretation and enforcement of their agreement.' In
challenge the accuracy and efficacy of the term "profession," but they do not deny that the term has a
value in conferring legitimacy on those who claim it. See Austin Sarat, Enactments of
Professionalism: A Study of Judges' and Lawyers' Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 814 (1998) (arguing that the term professionalism is "far too vague, complex,
and contradictory" but that it still confers legitimacy and operates as "symbolic capital" on those who
can claim it).
73 The term "rule of law" is useful shorthand, but its meaning as well as its normative value has
been questioned. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1997) ("The Rule of Law is a much celebrated, historic ideal, the
precise meaning of which may be less clear today than ever before."). Notwithstanding the significant
room for debate, there is broad consensus at the core. Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred
Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating the Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 471, 472 (2002). Applying Peerenboom's core definition to the international arbitration
context means that formal and articulated legal rules impose meaningful constraints that are equally
binding on all parties. Id.
74 Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing About the Forum: Categories and Definitions as
Stakes in Professional Competition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 285, 295 (1996).
75 Rogers, supra note 30, at 350-51.
76 Id. at 352-53.
77 S.I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: Infringement of
Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 915, 932
(1998) ("The doctrine of amiable composition is a doctrine that allows arbitrators to make an equity-
based, instead of a law-based, decision, even if they remain bound by national mandatory law."). The
doctrine of ex aequo et bono is very similar to amiable compositeurs, except that the powers of
arbitrators are slightly broader, enabling them "to disregard even mandatory provisions of substantive
law in order to reach an equitable outcome." Id. at 933.
78 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 74, at 295; Christopher R. Drahazol, Commercial Norms,
Commercial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 128-
130 (2000).
79 Rogers, supra note 30, at 351-52.
80 This trend is also likely attributable to competition among the lawyers who participate in
arbitration. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 74, at 297-98.
81 Other evidence of this shift is that the ICC Rules now prohibit arbitrators from acting as
amiable compositeurs unless the parties agree, which the parties virtually never do. International
Chamber of Commerce, ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 17, § 3 (Oct. 2004) (hereinafter "ICC
Arbitration Rules"), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf-documents/rules/niles-arb-englishpdf (last
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response to these changing needs, international commercial arbitration has
undergone a fundamental shift to become a more formalized legal process,
which has been both celebrated and decried as the judicialization of
arbitration.82
This trend is marked by a number of changes that make the arbitration
process more transparent and more accountable, primarily by making arbitral
procedure more definite in content and express in form.83 Back when the
arbitrator's task was to reach a compromise outcome, by definition, winners
and losers were less clear. Consequently, it was less likely that one party
would emerge from the arbitral process truly disgruntled. As arbitrators are
called on to use clearer legal rules to declare the victor and the vanquished,
their ability and impartiality in applying those rules naturally comes under
greater scrutiny. While a losing party might have previously regarded
unfavorable awards as simply erroneous, they are now a signal for possible
bias."4
In sum, consensus about what constitutes proper arbitrator conduct has
disintegrated, just as corresponding pressures brought on by increased
competition in, and formalization of, the international arbitration process have
created a need for clearer rules to guide, and effective mechanisms to regulate,
arbitrator conduct.85 The mechanisms that exist today, meanwhile, represent
only minor and imperfect modifications of those created in the heyday of
presumed arbitrator nobility and at the height of equitable informality. Even
more problematically, efforts to modernize arbitrator ethics have taken as their
starting point an artificial judicial model of impartiality.
B. Consequences of the Misleading Judicial Referent
The human addiction to antithetical analysis, meaning the defining or
visited Jan. 31, 2005).
82 See generally INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 2 1sT CENTURY: TOWARDS
"JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower, eds. 1993)
(containing commentaries on the pros and cons of judicialization of arbitration). The word
"judicialization" as used to describe the formalization of the arbitration process seems at odds with my
rejection of the judicial model as a basis for defining arbitrator ethics. Because the term
"judicialization" has gained significant currency as a shorthand for the formalization of international
arbitration, I leave it in with simply a disclaimer to the reader.
83 Procedural rules have emerged in modern arbitral practice that shift control over factual
investigation and presentation of evidence in the proceedings to the parties. For an investigation of
these trends see Rogers, supra note 30, at 353-54. In addition, formal rules of evidence and the
requirement of reasoned awards act as a constraint on arbitrator decisionmaking. Id. at 353.
84 As Randy Barnett explains, the rule of law can be a "warning sensor" so that substantive rules
provide a source of constraint on adjudicators, and deviations from established rules may signal
partiality. Randy Barnett, Coping with Partiality: Justice, the Rule of Law, and the Role of Lawyers, 3
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 1, 11 (1997). As Owen M. Fiss explains, the rule of law is
a network of so-called 'disciplining rules' which, like
a grammar, define and constitute the practice of judging and
are rendered authoritative by the interpretive community of
which the justices are part. These disciplining rules provide
the standards for determining whether some decision is right
(or wrong) and for justifying it (or for contesting it). They
constrain, not determine, judgment.
Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 11 (1986).
85 In this respect, arbitrator regulation is just one example of a larger trend in international
arbitration to replace informal controls with more predictable and effective ones. See Rogers, supra
note 30, at 350-53.
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evaluation of one thing by its opposite, infects most public discussions of
ethics. Ethical discourse often frames important quandaries as a choice
between diametrically opposed values-between truth and deception, loyalty
and betrayal, right and wrong. 6  With adjudicators, be they judges or
arbitrators, the dichotomy is between the absolute moral virtue of
"impartiality" and its supposed opposite, the deplorable sin of "bias."87
Notwithstanding continuous resort to such platitudes, absolute impartiality is
impossible as a matter of cognitive psychology88 and undesirable as a matter of
social policy. Methods of absolutely impartial decisionmaking-such as
flipping a coin or rolling the dice-have been thoroughly rejected as
inconsistent with the concept of adjudication.89 Even hypothesized alternatives
cannot provide absolute impartiality.'
86 The use of reductiorist dichotomies is a familiar rhetorical trope. See L.H. LaRue, What is the
Text in Constitutional Law: Does It Include Thoreau?, 20 GA. L. REV. 1137, 1151-52 (1986)
(critiquing Thoreau's use of dichotomies in Civil Disobedience as rhetorically powerful, but
deceptively simplistic and thus unable to provide a solid logical foundation for complex arguments).
87 As Judith Resnik has explained, the "buzzwords" in discussions of judicial ethics are
simplistic: "[i]mpartiality' is required; 'bias' is forbidden." Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist
Reconsideration of the Aspiration for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1882 (1988); see
RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES §
1.7, at 14-15 (1996) ("[l~t is generally agreed, at least in principle, that [the parties] are entitled to
nothing less than a calm and dispassionate decisionmaker who operates in an atmosphere of absolute
neutrality."), quoted in Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts,
87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1233 n.94 (2002) (emphasis added); see also Jeffrey M. Shaman, The
Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 605, 606 (1996) ("[W]e demand that
[judges] adhere to the highest degree of impartiality that is mortally possible.").
88 As Gadamer explains, "it is our prejudices that constitute our being." HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (1976) (quoted in RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND
OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 129 (1983)). Therefore, "it
literally makes no sense to think that a human being can ever be devoid of prejudices." RICHARD J.
BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAxIS 129
(1983). Judges have concurred in these hypotheses. Justice Cardozo recognized the relationship
between experience and judges' decisionmaking process: "All their lives, forces which [judges] do
not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs,
acquired convictions; and the resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs.... We may
try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
except our own." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12-13 (1921),
quoted in Brady Coleman, Lord Denning and Justice Cardozo: The Judge as Poet-Philosopher, 532
RUTGERS L.J. 485, 512 (2001).
89 Judith Resnik tells of a judge who was censured for deciding a criminal defendant's prison
term with the flip of a coin. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 839, 841 (1984) (arguing that
despite its efficiency and even in the absence of claims that the result was incorrect, "[t]he coin flip
offended this society's commitment to rationality"). Francois Rabelais's fictitious Judge Bridlegoose
resolved cases by casting dice in his chamber, one on behalf of each party, and deciding in favor of the
party whose die had the higher number. He was eventually prosecuted for this misconduct, but
ultimately absolved since all his accusers had upheld his decisions. See David A. Harris, The
Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal
Justice System, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 785, 793-94 (1993) (citing FRANCOIS RABELAIS, THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF FRANCOIS RABELAIS (Donald M. Frame trans., 1992)); THE PORTABLE RABELAIS (Samuel
Putnam trans. and ed., 1974). Evidently, Judge Bridlegoose rolled dice primarily as a form of
exercise, and not because of its assurance of absolute impartiality. See id. Other unconventional but
apparently objective methods have been similarly rejected by judges. Cf. LaPine Tech. Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (commenting that
"reading the entrails of a dead fowl" would not be a decisional strategy that parties could contractually
agree to have employed by courts), reversed on other grounds on rehearing en banc, Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
90 John Rawls' veil of ignorance was designed to ensure superhuman impartiality by insulating
decisionmakers from their own selfish personal interests, but even this idealized hypothetical would
necessarily permit certain common human emotions and attitudes to operate behind the veil. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (rev. ed. 1999); see also DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
41:53
2005 Regulating International Arbitrators:
It is impossible to "strip"9' adjudicators of everything that influences or
"biases" their decisionmaking. It is also undesirable: Stripping them of any
such influence or bias would remove all the qualities that make them
competent and good decisionmakers Setting standards for adjudicator
impartiality, therefore, is not about removing all forms of bias, but selecting
what types of bias are appropriate to the particular system.93
While many scholars have acknowledged the incoherence of treating
impartiality as a static ideal, 4 "[1lawyers and lawmakers have neither debated
these problems openly nor renounced the ideal of impartiality."95 They have
JUSTICE 55 (1999). As feminist theorists have pointed out, "gender neutral" representatives cannot be
impartial, but instead would necessarily be biased in favor of a masculine moral psychology. Linda R.
Hirshman, Is the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1860, 1866-75
(1994) (concluding that "given the real differences in physical strength between the sexes, no theory of
the disembodied self can adequately generate political justice for the weaker group"); see also SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 107 (1989) (suggesting that it may be possible to
modify Rawls's theory to take into account "the standpoint of women"); CAROL PATEMAN, THE
SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988) (exposing male-centric origins of classical social contract theory and
arguing that modem versions of the theory have not avoided the problem).
91 During his confirmation hearings, Clarence Thomas testified that a judge should be "stripped
down like a runner" and be free from "the baggage of ideology." Linda Greenhouse, The Thomas
Hearings: In Trying to Clarify What He Is Not, Thomas Opens Question of What He Is, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1991, at A19 (quoting Clarence Thomas), cited in Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a
Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1201, 1201 (1992).
92 As one scholar described in the context ofjudicial qualifications and bias:
[E]very judge brings to the bench a range of
professional and life experiences which will influence his
judicial decision-making. A judge may be deemed
"qualified" to serve based on his experience as a trial
lawyer, as a partner in a prestigious firm engaged in
commercial law practice, as a government lawyer, or as an
esteemed legal academic. These experiences, and a judge's
"thinking" about law, are part of the bundle of qualifications
a judge brings to the bench.
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence,
57 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 405, 460 (2000).
93 Some types of bias, in their strongest forms, are intolerable in any system. Most odious of all
possible motivations is racist or sexist animus against one party or their counsel. While these are the
most invidious forms of bias, other objectionable forms present more subtle problems, such as indirect
loyalties or empathy with parties, or when a decisionmaker has prior intellectual commitments to
specific legal questions raised in a dispute or actual beliefs formed by prior knowledge of facts to be
adjudicated in the dispute. Common sense and cognitive psychology tell us that those commitments
and beliefs are unlikely to be set aside in the context of the parties' dispute. See Charles G. Lord et
al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979) ("There is considerable
evidence that people tend to interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs."); Lee
Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance
of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
129, 145 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (citing studies that confirm that trained scientists exhibit
bias in favor of evidence corroborating their prior belief). These and several other sources
documenting empirical findings on bias based on prior factual and legal beliefs are found in John R.
Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657, 663 (1994).
94 See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform from Small Rules? Anti-Bias Canons as a
Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REv. 363, 363 (2000); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial
Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 23 n.103 (1994); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the
Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REv. 61, 102 (2000). Of course, not all scholars have
come to appreciate this point and some continue to recite outdated cliches instead of engaging in
analysis of what those standards mean. See, e.g., Alain A. Levasseur, Legitimacy of Judges, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 43, 48-50 (2002).
95 John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 237, 238
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neither delimited the true meaning of the term "impartiality," nor wrestled with
the question of what kinds of bias are acceptable in a particular system of
adjudication.' In the context of judicial disqualification, legislators and judges
rely on procedural devices to avoid actually insisting on absolute impartiality,
and on rhetorical flourishes to mask their infidelity to the unachievable ideal.97
Similarly, in reviewing arbitration decisions, courts have refused to give any
precise meaning to the term "impartiality," other than to note obliquely that, as
applied to arbitrators, the term is something "lesser," "lower" or "more
relaxed" than when it is applied to judges.98
Apart from being doctrinally shoddy, this approach demeans arbitral
justice. In the absence of traditional sources of legitimacy found in national
court systems, 99 arbitrator integrity is one of the cornerstones of legitimacy on
(1987) (observing the same tendency in the context of discussions ofjudicial ethics).
96 Professor Leubsdorf artfully illustrates the "cloudy distinctions" that have been drawn in the
judicial context:
A federal judge, for instance, must withdraw for 'personal bias'
against a party, but not for an equally powerful bias against that
party's case or counsel. A judge may hear a case although she
previously expressed strong views on its crucial legal issues, but she
must withdraw if she commented on the application of
uncontroversial law to the facts of that case. A judge who owns a
single share of stock in a large corporation may not hear a suit for a
few hundred dollars against it, but a judge may retry a suit even
though her first decision was vacated for numerous errors favoring
one party. A judge may construe a statute she helped write, but not
instruct a jury considering a traffic accident she saw .... There may
be justifications for these distinctions, but at first thought they seem
better suited to creating an appearance of scruple than to removing a
rationally bounded class of undesirable judges.
John Leubsdorf, supra note 95, at 238-39. According to Debra Bassett, at least part of the
reason for the distorted line-drawing is that "law tends to be highly resistant to non-objective concepts
or factors, and instead seeks logic, rationality, and predictability, shunning that which is subjective or
non-quantifiable." Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L.
REv. 1213, 1240 (2002). Consequently, financial interests, which can be objectively identified, are
subject to clear prohibitions, whereas other types of bias that might be even more disruptive, remain
mired down in confused standards and procedures. See id. at 1241-43.
97 See Leubsdorf, supra note 95, at 268 ("Judges and commentators find it all too easy to rely on
procedural arguments to gloss over disqualification issues.").
98 See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir.2002)
("'Evident partiality' under § 10(a)(2) [of the Federal Arbitration Act] is a subset of the conditions that
disqualify a federal judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)."); Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal
Properties, Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that unlike judicial contexts, it is well
known that arbitration is premised on "the selection of partial arbitrators-persons with substantial
financial interests in and duties of loyalty to one party"); Lozano v. Maryland Casualty Co., 850 F.2d
1470, 1472 (arbitrators are not required to be impartial); Toyota of Berkeley v. Auto. Salesman's
Union, 834 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that arbitrators are not held to the same "high standards"
as judges); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748
F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that "[f]amiliarity with a discipline often comes at the expense of
complete impartiality"); Areca, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 52, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(interpreting the Second Circuit as "[having] adopted less stringent standards for disqualification of
arbitrators than for federal judges"); Reeves Bros. v. Capital-Mercury Shirt Corp., 962 F. Supp. 408,
413 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Arbitrators are, therefore, held to a lower standard of impartiality than Article
III judges."); First Interregional Equity Corp. v. Haughton, 842 F. Supp. 105, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
("Arbitrators are ... held to a lower standard of impartiality than Article III judges."); see also
Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 677,
687 (S.D. Fla. 2001). Some courts have rejected this view and instead insist on "high" standards for
arbitrators, See Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d 214, 218 (N.J. 1981)
(arbitrators are expected to maintain high standards of impartiality).
99 National systems maintain their legitimacy through transparent procedures and
through external displays of ritual and formality. Resnik, supra note 89, at 854 ("Ritual and formality
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which the international arbitration system was built." In no small part due to
the personal force of its founders, international arbitration has emerged as the
way to resolve international disputes."0 ' The shift to increased party control,
transparency in proceedings and rule-based decisionmaking may provide new
sources of institutional legitimacy,' 2 but it cannot obviate the need for real and
perceived decisionmaker legitimacy.' 3 Any theory of arbitrator impartiality
must work not only to provide meaningful guidance at a practical level, but
also to strengthen the system by reinforcing the authority and legitimacy of its
decisionmakers.
C. The International Arbitration System and Arbitrator Conduct
The notion that arbitrators are "less" impartial than judges is
attributable to several features inherent in the arbitration system."' These
features must be incorporated into any understanding of what "impartiality"
means in the context of arbitration if it is to be defined as anything other than a
"lesser" form of real (translated "judicial") impartiality.
1. A Conflict Within a Conflict
One of the most dramatic, if systematically obscured, ironies about
arbitrators is that when they are required to self-diagnose a conflict problem,
they are necessarily required to act against their own financial interest. A
also give decisionmaking an appearance of 'correctness,' and thus legitimate the decisions
rendered."). International systems, by contrast, rely on party confidence to elicit voluntary
compliance from parties. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 705, 708 (1988). Institutional legitimacy holds consequences not only for the political vitality of
institutions, see id. at 725, but also for the level of voluntary compliance with the institution's
decisions. See Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluation of Their
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 51, 52-54 (1984) (reporting on social scientific
research into the effects of perceived injustice); JANICE NADLER, FLOUTING THE LAW: DOES
PERCEIVED INJUSTICE PROVOKE GENERAL NON-COMPLIANCE? (Northwestern Sch. of L.,
Northwestern Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-9 (2002)) (reporting on the results of an
experiment that empirically tested the "Flouting Thesis." Participants who were exposed to laws and
legal outcomes "that they perceived as unjust were more willing, as a general matter, to flout unrelated
laws"), available at http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taPabstract id=353745 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
The international arbitration system in particular has historically relied heavily on voluntary
compliance with awards. For example, as of 1984, the ICC boasted a ninety percent voluntary
compliance rate. See Thomas E. Carbormeau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The
Elaboration of a Common Law of International Transactions, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 606
(1985). The statistic basis for this ninety percent figure is unclear, and presumably is somewhat lower
today, but a high degree of voluntary compliance is undoubtedly an essential element of international
arbitration's success.
100 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 949, 950-51, 970 (stressing that in the absence of
mechanisms for enforcement, "transparency, disclosure, rules, sanctions and consequences [are]
necessary for arbitration to maintain any semblance of legal legitimacy and justice"). Cf Resnik,
supra note 89, at 849 (noting that impartiality helps legitimate the outcomes of adjudicatory
processes).
101 See Stephen T. Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, Chromalloy: United States Law and International
Arbitration at the Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650, 1650 (1998).
102 See generally Christopher J. Peters, Participation, Representation, and Principled
Adjudication, 8 LEGAL THEORY 185 (2002) ("Litigant participation can confer political legitimacy on
binding court decisions, but only if those decisions are meaningfully responsive to that
participation."). But see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian
Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 510 (2003) (questioning process-based fairness
arguments that contend that party "participation and control are necessary to institutional legitimacy");
Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
193, 285 (1992).
103 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 950-51, 970.
104 See discussion infra Subpart C.2.
72 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
decision to disclose a conflict or withdraw based on a challenge can result in
the arbitrator having to forego or relinquish hundreds of thousands of dollars in
potential fees.' 5 The process of evaluating a potential conflict of interest, in
other words, is itself infected with palpable self-interest."o
Notwithstanding the inherently self-interested nature of these
decisions, most governing disclosure standards effectively vest tremendous
discretion in arbitrators, both because of how they are phrased and because of
how they are enforced. 7 For example, the ICC Rules require that arbitrator-
candidates disclose "any facts or circumstances which might be of such a
nature as to call into question the arbitrator's independence in the eyes of the
parties. ' ' This requirement is a vast improvement over the predecessor rule,
which provided only that an arbitrator disclose information that the arbitrator
subjectively believed called her independence into question. '°9 Even if phrased
as an objective standard, however, the new rule still affords arbitrators
tremendous discretion. This vague, qualitative standard provides no guidance
for arbitrator-candidates about whether to disclose certain information, such as
whether she has a former law partner who had rendered services for the
opposing party the year before, or whether she has acted as counsel in another
case in which current counsel acts as arbitrator. An arbitrator-candidate could,
in perfectly good faith, decide that such contacts are not implicated by the
ICC's standard and therefore need not be disclosed, even if the parties
(particularly the losing party) would later vehemently disagree."' Regardless
of whether this decision is made in good faith or bad faith, subsequent
challenge to the decision is unlikely to result in vacation of the resulting award.
The decision about whether to disclose information receives significant
deference because, in the context of award enforcement, only the most
egregious instances of non-disclosure have been considered grounds for setting
aside or refusing to enforce an award.
Even in the relatively unusual situations when parties voluntarily
incorporate into their agreement a code of ethics for arbitrators' or choose one
105 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The conflict may be amplified when arbitrators
charge for their services by the hour. See John Yukio Gotanda, Setting Arbitrators' Fees: An
International Survey, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 786-88 (2000) (describing when the hourly
rate method is used to calculate arbitrator fees).
106 Even before the development of more subtle rules regarding bias, judges could be disqualified
if they had a direct financial interest in the dispute. See Bassett, supra note 96, at 1240-45.
Interestingly enough, with regard to arbitrators this aspect of bias is not discussed or even mentioned
in any of the articles that have addressed the subject of arbitrator conduct, perhaps because many of
those authors are themselves active arbitrators.
I7 I explore in greater detail both at infra Subpart II.B.3. and in my forthcoming companion
article the problems with conflating conduct and enforcement standards.
108 See Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, art. 7, § 2, available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf documents/rules/rules arbenglish.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2005); see also id., art. 7, § 3 (requiring disclosure of same information discovered
later in proceedings).
109 See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 46, at 214 & n.26.
11 See Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 56, at 37 & n.44 (describing how under American standards
relationships between an arbitrator and a party's counsel should be disclosed, while under European
standards the same relationship can legitimately be withheld).
III The two most complete codes are the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes and the International Bar Association Code of Ethics for International
Arbitrators, both of which were updated in 2004. These codes improve on arbitral rules by describing
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of the few institutions whose rules incorporate such a code,"2 arbitrators'
disclosure decisions during the selection process are only disturbed in
extraordinary circumstances."3 As a result, even erroneous failures to disclose
information are most often left undisturbed-a reality that arbitrator candidates
are undoubtedly aware of when they make their decisions."" One of the most
compelling reasons to develop clearer standards is to reduce the need for
arbitrators or candidates to rely on their own discretion at a time when their
own interests are at stake."5
2. Cognitive Dissonance and the Arbitrator Selection
Process
Another polemic inherent in regulating arbitrator conduct is parties'
simultaneously self-interested manipulation of, and unrealistic expectations
about, the arbitrator selection process. The ability to select arbitrators is
viewed by many as the benefit given in exchange for the agreement to forsake
appeal."6  Substantive decisionmaking accuracy is assured through the
selection of expert decisionmakers instead of multiple levels of substantively
specific categories of relationships and activities, instead of relying on qualitative terms such as
"independence." Useful as they may be, however, these codes are not formally binding on arbitrators
or in arbitral proceedings, except in those rare instances when the parties expressly incorporate them
into their contract by reference. See Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629, 631
(1989) (proposing language by which ethical codes can be incorporated into the arbitration agreement
via reference to some national body of law); Dr. lur. Oliver Dillenz, Drafting International
Commercial Arbitration Clauses, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 221, 250 n.71 (proposing
contract language for parties to incorporate the International Bar Association, Ethics for International
Arbitrators in their agreements). The problem is that parties rarely adopt these freelance codes and,
absent formal adoption, courts generally treat them as irrelevant. See ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix
of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that there was no basis for setting
aside awards based on nondisclosure because there were no applicable rules requiring disclosure); Al-
Harbi v. Citibank, N.A, 85 F.3d 680, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that there is no source for any
such generalized duty in the absence of expressly applicable codes).
Only a handful of arbitral institutions have implemented a formal code of ethics, most notably
the AAA and the Chamber of National and International Arbitration of Milan. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text (discussing the AAA Code of Ethics, which has recently been redrafted); Code of
Ethics for the International Arbitration Rules of the Chamber of National and International Arbitration
of Milan (CNIAM), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/milan.chamber.of.commerce.international.arbitration.rules.2004/a (last
visited Oct. 29, 2004). The Milan Chamber's code conditions an arbitrator's appointment on
acceptance of the code and sets dismissal of the arbitrator as a penalty for noncompliance with the
code. See id. arts. 1, 7.
113 Freelance ethical codes, which parties can incorporate by reference into their agreements,
provide some relief from the ambiguous standards of arbitral rules by going beyond qualitative
descriptions of the nature of information that should be disclosed to delineate specific categories of
information, such as personal and business relationships with counsel or witnesses.
114 While no comprehensive empirical research has been conducted, claims of bias rarely result
in refusal to enforce an award. For a discussion of challenges to arbitrators during arbitration
procedures, see infra note 134 and accompanying text.
115 More specific conduct standards would not necessarily translate into a commensurate
broadening of the enforcement standards. As noted above, I take up the relationship between conduct
and enforcement standards in a forthcoming companion article.
116 V.S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 16-17 (1980)
(describing control over the composition of the tribunal as the "royal road" that has lured sovereign
nations into international adjudication); Rau, supra note 65, at 506, 527 (noting the "widely shared
conviction that the ability participate in the selection of arbitrators is critical to fairness" and that "to
many, .... the right to choose one member of the panel is the very 'essence of arbitration"') (quoting
Sir Michael Mustill, Multipartite Arbitrations: An Agenda for Law-Makers, 7 ARB. INT'L 393, 399
(1991); see also W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 541-72.
74 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
untrained decisionmakers."' The ability to select decisionmakers makes it
possible, for example, to appoint trained computer engineers to preside over a
software dispute, or English-law trained barristers to preside over an insurance
dispute governed by English law.
Quite apart from assuring professional aptitude, however, parties also
use the selection process to ensure that their individual interests will be
represented on the tribunal. The result is the practice of the tripartite panel, in
which each party selects a party-appointed arbitrator, who together then select
the chairperson."' Instead of seeking out "impartial" arbitrators based solely
on professional qualifications, parties predictably seek to "load" the tribunal in
their own favor by selecting arbitrators who may be more sympathetic to, if not
predisposed in favor of, their case."9 For example, although usually irrelevant
as a qualification to decide the dispute, parties often focus on a candidate's
nationality'20 or use specific professional experiences as a proxy for a
candidate's predilection in favor of their legal position.'2'
Parties also engage in pre-selection inquiries and occasionally
interview directly with candidates to determine more precisely the candidate's
predisposition. There is little agreement about the substantive limits on pre-
appointment inquiries and interviews,'22 and it is easy to imagine how parties
117 See Resnik, supra note 89, at 859.
As Alan Scott Rau explains:
Nowhere perhaps is the tension between traditional
ideals of adjudicatory justice and the contractual nature of
arbitration felt more keenly than in the case of the so-called
"tripartite" panel, where each disputant is permitted to
select "his" arbitrator and the two arbitrators named in this
way are then to name the chairman of the panel. Party-
appointed arbitrators on "tripartite" panels occupy an
uncomfortable and ambiguous position-not quite
"advocates," perhaps, but not exactly "judges" either.
Rau, supra note 65, at 497-98; see also Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 65 ("There is a perceived
need.., for party-appointed arbitrators in international arbitration, and the predominant practice, as
reflected in the most widely used rules, is to presume, or even to require, that if three arbitrators are to
be appointed, each party shall appoint or nominate one of the three.").
19 See Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 ARB. 219, 223 (1987)
(explaining from his perspective, as an international arbitration practitioner, the optimal party-
nominated arbitrator "is someone with the maximum predisposition towards my client, but with the
minimum appearance of bias").
120 See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 46, § 12.04, at 196, § 13.05, at 224; Lowenfeld, supra note 61,
at 60, 69; Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and
Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L
395,401 (1998).
121 For example, in an intellectual property dispute, a party who is defending its license rights
might assume that a former in-house counsel for a technology-producing firm will be more
sympathetic to licensors than licensees. Courts have held that such industry-based sympathies do not
constitute disqualifying bias in arbitrators. See Carteret County v. United Contractors, 462 S.E.2d 816
(N.C. App. 1995) (holding that arbitrators are not considered biased simply because they are members
of the same profession as one of the parties). Chris Drahazol has undertaken the important work of
empirically documenting this, and other important trends affecting the practice of international
arbitration. TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH, supra note 49, Appendix A.
122 As the leading treatise of ICC arbitration describes, "it is perfectly proper for a party to
discuss the case with the potential arbitrator" and "it would be irresponsible for the arbitrator to accept
nomination without some knowledge of the scope and nature of the dispute." See CRAIG ET AL., supra
note 46, § 13.03, at 213. In addition to threshold inquiries about arbitrator-candidates' availability,
parties may also attempt to use the initial interview process as an opportunity to gauge the extent to
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and arbitrators from different legal systems could have substantially different
notions about what is proper in this process.23  At a minimum, given the
fundamentally different European and American conceptions about the role of
the party-appointed arbitrator, it follows that American and European parties
will have radically different notions about the range of appropriate questions in
interviewing candidates.'2 The irony of this pick-the-most-partial arbitrator
contest is that it collides sharply with parties' increased sensitivity to signs of
bias that may undermine the accuracy of the final decision."'
Possible solutions that have been offered to these problems are partial
and incomplete. For example, in response to the narrow question of pre-
appointment interviews, some commentators have suggested that the parties
conduct joint interviews." 6 Another possible solution to the more endemic
problem of loyalty to appointing parties has been proposed by the CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution. CPR has developed a relatively novel,
optional "screened" appointment procedure for its domestic arbitration rules,
which is intended "to offer the benefits, while avoiding some of the drawbacks,
of party-appointed arbitrators.""' 7 Under this procedure, two of three arbitrators
which the arbitrator might be predisposed in their favor at a more substantive level. See KLAUS PETER
BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 252 n.357 (1993). Although opinions on the
propriety of these particular questions might vary, parties often inquire about candidates' prior rulings
in arbitrations, their substantive views on particular legal issues, and their responses to hypotheticals
that could bear some resemblance to the facts underlying the case at hand. For example, the Swiss
Arbitration Association (SAA) hesitantly affirmed that a potential arbitrator could travel, at the
nominating party's expense, to meet with the party, and the SAA opined that although the case could
not be discussed in concrete terms, the candidate could still answer questions regarding his opinions
with respect to particular legal issues. See 1997 BULLETIN OF THE ASSOCIATION SUISSE DE
L'ARBITRAGE 2, 188, cited in Rau, supra note 65, at 130 & n.81.
123 Although not binding, the International Bar Association's Code of Ethics for International
Arbitrators, art. 5.1 (1987) sets forth some guidelines for communications during the nomination
process, which would preclude most of these types of questions. See IBA Code of Ethics, reprinted
in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
APPLICABLE TO THE CROSS-BORDER PRACTICE OF LAW 361-62 (Edwin Godfrey, ed. 1995). See
generally Bishop & Reed, supra note 120 (providing additional discussion of strategy in and
limitations on arbitrator interviews.)
124 In fact, I first became aware of and interested in questions of arbitrator conduct when I was a
junior associate charged with scheduling in-person appointments to interview candidates for an
international arbitration. At one point, my efforts were met with a vigorous reproof from a candidate.
Notwithstanding his derision, however, he could not point me to any source that either justified his
position or provided guidance about the extent or limits of pre-appointment communications.
Needless to say, at that point we crossed him off our list of desirable candidates, if for no other reason
than that he had apparently decided were engaged in illicit practices.
125 See discussion supra Subpart I.A. 1. There are clearly strategic disadvantages to selecting an
arbitrator who is overtly partisan, since clear partisanship can result in a loss of credibility and
effectiveness on the tribunal.
126 See Charles H. Resnick, To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2002, at
37, 38 (advocating interviews of arbitrator candidates, but cautioning that parties "should do so only
jointly with opposing counsel"); Spalding, supra note 24, at 356 (stating summarily that interviews
"can be undertaken appropriately only if done jointly by counsel for all parties"). Notably, both of
these authors are arbitrators and their rather emphatic conclusions appear to be based more on opinion
and experience than published rules or established practices.
127 Robert H. Smit & Kathleen M. Scanlon, How New Nonadministered Rules Improve
Arbitration Processes, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 172 (2000) (describing CPR
Arbitration Rule 5.4). As Smit and Scanlon explain:
On the one hand, parties are able to designate
arbitrators whom they consider to be well-qualified to sit on
the tribunal. On the other hand, any tendency (subtle or
otherwise) of a party-appointed arbitrator to favor or
advocate the position of the appointing party is avoided
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can be designated by the parties without the arbitrators knowing which party
designated them. Notably, however, CPR did not add this option to its
international rules because in the international context the screen would be
harder to maintain since parties tend to select arbitrators of their own
nationality.'28 CPR commentators also acknowledge that the screening rule is
less necessary in international arbitration since appointment of "biased, party-
appointed arbitrators is more pronounced in U.S. arbitrations than in
international arbitrations."'2 9
While many international experts would agree that partisan party-
arbitrators are less prevalent, U.S. parties new to international arbitration often
unwittingly (and unbeknownst to their opponents) import their assumptions
based on domestic experiences into the international context. "' Resulting
problems involve not only bias produced by engineered appointments, but also
bias and unfairness produced by unperceived asymmetry between the
appointment procedures used by each party.' Rising expectations about the
transparency and precision of arbitral decisionmaking combine with
entrenched practices of manipulating the selection process to increase the
prospect of challenges to arbitrators and to create opportunities to abuse the
challenge procedures.'32
3. The Conflation of Conduct Standards with
Enforcement Standards
Another problem is that the timing of challenges to arbitrator conduct
contorts the meaning of arbitrator impartiality. Most alleged arbitrator
because those arbitrators are approached and appointed by
CPR rather than the parties and are not told which party
designated each of them.
Id. Similarly, the Liverpool London Cotton Association has a process called "Anonymous
Arbitration," pursuant to which a dispute can be resolved without the arbitrators being told the names
of the parties or the parties being told the names of the arbitrators. The Liverpool Cotton Association
Ltd. Bylaws and Rules 344 (1997) (amended 2004), available at
http://www.lca.org.uk/pdffiles/rules.PDF (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter LCA Bylaws].
12 See Smit & Scanlon, supra note 127, at 172.
129 See id.
130 See Vagts, supra note 45, at 260.
Notably, even within a culturally uniform domestic context, as one treatise warns, "[B]oth
sides frequently have different expectations concerning the degree of partisanship or the types of
activities in which the 'party arbitrators' may engage." JUDGE H. WARREN KNIGHT (RET.) ET AL.,
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Ch. 8-E, 8:124 (1995).
132 In re Arbitration Between Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. & Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 579
F.2d 691, 700 (2d Cir. 1978) (observing the tendency of losing parties to seize upon an "undisclosed
relationship" between a party and an arbitrator "as a pretext for invalidating [an] award"); de Witt
Wijnen, supra note 59, at 2 ("The number of challenges to arbitrators seem to be increasing. Not only
before or at the time when arbitrators are appointed but also after their appointment, during the
proceedings and, later, in setting aside proceedings.") (footnote omitted) (on file with author).
Perhaps the most blatant example of purely strategic claims of bias is in two consolidated cases,
Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia and Patuha Power Ltd. v. Republic of
Indonesia, which are reported respectively in 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 1, A-I (2000), and 15
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 1, B-1 (2000). Accusations of bias on the part of the chairperson
followed failed attempts to enjoin the arbitral proceedings in Indonesian courts and threats to
prosecute and imprison opposing counsel, and were followed by a kidnapping of Indonesia's party-
appointed arbitrator. In a testament to the resilience of international arbitration as an institution and
the fortitude of the remaining two arbitrators, the tribunal reconvened the arbitration outside of
Indonesia, determined based on various international precedents that they had jurisdiction to proceed,
and rendered a $180 million award against Indonesia.
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misconduct occurs before the substantive proceedings begin,' but most
challenges to arbitrator conduct occur after the proceedings have concluded, as
challenges to award enforcement.'" As a result, the most in-depth
consideration of arbitrators' conduct is undertaken by courts, whose function
when faced with an award is to implement the strong pro-enforcement bias of
the New York Convention. The problem is that this pro-enforcement bias has
resulted in a reluctance to identify arbitrator conduct as improper. When
enforcement courts peer back through the other end of the kaleidoscope, they
reason backwards (even if only implicitly) that if the award is enforceable, then
there must not have been any arbitrator misconduct.'35 In this respect, courts
move back and forth seamlessly, in their rhetoric and analysis, between the
language of ethics and the language of arbitration award enforcement,
conflating substantive standards with remedial consequences for transgression
of those standards.'36 Even if interrelated, conduct standards must be separated
from enforcement standards.
Although there are currently no real alternatives for regulating conduct
standards, enforcement standards are an inadequate substitute for standards of
conduct for a number of reasons. First, enforcement standards are designed to
ensure the hyperenforceability of arbitral awards. The purpose of this
vigorously pro-enforcement bias is to insulate arbitral decisionmaking from
intrusive national court oversight. Enforcement standards provide final
recourse against the most egregious violations of the arbitral process, and are
therefore unable to provide detailed and meaningful guidance for arbitrator
133 I use the term "proceedings" to refer to the events in an arbitral case that involve the parties'
substantive claims, and to exclude the process of selecting arbitrators and enforcement of the award in
national courts. See Rau, supra note 65, at 490 ("Allegations that a particular arbitrator lacks the
requisite 'impartiality' almost always arise out of his supposed failure-at the time he was first
appointed-to reveal past contacts or relationships with one of the parties."). I use the term
"procedures" or "procedural rules" to refer to those rules, not included in arbitral rules, that govern the
substantive proceedings, meaning those proceedings after arbitrator selection.
134 There are several possible explanations for this fact. First, parties become more acutely
concerned about potential bias in an arbitrator's history and background when they receive an
unfavorable award. Post-award research can be inspired either because of legitimate concern over an
apparently unwarranted result, or as a last ditch effort to avoid a legitimate outcome since challenging
the arbitrator is one of the few possible means for avoiding enforcement of an award.
135 See, e.g., Consol. Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers of America, 48 F.3d 125,
129 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that award should be enforced despite arbitrator's failure to disclose that
his brother was employed by the union that was a party to the matter). In exercising their role in
regulating arbitrator conduct, arbitral institutions seem to adopt a comparable susceptibility to
temporal factors as demonstrated by the radically different rates of responsiveness to challenges to
arbitrator conflicts of interest depending on whether they are raised early or later in the proceedings.
For example, a study of challenges in ICC arbitrations between 1986 and 1988 found that the Court of
Arbitration refused appointment in seventy-two percent of the cases when challenges were raised prior
to confirmation, as compared to a mere nine percent of challenges raised during or after arbitral
proceedings. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 46, § 13.01, at 204. These statistics do not suggest any
clear conclusions since they cannot control for several potential variables, such as arbitrators'
increased willingness to voluntarily withdraw at the confirmation stage. See id.
136 In judicial contexts, there are separate codes of conduct, which are related to, but drafted
separately from standards for disqualification, even if the articulated standard ,overnine each is that
the iudge must avoid even the "aDpearance of impropriety." Compare CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
(1924). reprinted in LISA L. MILORD. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE, App. D, at
131, 140-41 (1992) (containing ethical obligations that apply to judges), with 28 U.S.C. § 455
(delineating standards for disqualification of judges).
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conduct."'
The limitations of the enforcement process are most aptly
demonstrated by the fact that Article V of the New York Convention, which
provides the exclusive grounds upon which a foreign arbitral award can be
refused enforcement,' 31 says nothing about arbitrator bias or misconduct. To
fill the gap, courts often look either to arbitral institutions' rules, which are
notoriously vague, ' or national arbitration laws. In the United States, the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that an award can be vacated "[w]here
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them
[sic].""'  In practice, however, the meaning of "evident partiality" has eluded
courts. When the Supreme Court tried to define the term over thirty-five years
ago, three dissenting justices concluded that it meant awards should only be set
aside on a finding of actual bias, which was absent on the facts of that case."'
The other justices all agreed that impartiality standards were violated by the
ongoing, undisclosed substantial business relationship between the arbitrator
and one of the parties, but they could not agree about what standard should be
applied."2
Writing for the purported majority, Justice Black argued that "we
should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of
arbitrators than judges.""'  Based on this reasoning, and invoking the language
of judicial standards, he concluded that arbitrators must "disclose to the parties
any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias"'" and must not
only "be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.""141 In his
concurrence, Justice White agreed with the result, but-notwithstanding a
137 In my forthcoming companion article, I reconcile the need for more precise standards for
guiding arbitrator conduct with the presumption in favor of hyper-enforceable awards and
enforcement standards more generally. Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A
Consent-Based Approach to Enforcement of Misconduct-Tainted Awards (draft on file with author).
138 If there is a conflict between the two, the prevailing view is that the New York Convention
trumps the FAA. See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir.
1997); see also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508
F.2d 969, 977 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Both the legislative history of Article V... and the statute enacted to
implement the United States' accession to the Convention [9 U.S.C. § 207] are strong authority for
treating as exclusive the bases set forth in the Convention for vacating an award.").
139 For example, the ICC Rules require only that an arbitrator be "independent" of the parties.
See ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 81, at art. 7, § 2. Despite the inherent ambiguity of this term,
the ICC has not published criteria defining the meaning of "independent," nor has it adopted the
International Bar Association's (IBA) guidelines in this area. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 46, §
13.03, at 212. Similarly, the Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) require
only that arbitrators be "impartial." See LCIA Rules, art. 5.3 (1998), available at http://www.lcia-
arbitration.com/arb/uk.htm#e (last visited Jan. 31, 2005); SCC Rules, art. 17(2) (1999), available at
http://www.chamber.se/arbitration/English/rules/scc rules.html#composition (last visited Jan. 31,
2005); CIETAC Rules, Ch. II, § 2, art. 28 (1994), available at
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw50.htm#Chapter/20II (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
140 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2002).
141 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 152 (1968). In
Commonwealth Coatings, the arbitrator was an engineering consultant who did regular and repeat
business with the respondent in the arbitration, including the rendering of services on the very project
involved in the arbitration. Id. at 146.
142 Id. at 149-51.
143 See id. at 149.
144 Id.
45 Id. at 150.
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rhetorical flourish and the parroting of the majority's phraseology-he made
some "additional remarks" that have called into question how much he actually
assented to the majority's reasoning. He stated that "[t]he Court does not
decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial decorum
of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges.' ' 6  His reasoning for holding
arbitrators to a different standard than judges is that arbitrators are "men of
affairs, not apart from but of the marketplace[.]' ' 7
Judicial fallout from this supreme confusion has been, predictably,
even more confused. Many courts have rejected the language of Black's
opinion, preferring instead the "clarification" offered by White's
concurrence.' 8 Closer examination reveals, however, that there is no real
contradiction. Instead, a distinction is being drawn between conduct/disclosure
standards in Justice Black's opinion, versus disqualification/enforcement
standards described in Justice White's concurrence. Justice Black reasons that
arbitrators must "disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an
impression of possible bias" and they must not only "be unbiased but also must
avoid even the appearance of bias."'4 9  Justice White, meanwhile, was
addressing enforcement standards when he reasoned that "arbitrators are not
automatically disqualified by a business relationship with the parties before
them if both parties are informed of the relationship in advance, or if they are
unaware of the facts but the relationship is trivial."'' ° Putting the two pieces
together, Justice Black's position is that we should expect rigorously ethical
conduct by arbitrators, but Justice White's position is that, even if those
conduct standards are sometimes transgressed, not every transgression should
result in disqualification or, by implication, award non-enforcement.
The failure to recognize that Justices Black and White were
distinguishing between conduct standards and enforcement standards has
resulted in innumerable splits among courts."' In addition to disorientation
I" Id. (White, J., concurring).
147 Id. Likewise, the English court in the AT&T case described in the introduction relied on a
judicial referent and distinguished arbitrators as "men of the world" whose experience contrasts with
"the cloistered calm of judicial life." AT&T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co., [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 22, 29
(Q.B. 1999).
148 As noted above, there is lower court disagreement about whether Justice Black's opinion is a
majority or plurality opinion. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Merit Ins. Co. v.
Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1983) (interpreting Justice White's clarification as part
of the majority decision).
149 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 149-50 (emphasis added).
150 Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
15, Compare Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefits Funds,
748 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that arbitrators are often chosen because of their
expertise and experience in a particular field, they cannot be held to the same standard as judges) and
Reeves Bros., Inc. v. Capital-Mercury Shirt Corp., 962 F. Supp. 408, 413 (S.D.N.Y 1997); with Kern
v. 303 East 57"h Street Corp., 204 A.D.2d 152, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (relying on fact that
arbitration awards are subject to judicial deference to find that the mere appearance of impropriety or
partiality is sufficient to warrant vacatur); Schnitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994)
(establishing the standard as whenever undisclosed information would create a reasonable impression
of bias); Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312
(11 th Cir. 1998) (expressly rejecting Ninth Circuit's test in Schmitz and defining "evident partiality"
instead to require a showing that arbitrator had actual knowledge of, but failed to disclose, information
that would lead a reasonable person to believe a conflict exists); Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83-84 (staking
out a middle ground between the "appearance of bias" standard and "proof of actual bias" and
defining the standard as where "a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was
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over the definitional fundamentals of "evident partiality," courts are also
confused about several implicit sub-questions. For example, there is
indecision about whether it is misconduct for an arbitrator to fail to investigate
and discover an unknown conflict, or whether the lack of specific knowledge
vindicates an arbitrator of any wrongdoing. '52 Courts are similarly split about
whether the same standards should apply to party-appointed arbitrators and to
so-called "neutral arbitrators" or arbitral chairpersons. 53 To complicate matters
further, there have been some suggestions that parties themselves do or should
have a duty to investigate conflicts by arbitrators.14  In the United States, the
confusion is in some ways more explicit than in other countries, in large part
because U.S. courts have had more cases in which to ponder the issue and in
part because the doctrine of stare decisis amplifies divisions and
inconsistencies.
If courts are confused, commentators seem only slightly more focused.
Commentators consistently refer to the need for augmented disclosure
obligations, "5 as if disclosure operates as a sort of confession and absolution of
arbitration's sins against the moral ideal of impartiality. Not surprisingly,
however, when it comes to demarcating the precise extent and limits of that
obligation, consensus quickly disappears. "6  Part of the breakdown in
consensus reflects the tension between the need for broad disclosure and the
partial to one party to the arbitration"); and DeBaker v. Shah, 194 Wis. 2d 104, 118 (Wis. 1995)
(defining a showing of evident partiality to require "clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable
person would conclude it clear, plain and apparent from the undisclosed information, that partiality is
so likely that action was required"); see also Burlington N. R. R. Co. v. Tuco, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629
(Tx. 1997) (reviewing various splits in both state and federal cases).
152 Compare Betz v. Pankow, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1503 (1995) (relying on arbitrator's lack of
knowledge of former firm's conflict to fird no impression of possible bias); Lifecare Int'l Inc. v. CD
Medical, Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 432 (11 th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the notion that arbitrators have a duty to
investigate past contacts and defining "evident partiality" to mean that arbitrator had actual knowledge
and that information was not disclosed) and A1-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 682 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (finding "no source for any such generalized duty" to investigate) with Wheeler v. St. Joseph's
Hospital, 63 Cal. App. 3d 345 (1976) (requiring vacatur of award notwithstanding fact that arbitrator
from reputable firm did not know of conflict).
153 Compare Barcon Assocs, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d 214 (1981)
(emphasizing that high standards for arbitrators apply equally to neutral and party-designated
arbitrators because they are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity); with Lozano v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
850 F.2d 1470, 1472 (1 lth Cir. 1988) ("An arbitrator appointed by a party is a partisan only one step
removed from the controversy and need not be impartial.").
'54 Most sources agree that a party who proceeds with an arbitration notwithstanding actual
knowledge of a conflict is deemed to have waived (or is estopped from raising) any objection. A few
courts have gone further, however, to suggest that parties themselves may have an affirmative duty to
investigate potential conflicts, and may be charged with actual knowledge if information of the
conflict was readily discoverable. See, e.g., Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197
(11 th Cir. 1982) (considering and ultimately rejecting claim that company should have knowledge of
conflict imputed to it because it possessed, but did not know about, the conflicts at issue); DeBaker,
194 Wis. 2d 104 (holding no "evident partiality" where arbitrator received political campaign
contributions from members of the law firm representing the opposing party because contributions
were publicly recorded and could have been accessed by the complaining party).
155 See, e.g., Orlandi, supra note 9 (arguing that enhanced disclosure requirements protect the
arbitration system); Forbes, supra note 9 (recognizing "disclosure... can in the end only benefit the
parties"). But see Carter, supra note 9, at 59 (expressing concern that expansive disclosure
requirements will result in undue burdens on arbitral candidates and preclude most qualified
candidates).
156 See FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
1060, at 580 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage, eds., 1999) ("The real problem is not the existence
of a duty of disclosure but determining which facts prospective arbitrators should disclose.").
41:53
2005 Regulating International Arbitrators:
perceived burden that broad disclosure requirements would place on
arbitrators.'57 The more exacting the duties to investigate and disclose, the
greater the burden in record-keeping and investigation that will be imposed on
arbitrators. Too great a burden, the argument goes, will render the occupation
of arbitrator undesirable to the most qualified candidates. ' Many also lament
that extensive investigation and disclosure obligations can increase the grounds
for refusing to enforce awards, destabilizing the entire system.'59 As I have
explained above, however, when conduct and enforcement standards are not
conflated, this latter concern is quickly deflated.
D. Conclusion
This examination of the standards and mechanisms that regulate
arbitrator conduct reveals a multitude of overlapping problems. To begin with,
the existing standards for arbitrator conduct are described in value-laden, yet
indeterminate terms such as "impartial" or "independent." In developing
workable standards, such platitudes are ineffective. Before a workable
framework can be developed, the underlying symptoms must be accurately
diagnosed.
Accurate diagnosis requires engagement with the true meaning of the
term "impartiality" in the specific context in which it is being applied. This is
the essential lesson of Jonathan Swift's Digression into Madness, where he
effectively illustrates how ethical judgment lies not in simply choosing
between contrasting values, but in conceptualizing the nature of the contrast
and the inter-relationships that exist between the seeming opposites."w Instead
of engaging in this process, courts and legislatures have generally fallen back
on incomplete and unconvincing analogy to the judicial ideal, and ill-defined
enforcement standards have become a substitute for a clear definition of what
arbitrator impartiality means. To be fully satisfactory, a theory of arbitrator
impartiality must explain the relationship between arbitrator standards of
conduct and those of their judicial counterparts, but it cannot use judicial
standards as a substitute for defining the critical terms.
157 As one commentator laments:
A potential arbitrator may be forced to undertake
significant research to look for potential "conflicts" of
which he or she is not even aware. In an age of large, multi-
office law firms and attorneys who make career changes
with some frequency from one firm to another, this has
become a problem.
James H. Carter, Rights & Obligations of the Arbitrator, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 59-60 (1997)
(objecting that "when legislators and courts begin to prescribe specific matters that must be disclosed"
the risk is that "a good principle" or broad disclosure may be taken "too far and infringe an important
right" of arbitrators).
158 See id.; see also Ruth V. Glick, Should California's Ethics Rules Be Adopted Nationwide?
No! They Are Overbroad and Likely To Discourage Use of Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall
2002, at 13; Judicial Council of California Adopts Ethics Standards for Private Arbitrators, 13
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 176 (2002) (noting that members of the council suspect that the
volume of information that must be disclosed under California's new standards "may be too
burdensome" and could "be used too readily" to disqualify arbitrators).
159 See, e.g., Glick, supra note 158, at 15. This lament is based on a false assumption that
conduct standards and enforcement standards are interchangeable.
160 This and other provocative and enlightened insights about A Tale of a Tub can be found in
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS
OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY 114-117 (1984).
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II. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND DECISIONMAKERS' ETHICS
The key to defining "impartiality" independent from the judicial model
is what I have elsewhere called a "functional approach" to professional
ethics.'6 ' The functional approach posits that professional ethics derive from
the functional role of actors in an adjudicatory system.'62 I have shown that the
fit between ethics and function not only illuminates at a descriptive level the
reasons why different legal systems adopt different ethical regimes for
advocates,'63 but also guides at a prescriptive level the development of new
ethical norms for international arbitration." These norms of conduct must be
integrated into the international arbitration system, which I take up in the
following Part III, and coordinated with enforcement standards, which I take
up in a forthcoming companion article.
In Subpart A, I critique as unworkable other methods that fail to
adequately define the role of the arbitrator. To provide the appropriate role
definition, I begin in Subpart B with an elemental definition of adjudication
and from there trace first the fundamental features of the non-specific
adjudicator and the broad perimeters of ethical obligations that that role
suggests. I then examine in Subpart C variations on the role of adjudicator that
exist in the United States and link debates over judicial conduct to these larger
underlying debates about role. Subpart C ends with a similar analysis in a
cross-cultural comparative context.
B. Role Definition as Predicate to Ethical Prescription
As Alasdair Maclntyre has explained, "moral agency is embodied in
roles" assigned to actors, who are "mutually interdefined in terms of types of
relationship.""'6 What this means in the context of professional ethics is that
"[e]thical codes do not establish the role of a professional. They guide and
facilitate performance of an already-established professional role."'"4 Because
situation-specific obligations cannot be analyzed outside the context of a
specific role, the starting point for delineating professional ethical obligations
is defining the role of the relevant moral agent, which in this situation is the
arbitrator.'67 Much of the current confusion over standards for regulating
arbitrators stems from a failure to address this necessary first step.
As depicted in the introduction, instead of beginning with a clearly
defined conception of their role, analysis of arbitrator ethics often relies on
161 My focus in earlier works was on the distinct but related problem of how to develop
international ethical standards for advocates from different countries who abide by different national
ethical standards. Rogers, supra note 30, at 361 & n.92.
162 See id. at 380-87.
163 See id. at 387-94.
64 See id. at 406-22.
165 Alasdair Maclntyre, What Has Ethics to Learn from Medical Ethics?, 2 PHIL. EXCHANGE 37,
46 (1978), cited in Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
WIs. L. REv. 1529, 1532 (1984).
166 Rogers, supra note 30, at 383.
167 "On the other hand, role cannot, in most instances, distill complex ethical quandaries down
to a single undeniable and controlling rule or algorithm, such that compliance with the rule would
obviate the need for any personal ethical reflection. The functions performed by a moral agent
establish a particular range of choices that would further fulfillment of that person's role and help
identify the factors to be taken into account in making ethical decisions." Id. at 382.
41:53
2005 Regulating International Arbitrators:
analogy to judicial ethics.6  The reasoning behind reliance on a judicial
referent is that arbitral decisionmaking substitutes for judicial decisionmaking,
so arbitral impartiality should be measured against the base model of judicial
impartiality. One problem with this approach is that it renders arbitrator ethics
nothing but a poor imitation of judicial standards, because most often arbitrator
impartiality is articulated as "lesser" or "less rigorous. '  This complaint is not
merely aesthetic. As noted above, the international arbitration system is
inspired by, and relies on, arbitrator integrity as one if its primary sources of
legitimacy.'70
Besides denigrating arbitral justice, the current approach is also
conceptually muddled. The notion of impartiality is not readily transferable
between these two adjudicatory contexts: While adjudicators in both contexts
seem to be performing the same task (i.e., resolving disputes), they have, as
will be explained in this Part, been assigned different roles in performing that
task. Even without further explication, this point seems almost intuitive after
considering not only the multitude of ethical incommensurabilities illustrated
in the Introduction,"' but also the many ethical obligations that are clearly not
translatable from one role to the other. For example, arbitrators are generally
regarded as having an obligation to maintain the privacy, if not the
confidentiality, of the proceedings."' Judicial adjudication, meanwhile, is an
inherently public activity, as, demonstrated by the fact that U.S. judges are
constitutionally compelled to open courtroom proceedings to the public."'
U.S. judges are ethically restricted regarding the nature and type of political
activities in which they can engage,"" but such restrictions make no sense for
arbitrators. These examples illustrate why ethical obligations cannot simply be
transplanted. They must be derived instead from the nature of these
decisionmakers' distinct roles.
168 As Carrie Menkel-Meadow has explained,
Many think that the Judicial Code of Conduct can be
used as a benchmark for ethical standards and professionalism
in situations where lawyers play adjudicative roles. I do not
agree, since the judge has a permanent role, which allows him
to be at arms length from parties on a regular basis.
Arbitrators who may depend on parties choosing and paying
them may be closer to lawyers seeking clients in some
respects, while resembling judges in others.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 Fla. St.
U.L. Rev. 153 n.49 (1999).
169 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
172 While the scope of judicial obligations to open their courtrooms in civil cases remains
unclear, in criminal cases, the obligation is well established. See generally Michael Collins, Privacy
and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 121 (1995) (highlighting that
institutional rules normally require arbitration proceedings to be private).
173 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980) (concluding that
the public has a qualified First Amendment right to access criminal trials).
174 Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and
Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1045, 1088 (1991) (noting that judges are
ethically prohibited from engaging in political activities because "[t]he public expects the courts to
work above the tangle of partisan politics").
84 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
There have been similarly befuddled suggestions that the role of the
advocate-lawyer could be a basis for extrapolating arbitrator ethics.'75 The
primary rationale for using attorney ethics is that although the attorney and the
arbitrator perform different tasks, the same actor is performing both tasks and
should therefore be bound by the same ethical obligations. The obligations
imposed on both also seem also to resemble each other. Attorneys must be
free from conflicts of interest, just as arbitrators must be free from bias.
Attorneys must conduct "conflict checks" before accepting representation, just
as arbitrators have a "duty to investigate" before accepting an appointment.
7 6
As Carrie Menkel-Meadow points out, however, "[o]ur conventional rules of
ethics are particularly inapposite when lawyers serve in quasi-judicial roles as
arbitrators .. ,,."" Attorney ethics were developed for those acting in the role
of advocate, where the hallmark is loyalty to, not independence from, a
client.' The role of lawyer is fundamentally different than the role of
adjudicator, even if both tasks can be undertaken by the same person."'
Development of arbitrator ethics requires, as a starting point, a clear definition
of the role of the arbitrator.
B. Defining the Role of the Adjudicator
Arbitrators and judges are both subsets of the larger category of
adjudicators; arguments relying on judicial standards instead implicitly assume
arbitrators are a subset of the category of judges.'80 It is the failure to recognize
this relationship that leads to the misleading judicial referent. The process of
defining the role of the arbitrator must begin, therefore, by defining more
generally the role of the adjudicator and, with that definition in hand,
explaining the nature and effects of variations within that general category.
1. Universal Features of Adjudication and Adjudicators
All adjudicators share certain core features, which derive from the
nature of adjudication itself. Although the ultimate aspirations and limits of
adjudication have been subject to heated debate,'"' Lon Fuller's classical
175 See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (tying arbitrator's obligation
to investigate possible conflicts of interest to his status and ethical obligations as a lawyer). For
reasonable presentations of this argument by esteemed scholars in ethics and arbitration, see Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., When ADR Is Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflicts Issues,
in 12 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 147, 147 (1994) ("Applying this rule
[regarding conflicts of interest] to [mediation], a law firm engaging in ADR practice must observe the
rules of ethics-particularly the rules concerning conflict of interest-in the ADR work and the other
practice, considering them as a single practice."); Gotanda, supra note 105, at 801-06 (arguing that
Model Rules 2.2 and 5.7 might apply to attorneys acting in the capacity of arbitrator).
176 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 168, at 183-84.
177 Id. at 162; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a
New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 63-84 (2002) (providing an elaborated analysis of how the
functional role of advocates differ from various dispute resolvers).
178 Lawyers' duty of loyalty and tolerance for lawyers' independence are not universal. For a
comparative analysis of the attorney's duty of loyalty, see Rogers supra note 30, at 368-70.
179 It is perfectly reasonable that one attorney might be bound by two different sets of
obligations-one when she is acting in the role of advocate and another when she is acting as a
decisionmaker. The multiplicity of ethical obligations is a product of the fact that "no one is ever an
abstract moral agent." Rogers, supra note 30, at 381.
18o See supra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
181 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of
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definition of adjudication provides the core for a universal definition.'82 Fuller
defined adjudication as "a process of decision that grants to the affected party a
form of participation that consists in the opportunity to present proofs and
reasoned arguments.' '83  The three constitutive elements or "ordering
principles" of adjudication under this definition are reason, adversarialism'
and separateness, 83 although the terms themselves are the subject of significant
debate.'86 Fuller uses these features to distinguish adjudication from other
forms of social ordering, such as contract and democratic popular
decisionmaking.'87
While Fuller provides a critical core, to distinguish adjudication from
other forms of dispute resolution and political decisionmaking, some other
features must be added.'88 Adjudication is "authoritative," meaning that the
Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982); Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
182 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 369 (1978).
As Jonothan Molot has pointed out, "[A]ny victory Chayes enjoyed over Fuller, and any defeat
suffered by Fuller, was only partial. Chayes may have succeeded in discrediting Fuller's arguments
regarding the types of disputes courts could handle (which Fuller dubbed adjudication's 'limits'), but
he did not discredit Fuller's observations regarding the adjudicative process (which Fuller dubbed
adjudication's 'forms')." Jonothan Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE
L.J. 27, 36 (2003).
183 Fuller, supra note 182, at 369.
184 As described in more detail later, see infra notes 265-272 and accompanying text, I challenge
Fuller's definition of "adversarialism" in terms of the uniquely U.S.-style "partisan advocate." While
a dispute is, by definition, founded on adverse positions that must be advocated and advanced by the
parties and their counsel, it is not necessarily true that that function must take the form of U.S.-style
"partisan advocacy." It is this accentuation of a culturally defined adversarialism that prevents
Fuller's definition from having cross-cultural, universal potency. One possible explanation for
Fuller's cultural blinders is that although he averred to be defining adjudication in "the very broadest
sense," he was really only attempting to define the meaning of adjudication within the framework of
the U.S. Constitution. See Fuller, supra note 182, at 353.
185 Fuller and many other scholars of procedure use the term "impartiality," but in an imprecise
way that conflates what I contend are two distinct concepts: the moral agent's role and the ethical
requirements that derive from that role. The term "separateness" connotes the status or role of a
decisionmaker in relation to the parties, whereas "impartiality" connotes the resulting mental state or
conduct that should flow from that status.
186 For example, like the term "impartiality," the term "adversarialism" has multiple
connotations. Fuller and other more contemporary scholars of U.S. procedure ascribe an intracultural
meaning to the term, while comparativist scholars use the term to designate intercultural differences,
particularly to contrast "inquisitorial" systems on the Continent. The former uses "adversarial" to
designate the dialectic ideal underlying litigation as a form, whereas the latter uses the term to
emphasize the fact that the parties, not the judge, controls the gathering of evidence and presentation
of proofs. Compare Fuller, supra note 182, at 383 ("It is only through the advocate's [partisan]
participation that the hearing may remain in fact what it purports to be in theory: a public trial of the
facts and issues.") with Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking Through Litigation: Adversarial and
Inquisitorial Systems Compared, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 193 (2002) ("Scholars of
comparative civil procedure often contrast American and continental European legal systems by
reference to the distinctive functions fulfilled by judges and lawyers in the two legal traditions. A
distinction is often drawn between 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' procedural systems."). In
elaborating a theory of adjudication, I use the term as neither an ideal nor a culturally defined
preference, but as a descriptive heuristic of one of the "valued features" of any adjudication, which
can be amplified or muted in relation to other competing features as demanded by a particular
adjudicatory system.
187 Fuller, supra note 182, at 366-69.
188 As described in more detail below, many of these "additions" actually derive from or can be
found in Fuller's writings on the subject. While I find Fuller's descriptive formulations useful, I reject
his conception of these formations as deriving from or inextricably linking to natural law theories. For
a discussion of the natural law foundations of Fuller's theories, see generally Robert G. Bone, Lon
Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public
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ultimate decision is final and binding on the parties.'89 This is the feature that is
usually relied on to distinguish adjudication from other forms of dispute
resolution.'" Moreover, the concept of adjudication cannot be considered apart
from the concept of jurisdiction,'9' which refers both to the power of bodies to
subject persons or things to adjudicative processes, as well as implicit
limitations on those bodies' decisionmaking power.'92 These notions of
authoritative and jurisdictionally bounded decisionmaking imply the closely
related requirement that adjudication exist within a system,'93 meaning within a
series of interrelated units that work together to effectuate its outcomes.' A
filly operational definition of adjudication, therefore, is a process to facilitate
final, binding, and jurisdictionally bounded decisions that operate within a
system and are based on the opportunity of participants to present proofs and
Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1290 (1995) (arguing that Fuller "assumed there
were natural principles that guided the ordering process").
189 This feature is implicit in Fuller's description of the products of adjudication, judicial
decisions, as "authoritative determinations," see Fuller, supra note 182, at 368, as well as some of his
other writings. See Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29-33 (Mark L. Kahn ed., 1962). See also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1670 (1998) ("[A]n adjudicative
system by definition requires a principle of finality.").
190 David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of Control: The Corporate Embrace of
ADR, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 133 n.2 (1998) (suggesting that the basis for distinguishing
mediation from arbitration is whether the process is nonbinding or binding); David A. Newton,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia, in A HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR IN
ACTION 231 (Karl J. Mackie ed., 1991) (noting the use of the term "non-binding ADR" to distinguish
between adjudicative and nonadjudicative forms of ADR, arbitration belonging to the former
category).
191 See Fuller, supra note 182, at 355 (noting that "certain problems by their intrinsic nature fall
beyond the proper limits of adjudication, though how these problems are to be defined remains even
today a subject for debate").
192 Jurisdictional limitations are necessarily part of the definition of adjudication because true
adjudicators do not enforce their own decisions but rely on other political forces for enforcement.
This feature is important to distinguish adjudicatory decisionmaking from deliberative and reasoned
political decisionmaking in which the decisionmaker and the enforcer are identical or at least closely
linked. Cf David Luban. The Adversary System Excuse. in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES
AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 90 (David Luban ed.. 1983) (defining the "adversary system" as "a method of
adiudication characterized by three things: an impartial tribunal of defined iurisdiction, formal
procedural rules. and... assignment to the parties of the responsibility to present their own cases and
challenge their opponents") (footnote omitted).
193 Adjudication must necessarily operate within a larger system because the other units are
necessary to ensure enforcement of adjudicatory decisionmaking, and to ensure that adjudicatory
decisionmakin2 operates within its prescribed iurisdictional limitations. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78.
at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961) ("The judiciary... has no influence over
either the sword or the purse... and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to
have neitherforce nor will but merely judgment ... ").
194 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479
(1997) (offering various definitions of systems). The requirement that adjudication operate within a
system distinguishes it from, for example, a mother's decision, upon hearing competing arguments
from her two children, about which one is entitled to possession of a favorite toy. In his essay, Fuller
seeks to include even this mode of decisionmaking in his definition of adjudication. See Fuller, supra
note 182, at 353. While parental discipline between siblings is clearly a form of dispute resolution, I
reject its inclusion within even the broadest definition of adjudication because parental
decisionmaking lacks many other features of true adjudication, such as jurisdictional boundaries or the
requirement of reasoned decisionmaking, as demonstrated by the most famous parental rejoinder
"because I said so." Still, I do not claim that every system that houses an adjudicatory process must
necessarily be a legal system, even if nonlegal systems of adjudication almost inevitably rest on
underlying legal regimes for ultimate enforcement. See David Chamy, Illusions of a Spontaneous
Order: "Norms " in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1841 (1996).
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reasoned arguments to third parties. This basic definition is subject to
innumerable particularized interpretations within various systems, which may
choose to invigorate one feature while muting another.'" Any process that
completely lacks one of these features, however, cannot be considered
adjudication.
This core definition of adjudication, in turn, delineates the role of the
archetypal adjudicator as a third party who is granted jurisdiction to render
authoritative and reason-based decisions after considering arguments from
both sides.'" These fundamental features inherent in the role of an adjudicator
provide a starting point for discerning the core essence of an adjudicator's
ethical obligations, including impartiality. When decisionmaking is infected
with bias, outcomes are not based on reasoned application of applicable legal
rules or premised on parties' proofs, but rather on the personal interests and
inclinations of the decisionmaker.' 9 Bringing reasoned analysis to bear on
legal problems necessarily requires being detached enough to engage in
rational analysis of the problem.'98 Relatedly, a requirement that adjudicators
consider arguments from both sides implies an obligation of fairness.'"
195 See infra notes 208-214 and accompanying text.
196 The definition of an adjudicator that emerges from my definition of adjudication illustrates
even more precisely why parental resolution of a sibling squabble is not adjudication. The parent is
not required to consider arguments from both sides or to render a reason-based decision. Surely a
good parent would listen to both children, and would decide based on reasons, but parental
decisionmaking is not founded on or defined by these requirements, whereas an adjudicator's
decisionmaking is. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. Those people who serve as
adjudicators may perform other functions corollary to their adjudicatory functions, and those functions
may carry their own ethical obligations. See generally, Murray L. Schwartz, The Other Things That
Courts Do, 28 UCLA L. REV. 438 (examining the nonadjudicatory activities of courts, including
promulgating rules, appointing officers, and administering probate estates).
197 The functional approach provides a conceptual analysis of the consequences of assigning
particular weights to various procedural values. While it does not attempt to defend a particular
normative vision of adjudication, it claims that certain procedural choices compel or preclude related
ethical obligations. See discussion supra Subparts II.B-C. The value of the functional approach to
normative undertakings in the context of procedural reform, therefore, is that it provides a means of
examining and testing the coherence (or incoherence) of various normative theories.
198 John Leubsdorf argues that the aim of judicial disqualification standards should be to ensure
that judges are able to put aside personal considerations, are willing to listen, and are able to act as a
clean slate. See John Leubsdorf, supra note 18, at 280-90.
199 In this context, I use the word "fairness" in a procedural sense, to refer to an affirmative
obligation to treat the parties equally as well as a negative obligation to avoid bias that would interfere
with an adjudicator's equal consideration of both sides. "Procedural fairness" has many different
connotations. See id. at 487. The sense in which I am referring to "procedural equality" and its
relationship to fairness is perhaps the most fundamental, what Professor Bill Rubenstein refers to as
"equipage equality," or equal opportunities for litigants to produce evidence and arguments. See
William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1874
(2002). As Jerry Mashaw observes, even in the narrower sense of equality of procedural opportunity,
"equality is a notoriously slippery concept, and its procedural implications are puzzling." Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 899
(1981). Notably, many of the conditions in traditional litigation settings that can systematically
disrupt this fundamental requirement are absent in the international arbitration setting, where all
parties can be presumed to have the financial resources to afford proficient counsel. Even if the
correlation between an attorney's cost and competence is not always a direct one, as David Wilkins
points out in his path-breaking article, corporations are less likely to be victimized by poor lawyering,
in part because they can employ their own sanctions in terms of reduced future employment. See
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L. REv. 801, 824-28 (1992); but see
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98
MICH. L. REV. 953, 970 (2000) (arguing that "[o]utside experts such as in-house counsel or market-
provided 'watchdog' services can only identify obvious abuses of the use of time or resources").
Notions of substantive fairness also operate as important measures in assessing the products of an
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The requirement that adjudicators are jurisdictionally bounded implies
an obligation to respect the limits of their jurisdiction.2 "0 The ethical nature of
this obligation explains why errors regarding jurisdiction are often described in
terms that imply moral or ethical judgment, whereas incorrect substantive
results are described simply as errors.' Finally, the authoritative nature of
adjudicatory outcomes, as well as their existence within a larger system,
imposes on adjudicators an obligation to preserve the integrity and legitimacy
of the adjudicatory system in which they operate.0 2 These responsibilities to
the system might translate into obligations in connection with performance of
certain administrative functions, 3 into obligations to avoid certain external
activities that are inconsistent with their judicial function,204 and into
obligations to avoid the "appearance of impropriety. 2 . The functional
approach reveals that, quite apart from any moral issues, fundamental ethical
adjudicatory system. Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian
Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B. U.L. REv. 485, 486 (2003).
200 In an extreme example, a traffic judge had a coffee vendor, who the judge had concluded was
selling "putrid" coffee, brought to his chambers in handcuffs. Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 53 (2d
Cir. 1978). The judge was charged with ethical violations for abusing his office and exceeding his
jurisdiction. In re Perry, 53 A.D.2d 882, 882, 385 N.Y.S.2d 589, 589 (2d Dept.), appeal dismissed, 40
N.Y.2d 1078, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1029, 360 N.E.2d 964 (1976). The judge was ultimately removed from
office and held civilly liable for violating the vendor's constitutional rights.
201"Conduct in excess of clearly defined limits of a judge's authority may amount to misconduct
requiring the disciplinary action be taken[.]" 48A C.J.S. Judges §109 (2004).
202 See Christopher J. Peters, Participation, Representation, and Principled Adjudication, 8
LEGAL THEORY 185, 185 (2002). Christopher Peters' work links participatory features of
adjudication with its legitimacy. Although he seeks to defend the law-making function of U.S. judges,
his arguments also help explicate the link between adjudicatory functions and obligations to preserve
the system in which those decisions are made.
203 See generally Murray L. Schwartz supra note 196 (examining the nonadjudicatory activities
of courts, including promulgating rules, appointing officers, and administering probate estates).
204 See Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the Response
to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 563 (2004) (discussing constitutional limitations
on legislative restrictions regarding judicial campaigning).
205 Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), recusal is mandatory "in any proceeding in which [the judge's]
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The "appearance of impropriety" standard originated as
a means of protecting the legitimacy or perceived legitimacy of judicial institutions. In an interesting
article, Professor Peter Morgan traces the modem rise of the appearance-of-impropriety doctrine to the
Black Sox scandal of 1919, the writings of lawyer/novelist Henry Fielding, and the turmoil following
Watergate. See Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil
Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REv. 593, 594-95 (1992). Although subject to some criticism, the standard
has some objective benefits in encouraging voluntary compliance with judicial outcomes. See
NADLER, supra note 99 (reporting on the results of an experiment that empirically tested the "Flouting
Thesis" in which participants who were exposed to laws and legal outcomes that they perceived as
unjust were more willing, as a general matter, to flout unrelated laws). In the United States, the
"appearance of impropriety standard" also serves an evidentiary function by permitting complainants
to produce objective evidence of possible bias, as opposed to the all-but-impossible to obtain actual
evidence of subjective bias. "[B]ecause not all improprieties are discernible, such [an appearance of
impropriety] rule lowers what could otherwise be prohibitively high evidentiary hurdles facing a
petitioner." Timothy R. Terry, Lawyers, Guns and Money: What Price Justice?, 88 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1087, 1113 (1998); see also Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 682
(7th Cir. 1983) (arguing that appearance of bias "just means that it is unnecessary to demonstrate-
what is almost impossible to demonstrate-that the arbitrator had an actual bias"). Notwithstanding
its importance, it is a standard without independent content. What creates an "appearance of
impropriety" for a government-appointed judge who wields law-making power in a political system is
necessarily different than what creates an "appearance of impropriety" for an arbitrator appointed
because of her professional expertise and experience by parties to resolve a single dispute. By
focusing on the relationship between the term "appearance of impropriety" used in the judicial context
and the term "evident partiality" used in the Federal Arbitration Act, the debate in the United States
avoids giving any real meaning to either of these terms.
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values cannot be compromised because, without them, the person could not
perform the role of adjudicator. 06
These core features of the adjudicator's role and their attendant ethical
obligations are universal, but only when discussed, as above, in the most
abstract generalities. Outside the fundamental definition of adjudication, there
are an infinite number of potential dispute resolution models that can be
designed to serve different goals and communities. In crafting these different
adjudicatory models, architects of various systems calibrate differently the
roles assigned to adjudicators, and as a consequence, adjudicators' professional
ethical obligations in these systems differ."7
To design a system, procedural architects answer a host of questions to
determine the salient features of the system: How are decisionmakers selected
to serve in the position of adjudicator? How are adjudicators selected for
individual cases? °. What are they being asked to decide? o9  On what
information should their decisions be based? What is the role of parties and
their counsel in the process?2 '  How will the decisionmaker evaluate the
information presented?2 ' What is the decisionmakers' constituency? And,
relatedly, what forces constrain decisionmaking? How does the decisionmaker
relate to underlying pojitical and governmental structures?. 2 What recourse is
available against decisionmaker error or abuse?. 3  What are the normative
206 See discussion infra Subpart II.B. 1. Fuller engages in a similar reasoning of the relationship
between judicial functions and the obligation of impartiality. Fuller reasoned that from the office ofjudge "certain requirements might be deduced, for example, that of impartiality, since a judge to be
'truly' such must be impartial. Then, as the next step, if he is to be impartial he must be willing to hear
both sides." Fuller, supra note 182, at 365. While Fuller identifies the link, this analysis reverses the
causal connection, namely that the obligation of impartiality results from the functional necessity that
a judge be willing and able to hear both sides.
207 As noted earlier, Professor Leubsdorf has recognized the link between ethical standards and
role, albeit in the judicial context. See Leubsdorf, supra note 18, at 239. Cf Rogers, supra note 30, at
385 (explaining how "[o]utside of the fundamental features inherent in the definition of an advocate,
and contrary to popular belief, the professional advocates of the world perform very different
functions ... in their respective adjudicatory systems"); M.D.A. Freeman, Standards of Adudication,
Judicial Law-Making and Prospective Overruling, 26 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 166, 181 (1973)
("Every institution embodies some degree of consensus about how it is to operate. To understand the
judicial role and apprise the legitimacy of judicial creativity one must explore the shared expectations
which define the role ofjudge.").
208 Brown & Lee, supra note 23, at 1044.
209 As Leubsdorf has noted, "[t]o define what a judge is is to decide what a system of
adjudication is all about." Leubsdorf, supra note 18, at 237.
210 As I have explained elsewhere, the role of parties and their counsel in proceedings is a
complementary counterpart to the judicial role. If the judge is assigned the role of questioning
witnesses, as in inquisitorial systems, attorneys' role with regard to witness testimony is circumscribed
to suggesting questions or adding minor clarifications. See Rogers, supra note 30, at 413-14.
211 For a discussion of how judicial roles are affected by different procedural arrangements and
legal methodologies, see discussion infra Subparts II.B-C.
212 For example, most democratic systems depend on a judiciary that is independent of other
branches of government. In the international and ADR contexts, the question is more how decisions
relate to the public government or governments. The UDRP, for example, was expressly designed as
a soft-law system that supplements but does not supplant national court adjudication of domain name
disputes. Laurence R. Heifer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case
Of The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 141, 203 (2001).
213 This question inquires not only about the availability of appeal, but the standards under which
review of an adjudicator's decision will be evaluated.
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objectives of adjudication?" ' And how will the legitimacy and correctness of
the outcomes be measured? In answering all of these and related questions to
create different models of adjudication, systems also fashion different roles for
adjudicators. Although the responses to all of these questions can affect the
role of adjudicators, the primary determinants are: the manner in which they
are selected and appointed to their positions as decisionmakers, the nature of
the decisions they are asked to render, and the procedural arrangements
through which they make their decisions. The next subparts examine the
variations that exist within the United States and in other national settings.
2. Competing Models of Adjudicators Within the U.S.
System
Within the United States, a host of models demonstrate how flexible
the definition of "adjudication" is. Even within the prototypical adjudicatory
model (i.e., the trial court or district court)," ' the role of the U.S. federal judge
has undergone several transformations in the past fifty years. The historical
and current debates in U.S. civil procedure illustrate the essential insight of the
functional approach-that ethical obligations derive from functional roles.
Following is a comparative "proof' of the functional approach using several
variations of adjudication that have been subject to what appear to be
criticisms about the ethical comportment of the decisionmakers. Analyzing
these various forms reveals how the criticisms, although sounding in ethics, are
really about role.
a. Administrative Tribunals
At the extreme end of the continuum of adjudicatory models, and some
say even hanging over the edge, are administrative tribunals."6
Notwithstanding the Administrative Procedure Act's use of the terms
"adjudication"2" and "judges,"28 many scholars doubt that administrative
"judges" actually "adjudicate." The labels are blankly mouthed, but they are
words that in this context have lost their meaning."9 Because they lack
institutional independence, administrative law judges ("ALJs") can impose
administrative policy on individual parties, but that is a different thing than
214 For a discussion of the different normative goals of the U.S. and Continental adjudicatory
systems, and the link between those goals and countries' cultural values, see Oscar G. Chase, Legal
Processes and National Character, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 17-18 (1997) (citing GEERT
HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES 25 (1980)).
215 Even at the trial level, there are a range of other adjudicatory models outside of this
paradigmatic example, such as small claims courts, James C. Turner & Joyce A. McGee, Small Claims
Reform: A Means Of Expanding Access To The American Civil Justice System, 5 UDC/DCSL L. REV.
177, 177-80 (2000), the federal Court of Claims, Note, The Constitutional Status Of The Court Of
Claims, 68 HARV. L. REV 527, 527-31 (1955), and the Court of International Trade.
216 See Michael Cornell Dypski, Standard OfJudicial Review for Administrative Decisions of the
United States Customs Service: Past, Present, and Future, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 103, 107
(2002) (referring to the Supreme Court's relegation of the Customs Courts "to a purgatorial muddle"
in an intermediate status above administrative agencies but clearly below full constitutional courts).
217 The APA defines "adjudication" as an "agency process for the formulation of an order." See
5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988). This definition has been criticized and alternative definitions proposed. See
KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 313 (2d ed. 1978).
218 The APA uses the term "judges" to refer to agency personnel who impose agency policy on
individual parties. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Organizing Adjudication: Reflections on the Prospects for
Artisans in the Age of Robots, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1992).
219 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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true adjudication.22 °
The debate over whether they are properly called "judges," however,
illustrates the link between role and ethics. Administrative law judges'
allegiance to their agencies and its substantive positions would clearly be an
impermissible transgression of traditional judicial ethics. 2 The extensive
criticism leveled against them, however, is not that they behave unethically.
Instead, criticism is aimed at the designation of a role that would not only
permit, but actually require, this kind of partiality in someone even nominally
called a "judge." Calls for reform seek to change this underlying role to allow
ALJs to undertake impartiality obligations, making this role more consistent
with that of a true adjudicator.22
b. The Public Law Structural Remedies Model
The emblematic model of adjudication, as Lon Fuller's definition is
usually cast, is based on a somewhat simplified notion of legal
decisionmaking. After modem psychology revealed the complexities of the
human psyche and Legal Realists refuted the notion that there exists one
objectively correct answer to any legal problem, the standard role of the judge
as impartial (and even agnostic) evaluator was no longer fully sustainable. 3
Armed with these insights and a rising awareness of the role of policy in
adjudication, and in response to intractable sociopolitical problems, Abram
Chayes and Owen Fiss heralded in the late 1970s a new role for judges as
vindicators of important public rights.22 ' In this role, judges are not only to
afford remedies for past harms, but to enact and oversee broad injunctive relief
aimed at effecting structural social change.225
In their reconception of the judicial role, Fiss and Chayes also
220 As Jerry Mashaw explains in his thoughtful critique of the issue, "[r]ather than viewing each
case as a unique opportunity to dispense individualized justice, as a job to be done well in and for
itself, administrators are likely to see adjudication merely as the means for implementing rules." See
Mashaw, supra note 218, at 1056. For a more disapproving critique of this problem, see William D.
Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts and the Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 351, 354 (2001) (noting that the existence of policy-making power under the rubric of
"adjudication" has caused concern among courts).
221 Notwithstanding the chorus of criticism, internally ALJs may perceive themselves differently
than their critics contend. See Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 321, 342 (2002) (arguing that "the role of the ALJ is defined by the
Model Code. Moreover, it is impossible to separate that role from the dictates and definitions of the
Code of Judicial Conduct-to be an independent decisionmaker and an example of good conduct in
public and private life. You may not be surprised to find that the two ABA resolutions address some
of these same concerns").
222 See Mashaw, supra note 218, at 1056 (expressing a concern to "protect[] adjudicatory
impartiality by upgrading the status of administrative judges, by separating them as much as possible
from their agencies, and by protecting them from those forms of importuning that lawyers devoted to
the sanctity of adjudicatory records call exparte contacts").
223 In making this point, Professor Leubsdorf eloquently describes modem psychology's
provocation of a shift in the perception of judicial bias "from the eighteenth century's economic man,
susceptible only to the tug of financial interest, to today's Freudian person, awash in a sea of
conscious and unconscious motives." See Leubsdorf, supra note 18, at 247.
224 Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, supra note 181, at 1284 (defining the
role of the trial judge as "the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief').
225 Although described as a direct challenge to the Fuller's model of adjudication, Fiss and
Chayes' model applies specifically to a subset of litigation, which is termed "public law litigation" and
aims at such projects as desegregating schools and reforming prisons and other institutions. See
Jonothan Molot, supra note 182, at 36.
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challenged the traditional notion (already destabilized by the Legal Realists) of
judicial impartiality as encompassing political neutrality.226 Under their theory,
instead of being ideal, judicial acts reflecting political neutrality are an
objectionable abdication of the proper judicial function. Fiss and Chayes
championed not only a new role for judges, but they defended the necessary
reformulation of judicial impartiality that must necessarily accompany the new
role.227
c. The Managerial Judge Model
In the past twenty years, Judith Resnik has identified another judicial
role: the "Managerial Judge.""22  Departing from the traditional model of
detached umpire, modem judges are "meeting with parties in chambers to
encourage settlement of disputes and to supervise case preparation" and as a
result "are playing a critical role in shaping litigation and influencing
results."29 Resnik is concerned, however, that Managerial Judging creates new
powers for judges because these activities are insulated from appellate
oversight and public visibility, and are free from institutional constraints."
This increase in judges' discretionary power marks a shift in the functional role
of the judge in relation to the parties.' In her managerial capacity, the judge is
not acting in response to party arguments or requests, but on her own initiative;
not issuing opinions that explain or justify her decision, but orders that must be
complied with, or informal pressure to compel party compliance."' The
change in role when judges are transformed from "adjudicators" to
"managers" '233 signals an attendant shift in the applicable ethical norms.
This shift occurs because the newly defined role elevates the values of
speed, and perhaps fairness, over deliberation and "separateness."' As the
functions of the Managerial Judge change, applicable ethical norms must
change to accommodate. Impartiality obligations in the traditional litigation
setting, which demand that judges scrupulously avoid ex parte contact and
226 Fiss and Chayes were essentially arguing that the correctness of judicial decisionmaking
should be evaluated by whether the results correspond with political ideals that are enmeshed in the
dispute, but also exist apart from the individual dispute. See Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political
Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43, 46 (1979)
(defining the role of the judge under the Fiss/Chayes model as a "political powerbroker").
227 Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428,
428 (1977) (arguing that in institutional reform litigation "judges are placed in a new role: they
become responsible for implementing broad reforms in complex administrative systems, without
ordinarily having expertise in either public administration or the particular institutional field in
question").
228 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 390, 425-27 (1982).
229 See id. at 377.
230 See id. at 392-93.
231 Seeid. at 414.
232 See id. at 404.
233 I do not contend, nor does Resnik, that when acting in their roles as managers judges are no
longer adjudicators. One purpose of my analysis of the role of the adjudicator is to demonstrate that it
is a flexible one that can be adjusted to fit within various systems.
234 See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 228, at 424-25 ("Judicial management has its
own techniques, goals and values, which appear to elevate speed over deliberation, impartiality and
fairness"). Defenders of Managerial Judging contest suggestions that it is less fair. See, e.g., Jon 0.
Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1644
(1985) (arguing that "fairness" in designing procedural systems requires consideration not only of
fairness to individual litigants, but also to other current and potential litigants).
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maintain intellectual and personal detachment from the litigants, are tied to the
traditional judicial role as neutral umpire. As judges assume a role that injects
them into party negotiations and requires them to mediate, they can no longer
be held to the same impartiality standards.235
Resnik implicitly acknowledges this point. But she does not argue that
Managerial Judges are acting unethically when they engage in ex parte contact
and develop personal intimacies with the litigants, even though this conduct
could be considered improper under the traditional model of the judicial role
and its impartiality requirements.236 She argues instead that this new form of
"judicial activism" is problematic and should be rejected because it would
necessarily require a shift in traditional conceptions of judicial impartiality. 37
After this new role has been implemented, in other words, criticism is more
fairly aimed at the legitimacy of the new role in light of the ethical obligations
attendant on it than at "violations" by those performing the new role based on
standards assigned to the antecedent role.23
Those who support Managerial Judging similarly acknowledge that the
role they envision has consequences for the conceptions of ethical obligations
of impartiality. The difference is that, unlike Resnik, they willingly accept the
shift in ethical standards that would accompany the change in role. 39 In other
words, while both sides acknowledge that a necessary correlative shift in
ethical standards occurs when judges become managers, they disagree about
235 See E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L.
REv. 306, 327 (1986).
236 Judges are generally prohibited from engaging in ex parte communications. See Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(7) (1990). But see id. at 307 (claiming consensus has developed that
such contacts are permissible if parties consent). Although application of this Canon is relatively
straightforward, Resnik refers to the techniques that characterize Managerial Judging as creating risks
or "threats" to impartiality, rather than characterizing them as clearly outside the boundaries of
acceptable judicial conduct. See Resnik, supra note 228, at 426-28 (describing Managerial Judging's
reliance on ex parte and informal processes as creating a "fertile field for the growth of personal bias"
and a "threat to impartiality"). But it is clear from her proposals that although framed as possible, not
actual, consequences, she clearly regards them as intolerable risks. See id. at 435-40 (discussing
possible reforms that would wholly separate managerial and judicial roles). This intolerance for
partiality that is possible but has not been demonstrated is consistent with insistence that the
legitimacy of the system requires not only the provision of justice but also the appearance that justice
has been done. For a discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard, see supra note 205 and
accompanying text.
237 See Resnik, supra note 228, at 380 ("[M]anagerial judging may be redefining sub silentio our
standards of what constitutes rational, fair, and impartial adjudication.").
238 Arguably, there is still room to criticize Managerial Judging techniques as ethically improper.
Even if attenuated impartiality is essential to the newly assigned role, at least part of the responsibility
for reconceptualizing the judicial role is attributable to judges themselves. See id. at 391-97
(describing the sources of changes to the judicial role as caused by "procedural innovations and the
articulation of new rights and remedies" as well as "changes initiated by judges themselves in
response to work load pressures").
239 See Elliott, supra note 235, at 327 (conceding that one cost of Managerial Judging may be a
real or perceived loss of fairness, but arguing that the cost is outweighed by increased substantive
justice when techniques are applied properly); see also Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the
Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 253, 261-63 (1985), cited in Elliott, supra note 235, at 311, 317. In
a more particularized example, advocates for the unrepresented poor argue that when unrepresented
poor are parties to an action, a judge's role should include vigorous assistance for those parties.
Russel Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles Of the
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987, 2028-29 (1999). In advancing this
argument, advocates recognize that the role they are urging would entail certain shifts in the nature of
a judge's impartiality. Id.
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the desirability of that shift.
d. The Transactional Model of Adjudication
More recently, William Rubenstein examines a genre of adjudication,
known as the "Transactional Model," that has emerged in "large, sprawling
class action lawsuits."2 '40 Under Rubenstein's description, modem class actions
have "more in common with business deals than they do with traditional
adversarial litigation, legislative activity, or executive management. 21 In class
actions, party control is hyper-accentuated and consequently the judicial role is
reduced to "one of presiding at a fairness hearing to bless the transaction. 24 2
This scenario represents a shift away from either the traditional adjudicatory
model or the Managerial model because it combines what Rubinstein
characterizes as settled adjudication and representative litigation.43 In other
words, "representative plaintiffs settle huge numbers of cases belonging to
absent parties."2" The resulting process, according to Rubenstein, is barely
distinguishable as adjudication and resembles more a private transaction, in
which effectively "defendants purchase a commodity-finality." '245
Like the Managerial model, the role shift implied in the Transactional
Model has consequences for judicial ethics. In the Transactional Model judges
may act "more as self-interested deal-brokers than as impartial dispute
resolvers."2 '6  According to Rubenstein, the judge's impartiality is replaced
with an obligation "to serve the interests of the judicial institution that sent
him."2 7  This obligation to serve an institution is distinguishable from a
professional obligation because, as Rubenstein argues,2" the judicial branch has
a "vested interest" in transactions that create finality because they are thereby
absolved of additional work.249  It is this presumed self-interest in reducing
their own workload that Rubenstein argues encourages judges to act more as
self-interested deal-brokers than as impartial dispute resolvers in the
transactional model. 50
240 William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 372
(2001).
241 Id. at 372.
242 Id. at 373.
243 Id. at 412.
244 Id. at 413.
245 Id. at 372-73.
246 Id. at 373.
247 Id. at 427.
248 Rubenstein's argument that Transactional Model judges serve an institutional interest of
conserving resources is not altogether persuasive. While it seems reasonable to assume, even in the
absence of empirical evidence, that judges will feel pressure to control their dockets and move cases
along, Rubenstein's arguments about the judicial branch suggest that judges personalize this urge into
a self-interested desire for a lighter caseload. See id. at 373. The institutional pressure is a
professional urge to administer justice swiftly and efficiently, while the personal pressure seems more
akin to professional shirking. To the extent that Rubenstein is referring only to the former, he may be
referring instead to "systemic bias," which is a related but distinct concept.
249 Id. at 373.
250 Id. To the extent that Rubenstein argues that the Transactional Model unduly emphasizes
finality and efficiency over other valued features of litigation, such as accuracy or party autonomy, it
may well be properly called a disrupting influence on the litigation process. It remains somewhat
questionable, however, whether the disruption is different than what other scholars have suggested is a
personal investment a judge may have in structured remedies. See Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke,
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Rubenstein, like Resnik, criticizes a judicial model that shifts the
judicial role in an undesirable direction, as opposed to critiquing conduct in
that role as improper. At a normative level, Rubenstein is troubled by the
ethical implications of the Transactional model he identifies."' He does not,
however, condemn judges for trespassing against static principles of
impartiality, but instead he questions a role that would enable and permit them
to abide by different standards of impartiality. Like Resnik, he is not arguing
that judges act unethically in the model he identifies. Rather, he argues that
the Transactional Model is perilous because it shifts the judicial role in a
manner that would permit what he conceives of as an illegitimate disruption of
impartiality."2 Even if one does not accept Rubenstein's argument that judges
might so easily be seduced by the lure of lower caseloads, the Transactional
Model portends another shift in the judicial role that implicates judicial ethics.
Rubenstein notes that courts enforce "transacted judgments" from other
jurisdictions "even if the dealmaking judicial system would have had no
jurisdiction to litigate the transacted case," pointing out that the Manual on
Complex Litigation urges judges to coordinate with one another not only
within a state or the federal system, but also across states and between states
and the federal system."3 At least some of these practices have been
questioned as an improper shift in the judge's role as independent
adjudicator."5 Others who have directly considered the shift in ethical
obligations on judges in mass tort litigation have expressly acknowledged that
the ethical shift is a product of the shift in roles. "
Innovation or Illegitimacy: Remedial Receivership in Tinsley v. Kemp Public Housing Litigation, 65
Mo. L. REv. 655, 701 (2000) (arguing that a particular judge "has an interest in the outcome of the
litigation, both because of his principled commitment to helping the residents of public housing, as
well as his professional interest in vindicating his choice of remedy"). Rubenstein may be using the
terms "impartial" and "vested interest" not as technical indicia of judicial professional ethics, but
instead to express more generally the idea that pressures are influencing judges to behave in ways they
may not otherwise and that the effect of those pressures is normatively undesirable.
251 "Should lawyers and judges engage in activities that are best characterized as transactional,
not adjudicative, in nature?" he asks. Rubenstein, supra note 240, at 431.
252 Rubenstein candidly admits that the Transactional Model does not "purport to provide final
answers" to normative questions about the proper judicial role in class action litigation. Id. at 375,
431. Instead, he seeks to "reorient our thinking toward the reality of class action litigation, a reality
that our current doctrinal discussions and theoretical conceptions tend to mask." Id. at 375.
253 Id. at 373.
25 As Martha Minow queries:
Has the court strayed into the domain of the executive
to enforce the law or taken over the task of the legislature to
devise prospective rules and establish governmental
agencies? Have appointed judges stepped into the fray
reserved for elected officials? Are the judges making
political judgments that require accommodation, bargaining,
and the accountability of the electoral sanction for
democratic legitimacy and efficacy?
Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2010, 2022 (1997). Even if invoking the terms that may
suggest ethical judgment, Minow's critique focuses on the constitutional and institutional
appropriateness of this shift in roles, as opposed to challenging the new role under traditional judicial
ethics. For example, Minow frames the larger debate as over the "proper relation between justice and
law" and implicitly the judicial role in that relationship. See id. at 2025.
255 Geoffrey Hazard notes that "[I]f we are to understand the ethical problems posed in mass tort
cases, whether involving personal injury or discrimination-poverty, we should address the web of
interests, power, authority, and responsibility in which the operatives in these new institutions
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d. Final Observations
The differences between the Public Law Litigation, Managerial
Judging, and Transactional Litigation models demonstrate that, although
created and constrained through relatively fixed traditions, precedents and
rules,2 6 the role of judges evolves in response to new social and political
pressures."' The model proposed by Fiss and Chayes altered the judicial role
by redefining the proper scope and nature of judicial products to include
structural remedies administered over time. Resnik's Managerial Judging
altered the traditional judicial role by moving from more formal to less formal
procedures, and by shifting the end product from full adjudication on the
merits to lesser included decisions that would encourage settlement.
Rubenstein's Transactional Adjudication reduces the role of the judge to
ratifying an already negotiated result. In each case, these changes in role
suggest a corollary shift in the notion of impartiality incumbent on the
adjudicator.
Donald Elliott argues that these procedural changes represent creative
evolutionary adaptations, which allow new functions that are needed but
unaccommodated by a system's traditional structure, in the same way the
panda's thumb allows an otherwise clumsy paw to efficiently strip shoots off
bamboo.258 Unlike biological organisms, however, legal systems are not only
concerned with changes that offer more efficient alternatives. Efficiency, or
that aspect of it called "economy," is one valued feature of the adjudicatory
process, but it stands in competition with several others.26 The crux of civil
procedure debate in the United States today is focused not so much on whether
a given procedure is more or less efficient,26' but rather on what weight
efficiency should be given in relation to other adjudicatory goals.262 To answer
function." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on Judge Weinstein's Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort
Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 569, 578 (1994) ; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass
Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 473-74 (1994).
256 As Resnik points out, the shift to the Managerial model was in part caused by changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Resnik, supra note 228, at 425-27.
257 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66, 172-77 (1982)
(discussing shifts in the judge's role in the face of obsolete statutes).
258 The analogy of a panda's mock "thumb" to civil procedure innovations was introduced by
Elliot. Elliot, supra note 235, at 307 (citing STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MORE
REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 21-24 (1980) for the metaphor).
259 Elliot, supra note 235, 334-35.
260 Resnik uses the term "economy," which she defines to mean "that part of efficiency that
relates to resource conservation and to the view that a functional system must produce results speedily
and with minimal cost." Resnik, supra note 89, at 854. Her article identifies litigants' autonomy,
litigants' persuasion opportunities, decisionmakers' power, the diffusion and reallocation of that
power, decisionmakers' impartiality and visibility, rationality and norm enforcement, ritual and
formality, finality, revisionism, economy, consistency and differentiation as valued features of United
States procedure. See id. at 837.
261 Judith Resnik questions the "efficiency" of Managerial Judging at the trial court level. See
Resnik, supra note 228, at 417-24 (arguing that without data on the amount of "judge-hours that
management consumes and saves, as well as information regarding the effect of management on
parties' costs," it is not possible to evaluate the efficiency of Managerial Judging).
262 Several strands of the debate have been discussed above, but there are still others. See, e.g.,
Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural
Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REv. 485, 487 (2003) (arguing that "[a]ll fairness arguments operate in the same
way: they provide reasons to trump or constrain the pursuit of aggregate social goals such as
economic efficiency").
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this question, the magnitude of efficiency gains must be evaluated on a
normative scale in light of other adjudicative values.
The functional approach cannot provide normative valuation. It can,
however, clarify an unacknowledged blurring of role definition and ethical
obligations by illustrating both the separateness of and interconnectedness
between the two."3 Any normative redesign meant to address problems such as
mass tort class actions and adversarial excesses must define a judicial role that
either coheres with the ethical obligations expected of judges by their
constituency or justifies departure from those expectations. Functional roles
are sensitive to evolutionary pressures because they are inherently utilitarian.
Ethical expectations, however, are more constant over time, even as the
original role to which those obligations were tethered has slipped from its
moorings. While new roles may portend new ethical obligations, it is not
always certain that those new obligations will be readily accepted as
legitimate.
C. Adjudicatory Models in Comparative Perspective
For as many different judicial models as exist and are debated in the
United States, the number and functions of tribunals vary even more across
cultures, The study of foreign systems can provide meaningful insight into the
efficacy of home-grown legal theories, particularly by revealing to us our own
unacknowledged and hidden assumptions."' Fuller, for example, doubts that a
judge in an inquisitorial system' could be impartial. Fuller and his co-author
John Randall note:
Any arbiter who attempts to decide a dispute
without the aid of partisan advocacy.. . must
undertake not only the role of judge, but that
of representative for both of the litigants.
Each of these roles must be played to the full
263 The functional approach also offers another response to Professor Molot's lament that
"scholars are reluctant to rely on an old judicial role to tackle new litigation problems." Molot, supra
note 182, at 31. Without a normative justification, the traditional judicial role is simply a utilitarian
choice made at an earlier time. Molot attempts to provide the needed normative justification by
reference to the judiciary's institutional competence and constitutional authority in performance of its
traditional role. The comparative analysis that follows offers other visions of judicial competences,
which raise legitimate questions about whether the traditional U.S. judicial role is the only one to
which judicial officers are institutionally adept. On the other hand, the functional approach adds to
Molot's constitutional justifications the observation that the traditional judicial role is consistent with
the ethical obligations that confer legitimacy on the judicial function.
264 See Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver's Troubled Travels, or The Conundrum of Comparative
Law, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 149, 182-83 (1998).
265 While it remains a useful heuristic device, it has long been acknowledged that systems
described as "civil law," "civilian," and "inquisitorial" are a range of distinct traditions. For this
reason, in my comparative analysis, I use these terms in the tradition of Max Weber and Mirjan
Damaka-to represent an ideal type, as opposed to a specific tradition, except to the extent I identify
specific national traditions. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 9 (1986). While this focus
undoubtedly poses some inherent limitations, the use of "ideal types" is helpful to demonstrate the
functional approach's ability to explicate the reasons behind different ethical regimes. The limited
focus of my comparative analysis reflects primarily limitations of my own knowledge, not a judgment
that norms for international arbitration need only consider European and American perspectives. To
the contrary, especially given the expanding role of arbitration in developing nations, it is particularly
important that legal systems outside of Europe and the United States be incorporated into the
discussion.
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without being muted by qualifications derived
from the others. When he is developing for
each side the most effective statement of his
case, the arbiter must put aside his neutrality
and permit himself to be moved by a
sympathetic identification sufficiently intense
to draw from his mind all that it is capable of
giving .... When he resumes his neutral
position, he must be able to view with distrust
the fruits of this identification and be ready to
reject the products of his own best mental
efforts ... 26
Defining the judicial role as contingent on U.S.-style partisan advocacy biases
Fuller's critique of judicial impartiality.267 By holding this definition as a
necessary constant, Fuller critiques the inquisitorial model for not properly
accommodating the judicial role.68 As David Luban explains, Fuller "is
presupposing that the inquiry proceeds best by unmuted adversary
presentation, in which case, of course, an inquisitorial investigation becomes
by definition a mere copy of the real thing." '69
Here, Fuller succumbs to one of the most common hazards of
comparative analysis: Fuller's erroneous conclusion about the implausibility
of judicial impartiality in the absence of "partisan advocacy" rests on a failure
to recognize that abstracting particular characteristics from their systemic
context portends the results of their comparison to other features of the
system."' To borrow Professor Andrew Huxley's poignant illustration of this
classical problem, the comparison of chalk with cheese necessarily will
highlight the question of edibility, while a comparison of chalk with pens will
focus on legibility."' By taking partisan advocacy as his starting point, Fuller
266 Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958), quoted in Luban, supra note 33 at 821.
267 As David Luban has explained in his more elaborated exposition on Fuller's theories, "we
can agree with [Fuller] that an adjudication should include all points of view without conceding that
each point of view should be spin-doctored by an advocate to advance a party's interest." See id. at
826; see also Bone, supra note 102, at 1307 n.126 (1995) (describing Fuller's conception of how the
"process of partisan advocacy is likely to push lawyers in the direction of viewing their role, not in
terms of persuasion or manipulation of doctrine, but instead in terms of 'conveying to the court that
full understanding of the case which will enable it to reach a wise and informed decision"') (citing
Lon L. Fuller, Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer, in KENNETH I. WINSTON, INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 282, 289-90 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981)). On the other hand,
Fuller's hypothesis finds some support in social scientific research that indicates that an "opponent of
an adversarial lawyer transmits more facts that are unfavorable to her own client," apparently induced
to candor by the presence of an adversary. Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary
System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57, 79 (1998) (citing E. Allan Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of
Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1136 (1973)).
268 See Luban, supra note 33, at 821 ("What Fuller claims is psychologically impossible turns
out to be daily practice in civil law systems.").
269 See id at 822.
270 For an extended discussion of the methodological problems raised in comparative law, see
Rogers, supra note 264, at 162.
271 Andrew Huxley, Golden Yoke, Silken Text, 106 YALE L.J. 1885, 1924-25 (1997). The
problems illustrated by Huxley's example are exacerbated in comparing principles, rules, procedures,
and doctrines instead of tangible and relatively simple objects, such as chalk and cheese. Legal rules,
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fails to adequately define the role of the civil law judge prior to delineating her
ethical role. Paradoxically, this omission is contrary to Fuller's own
prescription for how ethical norms should be developed.272
When the definition of the civil law judge's role in relation to the other
actors in her legal system is properly illuminated-as opposed to being left in
the shadow of partisan advocates-the distinctive features of the civilian
judge's impartiality obligations are revealed. That is not to say that the role of
advocates is irrelevant to the question of the adjudicator's role, because roles
are inherently inter-relational. For this reason, I take Fuller's misstep (his
assumption about the indispensability of strong partisan advocates) as my point
of departure from which to demarcate the inter-relational role of advocates and
judges in an inquisitorial system.273
As I have argued elsewhere, instead of acting as a partisan advocate or
"champion" of his clients, the civil law attorney is cast in a semi-collaborative
role as "guide" to the court:
Sometimes, this semi-official status is made
explicit, such as in Germany where attorneys
are considered part of a concept called
6ffentliche Rechtspflege (administration of
law) and in Greece the "Lawyers' Code"
characterizes lawyers as "unsalaried Public
Servants." Advocates' collaborative role is
also recognized and reinforced through a
range of traditions, such as a host of "rights
and privileges" enjoyed by Greek attorneys,
including special access to public service or
administrative offices at times closed to the
lay public .... Even the requirement that
[some] civilian lawyers appear in court
wearing a robe can be understood as a
symbolic reflection of their quasi-official
role. 7'
Consistent with this semi-official role, civilian attorneys are assigned an
obligation to be "independent" from their clients.7 ' In this role, civilian
principles, and procedures exist in the larger context of a legal system's framework. See Rogers,
supra note 264, at 161-62 & n.62.
272 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (citing Luban, supra note 33, at 807 and Lon L.
Fuller, The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, 1995 ELEC. ENG. 916, 917 (1955)).
273 The contrasting role of the judge in civil and common law systems has been called the "grand
discriminant" between the two systems, John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 862 (1985), and is consequently the primary determinant for other
actors' roles. Rogers, supra note 30, at 387.
274 Rogers, supra note 30, at 389 (footnotes omitted).
275 The texts of both the U.S. and European code of professional responsibility (the CCBE)
appear to be similarly committed to the principle of attorney "independence," but the linguistic
similarity masks deeply divergent views about what this duty requires. See id. at 365-67. American
attorneys also have an obligation of "independence," but the term denotes independence from the
state, whereas on the continent "independence" refers primarily to attorneys' relationships with their
clients and other attorneys. Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Legal
Ethics Part 1: An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1,46-48 (1993).
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attorneys do not present their clients' positions in their strongest, most
uncompromising form,276 as Fuller's partisan advocates would.277 Instead, they
mediate their strongest position, presenting a pre-screened and more restrained
view of their clients' cases to the inquisitorial judge."8
This role of the civil law attorney is prefigured by the role of the civil
law judge. At least according to the "official portrait," the civil law judge
"mechanically applies legislative provisions to given fact situations. 279
According to the "official portrait," statutory law, and in particular the Civil
Code, are not interpreted, but are rather simply applied by judges to determine
the outcome of cases.2  Mitchel Lasser and others have effectively
demonstrated that indiscriminant adherence to this "official portrait" can mask
the sometimes expressly policy-oriented decisionmaking by continental
judges."' Nevertheless, the "official portrait" suggests the intellectual heritage
of the role of the civil law judge282 that inevitably continues to affect at least at
some level perceptions of legitimacy for a civil law judge.
The role of the civil law judge derives from the process of judicial
education and selection in civil law countries. 3 As one scholar explains about
the education and selection of civil law judges,
Civil law judges are part of the civil service.
Judges enter a career of judging and advance
through the judicial hierarchy. They are
educated and trained to be judges. In
276 See Rogers, supra note 30, at 361-62 (explaining that creativity in legal argument is not
tolerated in civil law systems and can be regarded as professionally irresponsible).
277 See Luban, supra note 33, at 822 (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON
AMERICAN LAW 30 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961)).
278 For a contrary view about the advantages of partisan advocacy over civilian-style lawyering,
see Freedman, supra note 267 at 78-79 (citing E. Allan Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of
Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1129 (1973), for the
proposition that "an adversarial lawyer transmits more facts that are unfavorable to her own
client... [a]pparently [induced] to candor by the presence of an adversary").
279 Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse In The French
Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1334 (1995).
280 See id.
281 See Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser "Lit. Theory" Put To The Test: A Comparative Literary
Analysis of American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, 111 HARV. L. REV. 689, 695-99
(1998); see also Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J.
333 (1999) (arguing that American scholars of civilian systems often confuse the "folklore" of those
systems with "reality"); Claire M. Germain, Approaches to Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
History in France, 13 DUKE J. COM. & INT'L L. 195 (2003) (describing the range of interpretive
methods used today by French judges).
282 Lasser affirms the vitality of the official portrait of the civil law judge by pointing to explicit
provisions of the French Civil Code that prohibit judges from "making" law, see Lasser, supra note
279, at 1335. Lasser just denies that it is the only vision of the judicial function that operates in the
French system.
283 See generally John Bell, Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France. 61 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1757. 1757 (1998) (usin2, the French svstem to examine "different types of nroblems
encountered durine iudicial selection in which the political or policy orientation of the individual
judge may not always be a dominant feature"); David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of
Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1795, 1818 (1998)
(noting that France's selection of judges is based upon "the needs of a particular type of judicial
function" and that Germany's law schools focus on preparing students to become judges and that
selection "contemplates.. . emphasizing democratic legitimation and neutral administration of
justice" ).
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particular, their education and training equips
them to work with language and to engage in
the rational and scientific finding of the law.
They then gain experience as judges. The
judicial hierarchy allows judicial authorities
considerable control over lower level
judges .... Their training and experience
creates an elite, if anonymous, corps of
adjudicators."'
As a result of this education and appointment process, judicial selection is
regarded less as a political act than as a technical selection of the most
qualified personnel to perform the judicial function. This assumption is
reinforced in the process for promoting civil law judges. The early stages of
judicial decisionmaking are guided by senior judges and career advancement is
determined by senior judges' evaluations. 8
At a more realistic level, outside the stiff confines of the "official
portrait," when called on to fill gaps, civil law judges employ a range of
methodologies, including a resort to policy. Even when civil law judges act
more creatively outside their "official portrait" and venture into law-making
activities, their function still varies significantly from that of their common law
counterparts. As a matter of methodology, civil law judges may pronounce
new rules based on policy, but their primary task is to find the legal solution
that is consistent with the Code and contributes to the "manifestation of the
'organic whole.' 286  In this endeavour, their primary source is scholarly
doctrine,' which they use in search of an interpretation that coheres with the
larger framework of the Code.' Methodologically, civil law judges may look
to prior judicial decisions for guidance, but even if done regularly, this reliance
on prior judicial decisions does not confer on judicial decisionmaking the
express force of law that it has in common law systems through the doctrine of
stare decisis.
289
284 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1. 37 (2003).
For a classical articulation of judicial selection in civil law countries, see ARTHUR TAYLOR VON
MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY. THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAW 1148 (2d ed. 1977).
285 As one scholar explains, civil law judges advance in their careers from an apprenticeship
supervised by senior judges, up through increasingly important courts based on their performance,
which is evaluated and controlled by other judges in the form of a council. See Charles H. Koch, Jr.,
The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139, 143 (2004).
286 Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law. Legal Uniformity
and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 100 (2001).
287 See Lasser, supra note 279, at 1351.
288 Curran, supra note 286, at 76-77.
289 In what has been aptly heralded as a "unique collection of outstanding insights into judicial
structures and legitimacy, legal theory and reasoning, and comparative law," editors Neil MacCormick
and Robert Summers have brought together a series of commentators who describe the reliance on
precedent in European judicial decisionmaking notwithstanding the absence of formal obligation or
authorization to do so. See also Thomas Lundmark, Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study,
46 Am J. COMP. L. 211, 224 (1998) (book review); see generally INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, eds., 1997).
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At a procedural level, as is all the fashion to point out in the current
academic literature, civil law judges are much more active managers than their
American counterparts, even under the modem U.S. trend toward Managerial
Judging.290 In countries such as Germany and France, the judge is the one who
schedules, sets the agenda for and presides over a series of hearings,"' decides
what proof will be presented and in what order,292 and questions witnesses. 3
The judge is expected to conduct pre-hearing review of the files and to come to
the case with knowledge of the issues and ideas about how the case should
proceed.2' Furthermore, "[a]s the case progresses[,] the judge discusses it with
the litigants, sometimes indicating provisional views of the likely
outcome ... and sometimes encouraging a litigant to abandon a case that is
turning out to be weak or hopeless, or to recommend settlement."'29'
These features come together to shape the form of an inquisitorial
judge's role, and it is clear from this role that the civil law judge's impartiality
obligations need not be, and cannot be, the same as those of a U.S. judge.
Because a civil law judge is charged with control over witness questioning and
is obliged to "move the case along," forceful and insistent questions of
290 See discussion supra Subpart II.B.3.
291 Any one of these hearings may dispose of the entire case. See Langbein, supra note 273, at
831. One demonstration of the extent of judicial power is that in France, it is often said there are no
formal evidentiary rules. See THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 199 (GERALD KOCK &
RICHARD FRASE, trans., 1988) (describing and translating provisions regarding the introduction of
evidence from the French Code of Criminal Procedure). While the absence of evidentiary rules may
initially seem strange to an American lawyer, it is only because they are accustomed to the
presentation of information to a lay jury. Even in the U.S., when parties agree to a bench trial, often
the formal rules of evidence are relaxed. See Dama~ka, supra note 265, at 130 & n.60.
292 As John Langbein describes, in the German system,
The very concepts of "plaintiff's case" and
"defendant's case" are unknown. In our system those
concepts function as traffic rules for the partisan
presentation of evidence to a passive and ignorant trier. By
contrast, in German procedure the court ranges over the
entire case, constantly looking for the jugular-for the issue
of law or fact that might dispose of the case.
Langbein, supra note 273, at 830. Although the German judge is obviously much more active
than the U.S. version, the "inquisitorial" role of the German judge in civil proceedings can be, and has
been, dramatically overstated. See generally Ronald J. Allen, Idealization and Caricature in
Comparative Legal Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 785 (1988) (criticizing Langbein for overstating
the role of the judge in German civil proceedings).
293 Conventional wisdom among German advocates is that a lawyer should be wary of putting
more than three questions to a witness because to put more risks implying that the judge did not do a
satisfactory job in initial questioning. See Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Character,
5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4-5 (1997). While the conventional wisdom is not always
followed, it demonstrates the gravitational force of the judge's power over fact gathering.
294 See Dama~ka, supra note 265, at 138 (noting that continental decisionmakers are expected to
conduct pre-hearing review of the files and are not presumed to come to the case with a "virgin
mind").
295 Langbein, supra note 273, at 832. To the extent that U.S. judges engage in some of these
tasks, they do so informally, and partially. See Resnik, supra note 228, at 377. The divide between
civil and common systems is not always so stark. In Canada, judges have an obligation to assist the
jury in summarizing and characterizing the evidence for them, as well as suggesting conclusions that
might be drawn from certain evidence and warning the jury of the inherent unreliability of certain
types of evidence. Judges may also express an opinion about what would be a reasonable range of
damages. John P. Wright, An American Visitor to a Canadian Court, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 281, 285
(2001).
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witnesses is not a sign of bias, as it might be in the U.S. system. 299  Given the
quasi-collaborative role between judges and lawyers in the civil law system,
absolute prohibitions against ex parte communication, which exist in the
United States,"" are not as necessary.298 Judicial statements regarding the
relative strengths of each party's case during proceedings would not be
considered an inappropriate violation of impartiality obligations, and prior
knowledge of facts involved in a case are not necessarily grounds for
disqualification.'" Decisions, however, that veer away from doctrine toward
politically motivated outcomes might more readily be regarded as more
improper than they would be in the United States.
Conversely, the more staunchly partisan role of U.S. attorneys can be
seen as linked to the nature of common law legal methodology and the judge's
decisional role in relation to that methodology. The common law judicial
decision is predicated on the "mosaic of facts and circumstances presented in
their unicity with each case."3 9 The task of a common law judge is to evaluate
counsel's competing arguments about hyper-factual analogies and subtle
distinctions in prior decisional law.3"1 The view of each case as presenting a
unique scenario, combined with an inherent skepticism about the existence of
any single right answer, amplifies the need for the common law judge to
distance herself from the competing scenarios so that she can effectively
296 See also Dama~ka, supra note 265, at 120 (noting that when a judge "grills a witness
testifying in favor of one disputant, the other may think that the official is assisting his adversary").
297 In the United States there are strict prohibitions against ex parte communications, except in
the most narrow, and extreme exceptions, such as special proceedings for extraordinary relief through
temporary restraining orders, in camera inspections, and similar unusual procedural settings.
CHARLES F. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 605-06 (1986).
298 See Terry, supra note 275 n.159 (noting that in many European countries "ex parte contact
with the court on 'non-fundamental' issues is not prohibited"). For similar reasons, as I have argued
elsewhere, European regulation of attorney conflicts of interest may be much less rigorous than
regulation in the United States because of expectations that civilian attorneys, in performing their
quasi-official role, would maintain professional independence from their own clients, thus reducing
the threat of cross-client conflicts. See Rogers, supra note 30, at 390-91.
299 Compare RICHARD MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRAL 80 (1971),
with 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (requiring disqualification of U.S. judges if they possess prior knowledge
of case facts).
300 Curran, supra note 286, at 100.
301 As one comparative law scholar explains,
Common-law lawyers ... fashion their arguments from
a close study of prior cases. Their success as lawyers
depends on persuading the judge in each case of the
accuracy of the analogies they suggest between their client's
situation and that of the precedents they cite ... and the
[distinctions] from situations that arose in the precedents
they hope to distinguish. The common-law lawyer's task
also is to persuade the judge that the lawyer's interpretation
of existing case law accurately reflects prevailing
contemporaneous legal standards, and that the accumulated
body of relevant precedents obliges the judge to rule in favor
of the lawyer's client .... Thus, common-law lawyers
engage in complex factual triages, distinguishing as
factually different and distant those cases whose outcomes
would militate against their client's interests ....
Id. at 76-77.
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evaluate them. 2 Finally, the fact that U.S. judges have an express law-making
function 3 means that parties go to court not only to resolve disputes, but to
achieve changes in the law."4 When judges have the power to make law,
lawyers take on a lobbyist role in relation to them and the necessity of equality
of access becomes paramount.3
At a procedural level, as I and many others have explicated elsewhere:
[T]he American system is built on a model of
party contest before a "judicial tabula rasa."
The American judge (or jury) is supposed to
obtain only through the party dialectic all
evidence that must be evaluated and legal
arguments that must be analyzed, and they are
expected to remain completely neutral until it
is time to render the final judgment. As a
consequence of the relatively passive role of
decision-makers, the attorneys are given an
active role in managing the proceedings. The
attorney in U.S. litigation gathers evidence,
shapes the issues for trial and presents
evidence at trial, including examining and
cross-examining witnesses. Because the judge
only rules on pre-trial motions that are
brought by the parties, attorneys act not as
guides, but primarily as clients' strategists,
evaluating and advising when and how
various procedural tactics should be used."0
This understanding of the judge's role in the trial process makes clear why a
U.S judge's impartiality may be called into question for asking too many
questions of a party's witness,3" or for expressing opinions during the
302 Historically, modem concerns about impartiality can be traced to the emergence in the
seventeenth century of doubt about the ability or at least difficulty to reach "an objectively correct
legal decision," which caused people to go "to greater lengths to prevent extraneous motives from
inhibiting the delicate feat." Leubsdorf, supra note 18, at 249 (citing BARBARA SHAPIRO,
PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 190-91 (1983)).
303 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) (arguing that judges make law even though they are not elected or
subject to the same constraints as legislatures).
304
See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)
(arguing that courts are better suited than legislatures to resolve certain policy issues because of the
structure of the courts and the nature of the common law); Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice
Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219 (1997) (suggesting that
courts provide less expensive access to government than direct lobbying of the legislature).
305 See Rogers, supra note 30, at 390.
306 See id. (footnotes omitted). Although I quote from my own previous work, the most
profound and nuanced version of these explanations, and the one that has inspired my work in this
area, is that of Mirjan Damaka. "Tabula rasa" is his poignant expression. See DAMASKA, supra note
265, at 138.
307 There are many cases in the United States in which arbitrators have been challenged on the
grounds of bias or misconduct based on aggressive questioning of witnesses. Compare In Matter of
Arbitration between Cole Publ'g Co., Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994 WL 532898, *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1994) (rejecting challenge to arbitral award that alleged arbitrator bias was
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proceedings about the relative merits of the parties' cases. Such questions or
comments would remove the judge from a position of total detachment and
inject her into the attorney's process of developing and presenting the client's
case. It also explains why U.S. prohibitions against ex parte communications
are more absolute-because the decisionmaker is expected to be a blank slate
on which the parties, in heated contest, draw their dispute, and any stray
renderings by one party might unfairly alter the tableau.3 "'
On the other hand, because U.S. judges have express law-making and
policy-creating functions, it is necessary to have their selection and
appointment determined through a political process, namely appointment by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 9 For this reason,
American notions of judicial impartiality may be more tolerant of the effects of
"Politics" with a capital "P" than "politics" with a lower case "p," 3 0 the latter
of which may be more prevalent in civil law countries as a result of the
institutional pressure from more senior judges.3 ' Unapologetically politicized
decisions may injure perceptions of the legitimacy of U.S. judges,3 ' but the
level of political neutrality embodied in conceptions of political impartiality of
judges in the United States is less than that expected of ordinary civil law
judges, whose selection and promotion processes confirm that the position of
judge is regarded more as a technical vocation than a political activity. "
evidenced by aggressive questioning of some witnesses and attempts to rehabilitate others, and that
arbitrator acted more as an advocate than an impartial moderator), with Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381
F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.
1975) (finding bias and vacating arbitral award based on arbitrator's "badgering" the complaining
party at the time of the proceedings).
308 Rogers, supra note 30, at 392.
309 "[T]he Senate can serve as an important political check on the President's power to appoint.
Moreover, the political nature of the Senate's role, like that of the President, helps ameliorate the
'countermajoritarian difficulty."' Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or
Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1202, 1203 (1988); see also Richard D. Manoloff, The Advice and
Consent of the Congress: Toward a Supreme Court Appointment Process for Our Time, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1087, 1102 (1993) (arguing that aggressive Senate review of presidential nominees may provide a
valuable political check on judicial appointments).
310 This preference is most clearly expressed in the Public Litigation Model. While Fiss argues
that judicial independence is necessary to protect fundamental rights, he simultaneously demands
certain political inclinations of judicial decisionmakers. See Fiss, The Supreme Court Forward, supra
note 181, at 43-44.
311 Professor Koch reasons that the structure of the civil law judiciary, and particularly the
vesting of both promotion and disciplinary decisionmaking in the hands of senior judges, may
encourage junior judges to conform or "bias" their decisionmaking to conform to the perceived
oreferences of senior judges. See Koch. supra note 284. at 143-44, 147 & nn.16 & 28 (citing study by
Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff. On Not Makinz Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 161
(1998), and various works critiquing the judicial bias implications).
312 As dissenting Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Stevens commented in their dissent to the
majority opinion in Bush v. Gore, "[a]lthough we may never know with complete certainty the identity
of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the
Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
313 Notably, concern over political accountability does affect judicial selection in civil law
countries for those judges whose functional role includes invalidating unconstitutional legislative
decisionmaking. For example, Article 94(1) of the German Basic Law requires that half of the judges
of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the Bundestag and half by the Bundesrat, and
pursuant to Article 56 of the French Constitution, one-third of the French Cour di Cassassion are
appointed by the President of the Republic, one-third by the President of the National Assembly, and
one-third by the President of the Senate. These and other judicial selection processes are described in
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C. Conclusion
While adjudicatory systems have many moving parts, this discussion
of various systems demonstrates that the adjudicator's role is determined
primarily by the nature of her decisionmaking function, the procedures through
which she assembles information on which to make such decisions, and the
manner in which she was selected. As these features shift within various
systems, the role of the adjudicator shifts, and consequently her attendant
ethical obligations shift. Unlike courts in national systems, designed pursuant
to and in furtherance of specific constitutional objectives and subject to
relatively fixed procedural rules, arbitration is a flexible medium that draws
inspiration and personnel from both common law and civil law systems. This
distinction means that while national judicial roles may shift from system to
system or within one system over time, the arbitrator's role can shift from case
to case, based on party procedural preferences or the identity of the arbitrators
selected. This potential for ad hoc variation presents a new challenge for
application of the functional approach.
III. APPLYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO ARBITRATOR ETHICS
Having surveyed a range of adjudicatory models in Parts I and II, it is
now possible to apply the functional approach to the international arbitration
system. The problem in the arbitration context, which I discuss in Subpart A,
is that parties are able to contractually alter the role of the arbitrator. This
predicate, I argue in Subpart B, suggests that ethical rules for arbitrators must
be default rules that are tied as closely as possible to the primary source of
contractual manipulation of the arbitrator's role: the arbitral rules and hybrid
procedures adopted by the parties. After establishing the general outlines of
the international arbitrator's role, I address, in Subparts C and D, the two
aspects of arbitrator impartiality obligations that have been the focus of
concern by commentators and courts: the impartiality obligations of the party-
appointed arbitrator and the duty to disclose potential conflicts during the
selection process.
A. Deriving the Content of Ethical Codes
The difficulty in applying the functional approach to international
arbitration is that the arbitrator is a chameleon. One of the strengths of the
international arbitration system is the flexibility that allows the arbitrator's role
to be subject to change through individually crafted arbitration agreements.
While an entire article could be written regarding the precise factors that
determine the specific contours of an adjudicator's role, for our purposes it is
fair to concentrate on the most obvious and apparently most significant: the
process by which they are appointed, the processes by which they obtain
information from the parties, and their decisional methodology."' I address
these three variables in turn below.
The first of these variables, the appointment process, is determined by
the institution the parties choose to administer the arbitration. Cross-
institutional comparison reveals that the structure and appointment processes
for tripartite arbitral tribunals are fairly uniform across institutions. As noted
Gustavo Fernandes de Andrade, Comparative Constitutional Law: Judicial Review, 3 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 977, 986-87 (2001).
314 See discussion supra Subpart II.B.
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earlier, in this conventional structure, each party appoints its own party-
appointed arbitrator, and they together select the chairperson.3"' The most
significant distinction between this process and processes for judicial
appointment (regardless of the system) is that arbitrators are specifically
chosen for particular cases, whereas judges are appointed under national
procedures, but assigned cases randomly."' Arbitrators are specialized
decisionmakers, with attributes and experiences that are presumably well-
suited to the particular case in which they are appointed.
With regard to the second critical variable, decisionmaking
procedures, there is considerably more room for flexibility since institutional
arbitral rules provide only skeletal procedures for commencing arbitration and
selecting arbitrators. Those aspects of the arbitrator's role that are determined
by the procedures by which information is gathered, synthesized and presented
may still be subject to considerable variation, even within a single institution,
because parties can agree to (or arbitrators can decide on) a range of possible
allocations of power."7 Notwithstanding the shifting sands, some concrete
foundations can be found. One of the most significant points to find
equilibrium is in what might be called "hybridized" procedural rules for
gathering evidence:
[H]ybridized procedures ... are routinely adopted by
parties[,] ... under which oral hearings are routinely
held. In these hearings, most often direct
examination is submitted by the parties in the form of
witness statements or declarations, which gives
parties substantial control over what testimonial
evidence will be presented in support of their case.
Cross-examination of witnesses [in a more subdued
form] ... is generally accepted... [and] arbitrators
routinely interject with questions of witnesses, but
more for the purpose of clarifying and filling in gaps
in testimony, than developing the initial content of
testimony. Limited discovery is usually allowed,
including depositions, and evidentiary objections are
making an appearance in many arbitrations. ' .
These hybridized procedures represent a mutual accommodation of civil and
common law procedural traditions."9  While not always adopted, these
315 See Rau, supra note 65, at 497-98. Alternatively, under some institutional rules, the
chairperson is appointed by the institution. See, e.g., ICC Rules, art. 8(4). Sole arbitrators are almost
universally appointed by the institution or an appointing authority since parties rarely agree on this
issue. See, e.g., id. art. 8(3).
316 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
317 See Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation:
Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 26 (2003).
318 See Roeers. supra note 30. at 413-14 (footnotes omitted): see also Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure. 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313. 1330-31 (2003): Lara
M. Pair. Cross-Cultural Arbitration: Do the Differences Between Cultures Still Influence International
Commercial Arbitration Despite Harmonization?, 9 ILSA J. INT'L CoMP. L. 57, 65-66 (2002).
319 Although developed in a different context, the ALI's project in drafting transnational
procedural rules has a similar purpose. See generally, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Introduction to
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procedures provide some fixed assumptions about the allocation of functions
between the parties and the arbitrators, and consequently provide a meaningful
baseline for delineating the arbitrator's role and resulting ethical standards.
The third variable-the arbitrators' decisionmaking processes or
methodologies-is the most subtle and supple. At first blush, this variable
seems to be impossible to isolate since arbitrators and governing substantive
law can be selected from either the common law or civil law tradition.3 20 The
potential for variation at this level, however, is dwarfed by the more important
methodological shift, described above, away from vast, flexible equitable
powers, to a structure more subject to and constrained by established rules of
law and procedure.32'
The methodological distinctions between civil and common law, and
the effect of each system on the nature of judicial decisionmaking, do not
translate clearly into the arbitral context. For example, in international
arbitrations, arbitrators trained in the common law tradition are often required
to apply civil law rules, and arbitrators trained in the civil law tradition are
often required to apply common law rules.322 In these situations, an arbitrator's
methodology will be at best a hybrid, or more likely a covert mix, of
methodologies.3  As a result, arbitrators often either intentionally or
unintentionally add a "gloss" to their legal decisionmaking, either implicitly
viewing the legal issue through the lens of their home system or even expressly
incorporating into their decision international standards to supplement the
parties' choice of law."" In this way, international arbitral decisionmaking may
be gravitating toward substantive methodological hybridization in the same
way it has on the procedural level.323 Top international arbitrators are chosen
the Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure. 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 769. 771
(2001) (noting the proiect's use of "principles" as a general foundation that various systems can use,
including international arbitration).
320 For a discussion of the complexities in and the various methods employed to select
appropriate law, see generally Carlo Croft, The Applicable Law in an International Commercial
Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L LAW. 613 (1982); Vitek Danilowicz, The
Choice of Applicable Law in International Arbitration, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 235
(1986).
321 See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
322 Christian Borris, The Reconciliation of Conflicts Between Common Law and Civil Law
Principles in the Arbitration Process in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 1, 13-14, (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider
eds., 1999).
323 Overt and covert mixing of common law and civil law methodologies can be easily observed
when national courts are required to apply the law from a foreign legal tradition. See, e.g., V. Susanne
Cook, The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Mandate to Abandon
Legal Ethnocentricity, 16 J.L. & COM. 257 (1997) (pointing out a court's failure to use "general
principles," as a civilian court would, in its interpretation of the Convention, and its neglect to rely on
foreign case law when no U.S. jurisprudence was available).
324 Fabrizio Marrella, Choice of Law in Third-Millennium Arbitrations: The Relevance of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1137,
1167-71 (2003) (documenting "unforeseen" applications of the UNIDROIT principles).
325 Some even argue, citing statistical support, that the UNDROIT principles represent a new era
for choice of law in international arbitration. See Aline Grenon & Louis Perret, Globalization and
Canadian Legal Education, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 543, 546 (2002); see also Marella, supra note 324, at
1167 (exploring the use of UNIDROIT to supplement parties' choice of national law). Despite the
enthusiasm of internationalists, it remains doubtful whether commercial law can ever be fully
abstracted from national conceptions or methodologies of law, and particularly from the
methodologies of national legal systems, if for no other reason than that those who must apply it are
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for their specialized ability to work with the intermingled procedures,
substantive rules, and methodologies of multiple systems that come into play
during a single arbitration.326  While this creative mixing of law and
methodology may make arbitral decisionmaking less constrained than it would
be in the domestic context, it nevertheless operates as a much greater constraint
than the antecedent vagaries of the largely equity-based decisionmaking of
.former times."7
Notwithstanding a blurring around the edges, some distinctions in
methodology inevitably remain depending on whether the arbitrator is applying
common law or civil law. The consequences of these distinctions, however,
would seem to be less significant outside the judicial context. In national
courts, the applicable methodology determines judges' relationship to the
legislative and law-making functions.328 In the arbitration context, where
adjudicators do not have an expressly political role,329 the methodological
distinctions become more a matter of what analytic processes and research
techniques they will employ than what their relationship will be to other
political bodies. As a consequence, while the distinction between common law
and civil law methodologies will inevitably affect arbitrators' decisionmaking,
it is unlikely to affect their functional role in aspects that are most relevant to
their ethical obligations.
This sketch of the universal core features of international arbitrators
provides a basis for a definition of the arbitrator's functional role, from which
it is possible to outline broadly the structure of arbitrator ethics.3 Because
arbitrators are individually appointed, specialized knowledge of both factual
and technical matters, as well as industry-specific legal issues, is not only more
tolerable than it would be for judges in national contexts, it is to be expected.'
creatures of national systems. For the classic analysis of this vroblem. see R.J.C. Munday. The
Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions. 27 INT'L & COMP. L.O. 450. 450 (1978)
(arguing that "even when outward uniformity is achieved following the adovtion of a single
authoritative text, uniform application of the agreed rules is by no means guaranteed").
326 See JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AND COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
559 (1992) (noting that an important qualification of arbitrators is often that they possess legal
expertise in several systems of national law).
327 See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text (describing the shift from equitably-based to
law-based arbitral decisionmaking).
328 For a comparison of civil law and common law judicial methodologies, and their relationship
to the constitutional structures in which they exist, see supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
329 Arbitrators undoubtedly have a law-making role, but it is not in direct competition with
national legislatures. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 773, 807 (2002). Apart from the fact that arbitrators are structurally apart from
domestic governmental structures, competition is also limited because national legislatures have
largely ceded to arbitration control over most aspects of private international commerce because they
might otherwise be ceding it to other national legislators. See Hannah Buxbaum, The Private Attorney
General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE. L.J. 219, 242
(2001).
330 I do not seek to provide a specific definition of arbitrator impartiality. My theory is, in part,
that no single definition exists. Instead, my primary aim is to identify how and why certain hallmarks
of impartiality shift from the judicial context to the arbitrator context.
331 One exception might be specialized courts that are organized specifically to develop and
build an expertise regarding a specific type of dispute or particular industry, such as the Commercial
Court of Lille, France. See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys. Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir.
1993) (arguing that "[a]lthough called a 'court,' it is actually a panel of arbitrators, composed of
businessmen who devote part time to arbitrating").
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Given the hybridized information-gathering procedures, active questioning of
witnesses and expressions of opinion regarding the relative merits of parties'
cases are more acceptable in an arbitration than they would be in a U.S.
courtroom, but given the rise of party autonomy in arbitral procedure, this
should be practiced with less consistency than in traditional civil law
courtrooms.
On the other hand, the lack of appeal and absence of governmentally
conferred legitimacy may suggest that arbitrators should have heightened
obligations to support and enhance the legitimacy of the system. This
augmented obligation to the system may translate into more specific duties,
particularly with regard to disclosure, as I analyze in more detail below.
32
These are very general outlines of the international arbitrator's role, which will
have to be filled out through specific rules. It is at this juncture that the
difficulty with arbitral flexibility comes in."'
B. Appending Ethical Codes to Arbitral Rules
My purpose in this Article is not to delineate specific standards of
conduct or elaborate the details of how they should be implemented and
enforced, but instead to provide a methodology for how the rules should be
drafted. Because the functional approach dictates that the ethical rules must be
tied to functional roles, however, it raises some practical concerns about
implementation and enforcement that I address briefly in this section.
In arbitration agreements parties can contractually alter the above
sketch of the generic arbitrator's role, most fundamentally by selecting arbitral
institutions with particular features.3" To accommodate this complexity,
332 See discussion infra Subpart III.D.
333 In recognizing this reality, one of the most respected commentaries on ICC Arbitration
explains that the ICC has conferred upon the Court of Arbitration broad discretion to apply its flexible,
indeterminate standard in various contexts:
The notion of "independent" party-nominated
arbitrators has sparked extensive discussion. It would
however be impossible to establish specific ICC criteria for
determining "independence" without giving rise to criticism
from some ICC arbitration consumers, since they represent
such a variety of legal and economic systems. Instead of
articulating criteria ... the ICC approach is to give the
[ICC] Court [of Arbitration] wide administrative discretion
to refuse, confirm, or remove an arbitrator without stating
its reasons.
CRAIG ET AL., supra note 46, § 12.04, at 195. One of the troubles with the approach adopted by
.the ICC is that in hotly contested and controversial cases, such as the AT&T case cited in the
introduction, the ICC may be at least tempted to trade in some of its institutional legitimacy to avoid
controversy. See generally Shore, supra note 6 (describing how arbitral institutions reserve to
themselves decisions about challenges and have a great deal of discretion in applying those standards
through decisions that are not public or transparent).
34 For example, some institutions require selection of arbitrators from a predetermined list of
candidates. CIETAC Rules, art. 24 (1994), at
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw50.htm#Chapter%/ 201 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005); NAFTA, art.
2009 (1992), at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/indexe.aspx?DetaillD=175#A2009 (last
visited Jan. 31, 2005). This restriction on party choice might necessitate that those arbitrators on the
designated list might have an increased obligation to avoid business or other contacts with potential
parties. Alternatively, in arbitral institutions that cater to small, discreet industries, such as the
Liverpool Cotton Association, arbitrators may be presumed to have significant contacts with the
parties and even prior knowledge of the facts of the case. Cf LCA Bylaws, supra note 127, num.
303.3 (requiring that arbitrator candidates be members of the association).
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ethical codes for arbitrators should be drafted in conjunction with, and should
be tied closely to, the primary source of contractual manipulation of the
arbitrator's role-the arbitral rules adopted by parties. In other words, instead
of one universal ethical code of conduct for arbitrators, I am proposing that
there be multiple codes that can be calibrated and appended to the specific
rules, traditions and features of particular arbitral institutions. " Moreover,
these rules should be set not as static prohibitions, but as default rules that can
be amended as necessary by the parties.
This approach holds several advantages. First, and most importantly,
co-joining these ethical rules with arbitral rules will ensure that they become
contractually binding on arbitrators.336 Currently, relatively few institutions
have rules of ethics, and parties rarely incorporate the freestanding IBA ethical
code into their contracts. As a result, parties often come to an arbitration with
divergent expectations and arbitrators have little guidance about what
constitutes appropriate conduct.'
Appending ethical codes to the arbitral rules will also necessarily
conscribe for arbitral institutions a more active and transparent policing role,
instead of leaving the matter to their shadowy discretion. It is not surprising
that the only two institutions that have published a policy of refusing to appoint
in future arbitrations those arbitrators found to have violated ethical
obligations, the AAA and the Milan Chamber, are among the few institutions
whose rules append a code of ethics for arbitrators. ' The benefits of increased
oversight and transparency would inure not only to parties, but also to
arbitrators. Even arbitrators who are honest and scrupulously attentive to their
reputations for fairness and impartiality can be the victims of a frustrated
award debtor who seeks to use accusations of misconduct to frustrate
enforcement. An obscure absolution from an institution, and an inevitable
decision to enforce by a deferential court, might not be sufficient to avoid
335 I have made similar arguments regarding proposed codes of ethics for attorneys in
international arbitration. See Rogers, supra note 317, at 27.
336 A limited few arbitral institutions have already taken this step, most notably the detailed code
provided by the AAA. See supra notes 10 & 112 and accompanying text.
337 There are several possible explanations for why parties do not incorporate the IBA CONFLICT
GUIDELINES. The most plausible explanation is that, while there is evidence that some degree of
attention is given to the process for selecting arbitrators, parties rarely address more general
procedural issues, such as the methods for obtaining and presenting evidence. Legend has it that
arbitration agreements are often tossed in the night before a deal closes. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that at that time corporate counsel, with little or no dispute resolution experience, draft arbitration
clauses. See Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and
Hazards for Corporate Counsel, 48 BUS. LAW. 395, 413 (1993) (noting that arbitration clauses even
by companies as large as Union Carbide are often "included in agreements almost as afterthoughts").
From this perspective, the omission of procedural rules or reference to the IBA CONFLICT RULES is
not reflective of party choice, but rather clumsiness in drafting clauses. This theory is consistent with
the fact that although parties often modify model clauses (most significantly to denote arbitrator
selection processes), those modifications often result in confusion and administrative difficulties since
they are not drafted as amendments to specific rules.
338 See American Arbitration Association, Failure to Disclose May Lead to Removal From the
National Roster of Neutrals,
http://www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?JSPssid=15773&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Resources\Roster\Arbitr
ators\Falilure%20to%20Disclose.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004); Article 13 of the Code of Ethics for
the Camera Arbitrale Nazionale e Internazionale Milano, available at http://www.camera-
arbitrale.it/show.jsppage=169945 (last visited Oct. 7, 2004). Other arbitral institutions may limit
future appointments as an informal and covert sanction, but informal regulation based on vague and
unarticulated standards may do more harm than good for the legitimacy of international arbitration.
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tarnish to the arbitrator's reputation. On the other hand, having misconduct
formally identified and regulated publicly through written opinions based on
clearly articulated and published rules would provide notice and protection for
arbitrators.339
Increased transparency would also contribute to perceptions of
legitimacy by increasing the shared understanding among arbitrators and
parties about when conduct transgresses into the inappropriate. The nuance of
a term like "impartiality" cannot be captured in a single rule, but instead must
be developed incrementally through decisions that apply and comment on its
meaning in various factual contexts. Meanwhile, these applications to specific
arbitrators will also improve the market-based forces that inevitably
supplement formal regulation of arbitrator misconduct by-providing a resource
for parties seeking to evaluate an arbitrator's record." ° Appending ethical rules
to arbitral rules will also avoid problematic mismatches."' To the extent that
parties want to amend the baseline of an arbitrator's role (for example, by
shifting presentation of evidence to more complete party control), they are
more likely to address corollary ethical obligations if they are part of the same
body of rules. Ad hoc party drafting of ethical rules may seem like a tall order,
particularly in light of the fact that parties rarely include any procedural
provisions in their arbitration agreements. 2 For this reason, the call for greater
clarity, predictability and transparency in arbitrator ethics may ultimately mean
that the flexibility afforded to parties in shaping arbitrators' roles should
translate into relatively stable menu formats, in which parties can choose, even
at one particular institution, from multiple sets of governing rules, each of
which comes with its own custom-tailored ethical rules.4 3
339 Arbitral institutions can protect confidentiality concerns by expunging names from the
opinions. For similar, more expanded examination of the benefits of reasoned decisions in the context
of attorney conduct in international arbitration, see Rogers, supra note 317, at 36-37.
340 As noted above, there is reason to doubt that the conditions are present for a fully functioning
market for arbitrator services. The most important limitation is that the confidentiality in arbitration
and the lack of agreed-upon standards make it difficult to identify an arbitrator who may have
committed misconduct. Moreover, even if the award enforcement phase can result in public opinions
and proceedings, the extreme deference courts give to arbitrator decisions can serve to sanitize
misconduct instead of exposing it. In the absence of clear market signals, the only ones likely to know
about "bad apple" arbitrators are the arbitration insiders. Under this scenario, repeat players, who
already enjoy certain strategic advantages over newcomers, will also be able to avoid suspect
arbitrators, while newcomers may be less able to identify and avoid them.
341 For example, if arbitral ethical rules permit pre-appointment interviews, but the parties
choose to have the entire tribunal appointed by the institution, interviews would be inappropriate.
342 Howard M. Holtzmann, Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility in International
Arbitration Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY: TOwARDs
"JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 11 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower, eds. 1993)
(citing study by Stephen Bond, former ICC President, of over 450 arbitration clauses submitted to the
ICC, in which only one referred to specific procedures).
343 While the proposal for multiple sets of rules to be administered by the same institution may
seem foreboding, there exist some precedents that were created to respond to market forces. The
CPR's optional screening process, see discussion supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text, may
represent a movement in this direction. In an analogous move, several arbitral institutions already
offer separate "fast track" procedures that are available to parties who require particularly expeditious
resolution of their disputes. See generally, Hans Smit, Fast Track Arbitration, 2 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
138 (1991) (providing a general overview of fast-track arbitration); Arthur W. Rovine, Fast-Track
Arbitration: A Step Away From Judicialization of International Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN THE 2 1 s CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 45 (Richard
B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower, eds. 1993). This approach would be an effective response to the
complaint that providing specific content for terms such as "independence" and "impartiality" is
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C. Party-Appointed Arbitrators
One context to which the functional approach can bring clarity is the
meaning of "impartiality" as applied to party-appointed arbitrators. This topic
has been a lightning rod for debate over arbitrator ethics, particularly as the
entree of U.S. parties and attorneys has introduced what many regard as
intolerable excesses.' The focus on those perceived excesses, however, has
obscured the even more important, but subtler problem of how party-appointed
arbitrators are distinguishable from chairpersons. Debate over party-appointed
arbitrators has presumed the existence of a stark dichotomy in models for
party-appointed arbitrators between either strong-form partiality, meaning the
traditional (if waning) American practice described above, " or no partiality.
But this dichotomy is false.
Apart from the strong-form party-appointed arbitrator, who
communicates with the appointing party throughout the proceedings, there are
a range of possible intermediary models, including several semi-strong
variations. Under these latter models, the arbitrator may not continuously
communicate with her appointing party, but her role still contrasts with the
agnosticism presumed of the chairperson. As Thomas Carbonneau describes,
the practice in international arbitrations has been generally to have
"arbitrations within arbitrations," in which the chairperson "resolved the
disagreement between the two party-appointed
arbitrators ... [because] ... each party wanted 'their man or person' on the
tribunal.",3 6  Critiques of strong-form and semi-strong form party-appointed
arbitrators are usually framed in ethical terms,3' 7 but the functional approach
reveals that what is really in dispute are questions of role.
Strong-form and semi-strong form party-appointed arbitrators are
pragmatic responses to party demand for more responsive and express
representation on the tribunal. Many participants in arbitration desire to have
clearly defined representatives on the tribunal who act as a party's agent on the
"impossible" to do without alienating certain segments of institutions' clientele. See CRAIG ET AL.,
supra note 46, § 12.04, at 195.
344 Robert Smit, The Newly Revised CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of
International Disputes, 18(1) J. INT'L ARB. 59, 67 (2001), quoted in James H. Carter, Improving Life
with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clearer Conduct Guidelines for "Nonneutrals," 11 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 295, 299 (2000).
345See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
346 Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise Of Contract Freedom In The Making Of Arbitration
Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1189, 1211-12 (2003) [hereinafter Exercise Of Contract
Freedom]. In the words of one practitioner, a frequent, though he contends mistaken, strategy in
international arbitration is to appoint arbitrators who "blatantly favor one side," which ends up
polarizing the tribunal and "leaving the chair to decide." Lawrence W. Newman, A Practical
Assessment of Arbitral Dispute Resolution, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION
OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 5-6 (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed., rev. ed. 1998). Others contend that
the mistake is not in choosing an arbitrator who will favor one side, but in choosing one who appears
to favor one side. Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 ARB. 219, 223 (1987)
(explaining that from his perspective, as an international arbitration practitioner, the optimal party-
nominated arbitrator "is someone with the maximum predisposition towards my client, but with the
minimum appearance of bias").
347 Carbonneau, Exercise of Contract Freedom, supra note 346, at 1211-12 (noting that the usual
response to claims of arbitrator partiality is a general reassurance that "international arbitrators are
people of high integrity and accomplishment and rule in an independent manner").
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tribunal rather than as an umpire over the dispute?' As a result, under the
strong form model, the role of the party-appointed arbitrator is not one of
separate adjudicator, but rather of "tribunal advocate" or "tribunal
representative" for the party.
In the context of this role, ex parte communication may be regarded as
necessary to ensure that the party-appointed arbitrator fulfills her assigned role.
Even if declining in popularity, there might be theories that support the use of
strong form party arbitrators, which are evidently appealing to some parties.
Just as the civil jury, so treasured in the American legal tradition, brings the
promise of common sense and shared values being injected into the
decisionmaking process, so too party-appointed arbitrators might be able to
bring to the tribunal a perspective that, while not shared by both parties,
nevertheless adds a representative dimension to the decisionmaking process.' 9
There may also be functional advantages to party-appointed arbitrators, such as
an ability to create opportunities for more frank debate within the tribunal." '
Moreover, to the extent that the parties and the process establish a tribunal that
has mediation-like competences, party-appointed arbitrators who communicate
with parties may be able to act as "shuttle diplomats" in ways that are unique
and impossible for a "neutral" member of the tribunal. Finally, because
arbitral decisionmaking is immune from substantive scrutiny after an award is
made, having a "representative" on the tribunal could be regarded as an
efficient safety device against biased, corrupt, or otherwise wrongheaded
decisions. In functional terms, this role is analogous to that performed by
barristers in Anglo systems, who represent clients but retain some professional
detachment.3"'
The foregoing is not meant to be a sentimental requiem for an
apparently dying breed of party-appointed arbitrators,"2 but instead to reveal
the real issue underlying the debate over the practice of ex parte
communications. Most scholars who have questioned the practice of
348 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 46, § 12.04, at 195 (noting that it is rare, but possible, for parties to
contractually agree to have party-appointed arbitrators who are not independent but rather are agents
(i.e., lawyers or employees) of the nominating party).
349 See Olga K. Byrne, A New Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: The Neutrality of
Party-Appointed Arbitrators on a Tripartite Panel, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1815, 1840 (2003) (noting
that party-appointed arbitrators have the effect of making arbitral awards more acceptable to parties in
the reinsurance industry). The author bases these conclusions on interviews she conducted with
lawyers active in reinsurance arbitration. See id. at n. 170.
350 See id. ("They have the occasion to hear the umpire speak frankly about his or her initial
views of the case and may then offer alternative outlooks in response.").
351In fact, in the case described in the introduction, the court describes the role of barristers and
relies on the professional detachment of the Indian equivalent of barristers to find that the prior
representations by him were not unduly prejudicial, even though they had not been disclosed. See
Fertilizer Corn. of India et al. v. IDI Mumt. Inc.. 517 F. SunD. 948. 954 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (describin,
how "Senior Advocates in India are hired by the client's advocate (similar to the retention of a
barrister by a solicitor under the British system), are Daid by the advocate (who is normally
reimbursed by the client), and the Senior Advocate is thus insulated from the client").
352 While these arguments may legitimate the role of strong-form party arbitrators, the more
grave problem arises when one side is treating its party arbitrator as a representative on the tribunal,
while the other is not. As I have posited elsewhere, "how can a proceeding be neutral if one party is
meeting with its appointed arbitrator to strategize, while the other is not?" See Rogers, supra note 30,
at 374. Many normative questions about the efficacy and perceived legitimacy of a system that
employs party-appointed arbitrators remain, but particularly in the absence of empirical research on
that issue, I will leave those questions aside for now.
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communication between arbitrators and their nominating parties have framed
the problem as a transgression of appropriate (even if unwritten) ethical
norms.3 Analysis under the functional approach reveals that the real problem
with ex parte communication is not that it contravenes ethical norms, but rather
that the role assigned to strong-form partisan arbitrators expressly permits, if
not necessitates, such conduct. Just as various shifts in U.S. civil procedure
have conflated critiques of role with ethical-based objections, objections to ex
parte communications with party-appointed arbitrators are not inherently about
ethics, but are instead objections to assigning a role that would permit or
require such conduct to be accepted as ethical."
This analysis instead illustrates how the role of the party-appointed
arbitrator is shaped by the functions they are expected to perform, which are
presaged in large part by the manner in which they are appointed. The
functional approach also reveals that what ultimately makes ex parte
communication objectionable is not that it violates some static ethical ideal,
but that it presupposes a role for the arbitrator that is inconsistent with the
essential functional attributes of an adjudicator."' Like the individual who flips
a coin or rolls the dice,5 party-appointed arbitrators who act as a party's agent
on the tribunal are not making reasoned decisions based on argumentation
presented by both parties. They are not, therefore, adjudicating, but are instead
performing a different function for which they were specifically selected and
retained-to cast a vote for their nominating party and attempt to persuade
other panel members to do the same. Accordingly, the proper response for
those who defend strong form party-appointed arbitrators might be to explicitly
acknowledge their non-adjudicatory function, perhaps by redesignating them
"party representatives."
Alternatively, for those who object to strong form party-appointed
arbitrators, the appropriate response is not simply to decree that all arbitrators
should be "neutral" and "independent," . or to merely prohibit ex parte
communication. ' Extracting out of this context the practice of ex parte
353 See, e.g., Deseriee A. Kennedy, Predisposed with Integrity. The Elusive Quest for Justice in
Tripartite Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 749, 764 (1995) (referring to ex parte
communication, even when agreed to, as a "practice [that] raises a number of ethical issues").
354 See discussion supra Subpart II.B.2.
355 This example illustrates, yet again, my thesis that the utilitarian nature of functional roles
makes them receptive to pragmatic pressures, but the shift in ethical obligations that they portend may
not be as readily accepted as legitimate because ethical expectations are more constant over time. See
discussion supra Subpart II.A.2.d.
356 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
357 Carrie Menkel-Meadow documents this trend, noting that
[r]ecently, some provider organizations, like the
Center for Public Resources, in the United States, and
several of the international arbitral administrative bodies,
have clearly specified that all arbitrators once chosen (even
if by a single party) should be neutral and 'impartial' while
serving on the panel and should refrain from ex parte
communications with either party or side in the arbitration.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 958.
358 For example, the WIPO Rules prohibit ex parte communications between parties and the
tribunal after all tribunal members have been appointed, except on matters of a "purely organizational
nature." World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Arbitration Rules, art. 25 (1994). The
Milan Arbitration Chamber, as part of its more comprehensive code of ethics, expressly prohibits "in
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communication ends a practice that is highly visible (at least as compared to
internal psychological commitments), but it seems to implicitly deny the
existence of semi-strong form party-arbitrators. Similarly, rules that declare
that all arbitrators shall be "neutral" or "independent," without imbuing those
words with any meaningful content, do not alter parties' expectations that the
arbitrators they choose will be more sympathetic to their positions."9
Parties' expectations are indulged and reinforced by international
arbitration selection procedures, which allow parties to identify candidates
based on their nationalities and supposed predispositions,3" and in many cases
allow a party interview to confirm these predispositions. 6' Although denied at
a rhetorical level, the distinct role of the party-appointed arbitrator is implicitly
acknowledged and reinforced by what are in essence, if not in name, ethical
rules or ethical implications contained in arbitral rules. Arbitral rules generally
permit party-appointed arbitrators to share the nationality of their appointing
party, reifying the popular practice, while prohibiting chairpersons from
sharing the nationality of either party. 62 These rules suggest that shared
nationality is not violative of the scope of impartiality applied to party-
appointed arbitrators, but generally would be for the chairperson. These
selection procedures and criteria create an interrelational role for the party-
appointed arbitrator that is necessarily different from that of the chairperson."'
In this way, institutional rules and arbitral practices necessarily presume
functional differences between party-appointed and chairperson arbitrators,
even as they expressly deny any such distinction. These differences are
created by procedural rules, but hold consequences for the ethical obligations
that can reasonably be imposed on these actors.
If, true to the rhetoric, there were a desire to have panels comprised of
three arbitrators with identical impartiality obligations, then the linguistic
commitment must be honored by the procedures that portend the functions of
party-appointed arbitrators. In this vein, the CPR's new screening procedures
the entire course of the proceeding" what it refers to as "unilateral contacts" and requires that any such
contacts be reported to the Chamber so that it can notify the parties and other arbitrators. CNIAM
Arbitral Rules, Article 9, at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm milan. chamber.of.commerce.international.arbitration.rues.2004/a9 (last
visited Jan. 31, 2005). It is not clear from the rules whether this would also preclude unilateral pre-
appointment interviews. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
359 See Martin Hunter, Ethics of the InternationalArbitrator, 53 ARB. 219, 223 (1987); CRAIG ET
AL., supra note 46, at 196 ("It is sometimes said that while a party-nominated arbitrator must be
'independent,' he or she need not be 'neutral.').
360 See Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 60, 69; CRAIG ET AL., supra note 46, at 196 (describing how
shared nationality, shared "economic, political and social milieu" and commitment to particular legal
doctrines may create expectations that an arbitrator is particularly sympathetic to the nominating
party's case).
361 See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text. As noted above, there is little or no
agreement about the nature and extent of questions that can be properly posed to an arbitrator
candidate.
362 For example, Article 9(5) of the ICC Arbitral Rules provides that "[t]he sole arbitrator or the
chairman of an arbitral tribunal shall be chosen from a country other than those of which the parties
are nationals." It also provides an exception for "suitable circumstances" when neither party objects.
363 The chairperson's more executive and, it is sometimes contended, tie-breaker role on the
tribunal is protected and reinforced through appointment procedures. Selection processes generally
preclude parties from having direct contact with chairpersons, who are instead either chosen as a
product of agreement between the party-appointed arbitrators or by an arbitral institution or appointing
authority.
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represent an inspired step toward clearer role definition because they
synchronize appointment procedures with other functions expected to be
performed by party-appointed arbitrators. Even if not under the CPR's
screened appointment procedures, rhetorical commitments to uniform
arbitrator impartiality obligations must be accompanied by regulation of the
arbitrator selection process, for example, to exclude shared nationality and to
preclude pre-appointment interviews, or at least to ensure that such interviews
are held jointly." On the other hand, as the CPR drafters concluded,
international arbitration is unlikely to abandon the practice of having party-
appointed arbitrators bring to the tribunal representation of a party's national
culture, legal or otherwise. In the absence of a willingness to unify
appointment procedures for party-appointed and chair arbitrators, their
distinctive roles and consequent ethical distinctions should be made more
explicit and delimited more carefully in arbitral rules and attendant ethical
standards.
D. The Duty to Disclose
The other area where the functional approach can help demystify
ongoing debate is with regard to the duty to disclose. Proponents of broadened
disclosure obligations emphasize the need for "impartiality" or "fairness,"
while opponents emphasize the potential to undercut finality or diminish the
pool of worthwhile arbitrators or the integrity of arbitral awards. 6 Meanwhile,
existing arbitral rules impose some disclosure obligations as part of their
arbitral procedures, but most institutions frame obligations in vague
generalities that provide little guidance. 3" The vague standards leave
arbitrator-candidates with considerable discretion, which is to be exercised
precisely at a time when they face a competing interest in securing their own
appointment. 67 Moreover, this exercise of discretion is given significant
deference when awards are later reviewed on very narrow grounds for refusing
enforcement."' The functional approach can clarify the terms of this debate,
and help resolve the apparent conflicts by linking those issues to the role of
arbitrators.
Although there remains considerable suppleness in the role of
arbitrators, with regard to disclosure obligations, one of the important features
of modem arbitrators' role is represented in the observed transition from being
ascertainers of informal equitable solutions to being appliers of legal rules
through formal processes."9 The other important, and probably related, trend
explored in the preceding section is the decline of strong-form predisposed
party-appointed arbitrators whose primary role is to advocate the interests of
their appointing parties. The notion of "tribunal representatives" has given
364 Resnick, supra note 126, at 37-38; Spalding, supra note 69, at 356.
365 For an overview of this debate, see supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text. Shore,
supra note 6, at 82 (noting that "[s]ome international arbitrators have expressed unhappiness about
what they see as an American-driven tendency to overburden arbitrations with excessive
punctiliousness about impartiality").
366 See arbitration rules cited supra note 139.
367 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
368 See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text
369 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
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way to an expectation that all arbitrators are expected to make autonomous,
law-bound decisions.7 These observed shifts in role help unravel the ongoing
debate about how broad or detailed the duty of disclosure should be.
The necessary predicate to understanding the puzzle over disclosure
standards is to clarify exactly what is and is not at stake with broader
disclosure requirements. Those who link broader disclosure requirements to
vague notions of impartiality miss the point. Broader disclosure requirements
may have some benefits for arbitrator impartiality, but those benefits are only
incidental and indirect. For example, because disclosure facilitates analysis of
arbitrator impartiality, more expanded disclosure rules will likely aid arbitral
institutions (or courts) in making more precise decisions about the parameters
of impartiality. This process, in turn, will inevitably improve collective
understanding of what the term "impartiality" means among arbitrators,
parties, and their counsel. Apart from these indirect benefits, however, broader
and more detailed disclosure obligations will not enhance or improve actual
impartiality of arbitrators, unless accompanied by a commensurate broadening
of the disqualification and enforcement standards. 7' For example, a new
requirement that arbitrators disclose past relationships with a party's counsel
will not increase impartiality in any absolute sense unless that relationship is
also a ground for disqualification or if nondisclosure of that relationship is a
ground for refusing to enforce an award. In the absence of a corresponding
expansion of disqualification and nonenforcement standards, the actual
impartiality of the arbitrator remains unaffected by the expansion in disclosure
requirements.
While broader disclosure requirements do not enhance actual
impartiality of particular arbitrators, they do enhance perceptions of
impartiality and more generally the legitimacy of the international arbitration
system. With this understanding of the purpose of disclosure requirements, it
appears expanded and clearer, more categorical disclosure standards are
necessary. With the increased size and diversity in the pool of arbitrators, and
the consequent breakdown in informal social controls, formal rules clarify the
propriety of relationships about which there might otherwise be disagreement.
Moreover, international arbitration, as resilient as it is, has had its legitimacy
challenged, at least in the developing world.3 72 These relatively minor chinks in
the international arbitration system's armor may increase pressure on arbitrator
obligations to maintain the legitimacy of the system. Expanded and more
categorical disclosure requirements will undoubtedly decrease misperceptions
and misunderstandings.
Correspondingly, standards of disclosure that afforded arbitrators
considerable discretionary latitude in disclosure decisions are no longer
acceptable because they are inconsistent with this new constrained role.
Instead, arbitrators' new role necessitates that disclosure obligations be defined
370 See discussion supra Subpart I.C.2.
371 Of course, as the IBA CONFLICT GUIDELINES acknowledge, a failure to disclose relevant
information may be evidence of partiality, and even grounds for nonenforcement. In that instance,
however, it is not the nature of the information that leads to disqualification or nonenforcement-it is
the misconduct in not disclosing required information that may give rise to questions of partiality.
372 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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by categorical rules that limit arbitrator discretion.373 The two examples of the
trend toward categorical rule-based disclosure requirements, instead of open-
textured standard based requirements, are the new IBA Conflict Guidelines and
the newly revised AAA Rules.37 ' The IBA Conflict Guidelines, and to a lesser
extent the AAA Code of Ethics, describe specific categories of information
subject to disclosure, such as prior service as an arbitrator for a party and
specifically enumerated social relationships with counsel.7 These specific
descriptions eliminate the need for arbitrators to rely on their own discretion in
deciding whether to disclose particular information. They also make it easier
to evaluate when disclosure obligations have been violated.
This conceptual analysis of disclosure obligations is also important in
order to correct confusion about whether party-appointed arbitrators should
have lower disclosure obligations than chairperson arbitrators. In the previous
section, I explained how the functional approach justifies a more flexible
impartiality standard for party-appointed arbitrators to correspond with the
different role they have with respect to their appointing party. Many courts
and commentators have inaccurately assumed that lower impartiality standards
should translate into lower disclosure standards. I will concede that
disqualification standards (or what I elsewhere refer to as "enforcement
standards") may well be lower or more flexible for party-appointed
arbitrators,3 6 but it does not follow that their conduct standards, at least with
regard to disclosure, should be any different than those of other arbitrators. To
the contrary, the importance of clearer and more expansive rules may be all the
more important for party-appointed arbitrators to make their representative role
explicit.
As the analysis of this section has revealed, disclosure obligations
protect the legitimacy of the system, but do not ensure the actual impartiality
of individual arbitrators. Once separated from impartiality standards, it
logically follows that disclosure obligations for all arbitrators should be the
same. The alternative to categorical disclosure standards are the vague,
qualitative standards that currently prevail in most arbitral rules. As analyzed
above, however, the effect of qualitative standards as opposed to categorical
rules is to vest arbitrators with discretion right at the time when their discretion
is most vulnerable to outside and even selfish interests. Meanwhile, party-
appointed arbitrators are the ones whose discretion is most subject to question
or doubt because of their presumed empathy toward their appointing party,
even if only reflected in a shared nationality. Reduced standards for party-
appointed arbitrators would vest discretion over disclosure in the hands of
precisely those whose discretion is most suspect.
373 For a description of how even objective standards leave much leeway for arbitrators'
subjective judgment, see supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
374 IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2004), athttp://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/guidelines%20text.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
375 See id. nums. 16-22 (2004).
376 In other words, party-appointed arbitrators should be allowed to serve despite the existence of
conflicts that would be impermissible for chairpersons or sole arbitrators. A discussion of
disqualification and enforcement standards is beyond the scope of this Article, and is instead the
subject of my forthcoming piece, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Consent-Based Approach to
Enforcement of Misconduct-Tainted Awards (draft on file with author).
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At a more pragmatic level, as noted in the previous section, there has
been considerable confusion and historical shifts over the role of party-
appointed arbitrators. Among the sources of controversy are those cases in
which opposing parties had conflicting and undisclosed assumptions about
what constituted appropriate conduct for party-appointed arbitrators. This
history heightens the need for the clarity and transparency with regard to party-
appointed arbitrators to aid in the development of an agreed-upon role
definition for party-appointed arbitrators.
E. Conclusion
Defining the role of the arbitrator is an essential predicate to framing
the standards for regulating arbitrators.37' There are certain fundamental
features that an arbitrator must have because all adjudicators must have them,
but other features of an arbitrator's role must be determined by examining the
arbitrator in the context of the system in which she operates. Because the
procedures and selection processes for arbitration, and hence arbitrators' roles,
can be affected by party decisions in individual cases, ultimately ethical rules
may have to include prefabricated adjustments designed to correspond to the
most popular modifications adopted by parties. Finally, the functional
approach will avoid reference to the misleading judicial analogy, which
renders arbitrators poor imitations of the real thing and unworthy knights in the
elusive quest for "true impartiality." '378
IV. Conclusion
As a system constructed in the undefined spaces between state
governments and conceived of as an alternative to the supposed bias of
national courts, international arbitration relies on the actual and perceived
impartiality of arbitrators as one of its primary sources of legitimacy.
Confusion over the nature and extent of that requirement has hung like a dark
cloud over the arbitration community. While some commendable efforts have
been made to clarify standards, the practical project must be accompanied by
theoretical models that explain why arbitrators are not simply inferior
imitations of judicial decisionmakers and how the meaning of "impartiality" as
applied to arbitrators is distinct from its definition in the judicial context. The
functional approach provides an independent justification, and methodology
for the development of, standards to govern arbitrator conduct.
Delineating clear and reasoned standards for arbitrator impartiality will
help resolve existing confusion, but also exposes another problem. Detangling
award enforcement from the substantive standards will emphasize that some
awards will be enforceable even when there has been arbitrator misconduct.
Recognizing this distinction emphasizes the need for other sources of
regulation for international arbitrators.379
While I do not attempt to resolve these issues here, my thesis in this
377 See discussion supra Subpart I.A.
378 See John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced
Accommodations of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 224 (1986).
379 Clarifying the standards for arbitrator misconduct may actually accentuate this problem. A
party victimized by misconduct, but still forced to abide by the final award, will find little
consolation-and will likely feel even more aggrieved-knowing that the arbitrator's conduct is
formally labeled as unethical.
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and my forthcoming companion article accentuates the need to reconsider
some of the control mechanisms that have been advocated for regulating
arbitrator conduct. There is ongoing debate about whether, why, and to what
extent arbitrators should enjoy immunity. ° Mechanisms for disseminating and
publicizing arbitrator misconduct must be enhanced to improve market
controls.38' Arbitral institutions must engage in more active, rigorous, and
transparent regulatory oversight of arbitrator conduct. It may well be that
those few institutions that have led the way by adopting clearer ethical codes,
and assumed an active role in enforcing those codes-the AAA, the Chamber
of National and International Arbitration of Milan, and the Center for Public
Resources3 --will end up being winners in the global race to attract
international arbitration business. Finally, as some have already suggested for
the domestic context,383 perhaps the time has come for licensing or certification
procedures to regulate arbitrator conduct. These steps are inevitable as the
pool of international arbitrators transforms from being an ad hoc collection of
highly talented independent contractors into a fully formed profession.
380 See generally Franck, supra note 54 (providing an interesting and thorough discussion of
arbitrator immunity and its relationship to the contractarian and judicial models of arbitration in
various countries); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 517 (2004) (suggesting that "arbitral immunity
should be qualified, not absolute" and should extend to provider institutions, "which by their own
proclamation perform only administrative tasks, does not align with the purpose underlying the
immunity doctrine").
381 Cf Rau, supra note 65, at 495-96.
382 See supra notes 110 & 335 and accompanying text.
383 See generally David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process,
2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 73 (1999) (proposing arbitrator licensing and oversight
mechanisms for employment discrimination claims); Theodore A. Levine & Peter R. Cella, Arbitrator
Training and Selection, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1679 (1995) (discussing oversight mechanisms for
securities arbitration); Nicole Buonocore, Resurrecting a Dead Horse: Arbitrator Certification as a
Means to Achieve Diversity, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 483 (1999) (proposing certification for labor
arbitrators as a way to promote diversity); see also Fehn, supra note 53, at 93.

